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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the conceptualization of the imagination in 
contemporary psychoanalytic theory, focusing in particular on its connection with 
knowledge. I will propose that imaginative processes form the core of psychic 
‘health’ by instantiating a state of mind in which the subject is genuinely open to 
‘learning from experience’. At the centre of the investigation is a psychic process that 
I term the ‘reality oriented’ imagination: a form of conscious mental activity that 
facilitates an epistemological connection with both the internal and external worlds 
and renders the unobservable psychological experiences of others accessible.  
The concept of the ’reality oriented’ imagination significantly disrupts Freud’s 
portrayal of the imaginative processes as a form of wish-fulfilment in which the 
individual’s attention is drawn away from external reality and placed under the sway 
of the pleasure principle. Such differing presentations of the imagination across 
psychoanalytic models can arguably be understood by considering several major 
shifts in psychoanalytic theorizing since Freud’s time. I will propose that these 
changes can be characterised as an ‘epistemic turn’: a general movement in 
psychoanalysis towards framing the internal world as strategic rather than 
compensatory, and a corresponding understanding of psychopathological processes 
as a response to failures in understanding and prediction rather than instinctual 
conflict.  
Sound psychological functioning, according to such a picture, is characterised by a 
lack of rigid internal interpretive schemas: it is, paradoxically, the individual who does 
not need to ‘know’ who is most open to experience as it presents itself. This leads to 
a characterization of healthy conscious experience that resonates more with 
Winnicott’s ‘creativity’ than Freud’s ‘secondary process’: a form of engagement with 
internal and external reality that combines veridical perception with an affective 
sense of self and agency.  
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Because I know that time is always time 
And place is always and only place 
And what is actual is actual only for one time 
And only for one place 
I rejoice that things are as they are and 
I renounce the blessed face 
T.S. Eliot “Ash Wednesday” 
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Introduction: Part One 
“Reason is to imagination as the body to the spirit, as the shadow to the substance”  
- (Shelley 1821 quoted in Cocking 1991: vii) 
Sophocles’ play Oedipus Rex can be seen to narrate the founding myth of 
psychoanalytic theory: the ill-fated Oedipus, after hearing from the Oracle that he will 
murder his father and have sexual relations with his mother sets off determined to 
avoid his fate, only to bring about the very thing he feared. From a Freudian 
perspective, this can be seen to echo his theory that the Oedipus Complex is the 
universal structuring force of the unconscious mind; a psychic fate that none of us 
can escape in spite of all our repressive efforts (Freud 1924b). Freud read Oedipus 
Rex as an instinct theorist, a position from which he placed a great deal of 
importance on infantile sexuality in understanding both adult health and 
psychopathology (Freud 1905b, 1915b, 1924). Clinical psychoanalysis, on this view, 
is the search for cure through insight into repressed sexual conflicts, with the analyst 
acting as a skilled archaeologist who is able to till the patient’s associations for 
traces of thoughts, feelings and desires that have been banished to the unconscious 
mind (Freud 1937). Paul Ricoeur (1970) has stressed that this ‘archaeological’ view 
leads to a ‘backwards’ reading of the Oedipus drama, which Henri Enckell has 
described as follows:  
The drama opens with the ongoing plague; it is clear that the epidemic is a 
punishment, and in the archaeological reading, the play is the story of the search 
for the crime. As the crime has already been committed, all eyes are turned 
backwards. In the archaeological reading, the slaughter of Laius is not the only 
misdeed, but the fundamental "crime" is childhood sexuality (with its own 
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consequences). The tragedy of man is posited desire, a starting point we cannot 
avoid. In this reading, we thus look for past deeds and childhood desire, facts 
that define us. The central figure of this reading is the Sphinx, representing the 
enigma of childhood sexuality (Enckell 2007: 66)  
Freud’s strict focus on infantile sexuality as the ultimate driving force behind 
psychopathology has largely fallen out of favour since his death, leading to broad 
changes in both psychoanalytic theory and practice (Fonagy & Target 2003; 
Greenberg & Mitchell 1983; Rayner 1991). In line with this, Ricoeur has proposed an 
alternative ‘teleological’1 reading of Oedipus Rex:  
In this reading, Oedipus Rex is not a story of past deeds and desire, but a drama 
of evolving truth. The tragedy is not of posited desire, but of an unrelenting 
search. Despite Iocaste's warnings, Oedipus cannot help but try to cast light on 
the facts…Oedipus reaches forward; he moves towards self-consciousness, 
towards a position from which he can see himself. (Enckell 2007:66)  
The ‘teleological’ reading, Enckell argues, captures the fact that bodily ‘instincts’ 
have become displaced by ‘affects’ as the central driving force in psychic life:  
In Ricoeur's dialectical reading of Oedipus Rex, the archaeological reflection 
looked for the human subject in a regressive move to a temporal, functional and 
structural past. In the opposite reading, the drama was seen as a tragedy of 
evolving self-consciousness. Oedipus cannot help but reach for the truth lying in 
front of him: he strives for a position not yet attained… In the teleological 
reflection, the motive lies ahead at the perceptual end. What makes a person 
                                            
1 ‘Teleology’ describes things in terms of the purpose, goal or directive they intend to serve.   
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move in a specific way is the affect, the feeling one strives for. For teleology, the 
motive is the affect. (Enckell 2007:70). 
Enckell’s argument is evocative of the ‘relational turn’ in psychoanalysis (see Blass & 
Carmelli 2010), in which psychoanalytic theory has moved away from Freud’s 
portrayal of man as a primarily instinctive and pleasure driven being towards a view 
of man as a ‘political animal’ (Enckell 2007, Greenberg & Mitchell 1983). A great deal 
of psychoanalytic theory from the latter half of the twentieth century has either 
implicitly or explicitly been swept up in the ‘relational turn’ (Blass & Carmelli 2010), a 
movement which has been mirrored in the 1990s ‘affective turn’ in social theory 
(Clough & Halley 2007) and accompanied by an explosion of neuroscientific insights 
into the central role of affects in brain functioning (Cozolino 2010, Damasio 1999, 
Panksepp 2010, 2012). 
While affects play an important role in the account of imagining proposed in this 
thesis, they are not its defining feature. Where affects are emphasised, this will be in 
the context of their relationship with epistemic concerns; features of psychic life 
which focus on knowledge and the experience of knowing (Morton 2009; De Sousa 
2008). Although epistemic factors are quietly present in a broad range of 
psychoanalytic theories, their role is rarely highlighted and thematised. For example, 
Enckell’s reading of Oedipus Rex delineates “the feeling one strives for” (Enkell 
2007: 70) as the ultimate motivating force, with Enckell concluding that “for teleology, 
the motive is the affect” (ibid), failing to pick up on his own assertion that “Oedipus 
cannot help but cast light on the facts” (Enckell 2007: 66). Why not read Oedipus’ 
journey as one in which the motive is a need to know? This is the view adopted by 
Jonathan Lear in his work Open Minded (1999), where he remarks: 
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What, after all, is Oedipus’ Complex? That he killed his father and married his 
mother misses the point. Patricide and maternal incest are consequences of 
Oedipus’ failure, not its source. Oedipus’ fundamental mistake lies in his 
assumption that meaning is transparent to human reason (Lear 1999: 29, 
emphasis in the original) 
Elsewhere, Lear expands this line of thinking, arguing that Oedipus’ unwarranted 
confidence in his own capacity to master situations through transparent and 
definitive ‘knowledge’ results in his downfall. Lear takes Oedipus’ boastful assurance 
to Tiresias that he unpicked the Sphinx’s riddle “by native wit, not by what I learnt 
from birds” (Sophocles 303-98 quoted in Ray 1975:102) - that is to say, through clear 
and rational thinking, rather than superstitious divination - to be indicative that 
Oedipus is suffering from a striking and malignant lack of curiosity. His deficiency in 
open-mindedness, Lear suggests, is precisely what propels Oedipus towards the 
very fate he believed he had worked out how to avoid:  
Oedipus is suffering a reflexive breakdown: he cannot give a coherent account 
of what he is doing. But he can’t focus on the breakdown – and thus remains 
unconscious of it – because he is too busy thinking. He assumes he already 
knows what the problem is; the only issue is how to avoid it. What he misses 
completely is the thought that his “knowingness” lies at the heart of his troubles: 
what he doesn’t know is that he doesn’t know (Lear 1998: 46, emphasis in the 
original) 
The ‘Epistemic’ Turn 
In this thesis, I will pick up on Lear’s line of thought by proposing an ‘epistemic turn’ 
in psychoanalytic theory which is analogous to the ‘relational turn’ introduced above 
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(Blass & Carmelli 2010, see Chapter Four). Most importantly, I will propose that 
‘epistemic turn’ promotes the imagination as a core feature of psychological health. 
According to this view, health can be described as a psychic stance in which 
imaginative engagement with reality leaves one open to ‘learning from experience’ 
(Bion 1962/1984). My argument will draw on the fact that the capacity for social 
learning has been linked with the ability to successfully regulate affect, which in turn 
is believed to underlie sound mental functioning (Fonagy et. al 2002; Fonagy & 
Luyten 2009; Hopkins 2016).  
To further this view, I will demonstrate that an undervalued aspect of psychic 
life is the role played by epistemic emotions (Morton 2009) and motivations (De 
Sousa 2008) leading to a view in which the mind is largely driven by the need to 
predict, explore and understand (Clark 2016; Gopnik 1998). When psychic health is 
at its most robust, it is characterised by a capacity for learning from social contexts 
(Fonagy et. al. 2017a) and an ability to make use of what is novel in presenting 
situations (Crittenden & Landini 2011). It also entails that pleasure and pleasure-
seeking take on a notably epistemological flavour, which has been captured by Jaak 
Panksepp as “enthused curiosity” (Panksepp 2012, see Chapter Four). On this view, 
knowledge is not a ‘luxury’ of the secondary process – an activity that the mind turns 
to only once it has reigned in its base pleasure seeking elements and focused its 
attention on the sophisticated contemplation of reality - but is built into the primitive 
foundations of mental activity from the bottom up (Clark 2016). Equally, I will show 
how psychopathology can be understood as a rupture in the subject’s 
epistemological relationship with her environment (which can encompass both the 
internal and the external worlds), resulting in overly rigid explanatory frameworks 
(Crittenden & Landini 2011, Hopkins 2016) and failures in the capacity for learning 
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(Fonagy et. al 2015, 2017a, 2017b). An important part of this argument will be an 
analysis of the conspicuous lack of epistemological themes in Freud’s writings (see 
Chapters One and Two), which I will argue can go some way towards explaining his 
portrayal of the imagination as a process which distracts and insulates the imaginer 
from the world (Freud 1900, 1907).  
The current investigation will aim to provide a conceptual analysis rather than 
a history of ideas. In other words, it considers the theoretical conditions that create a 
demand for a form of ‘reality oriented’ imagining. Although there is a chronological 
element implicit in this – it considers, after all, psychoanalysis at its inception versus 
psychoanalysis in some of its most current formulations – what I will present is far 
from a linear tale of psychoanalytic theory transforming from one thing into another. 
Indeed, one of the reasons for beginning this project with an in-depth analysis of the 
Freudian theory is to appreciate the multitude of theoretical insights that can be 
gleaned from it which remain highly relevant today, (especially in light of current 
movements to, once again, grant psychoanalytic theory an empirical basis (see 
Fotopolou et. al ed. 2012)). At the same time, the argument that follows may prompt 
a more mindful consideration of use of the term ‘imagination’ in psychoanalytic 
theory. The explicit links I will draw later on (see Chapter Three) between Freud’s 
notion of the imagination and his status as an instinct theorist (a theory of motivation 
which arguably lost popularity after the development of ‘object relations’ (Greenberg 
& Mitchell 1983) may caution against automatically adopting Freud’s portrayal of the 
imagination  in the future as it is precisely the abandonment of ‘instinct theory’ and 
the rise of other broad conceptualizations of the mind which encourages a new 
perspective on imaginative functioning (see Chapters Three and Four). 
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The current study will also aim to de-couple the imagination from its often 
exclusive connection with aesthetics and artistic creativity in psychoanalytic theory 
(Freud 1907, 1910; Segal 1991). Instead, I will aim for a more grounded construal of 
imaginative processes, in which the term aims to grasp a certain quality of 
experience that is available to all regardless of aesthetic ability (Lennon 2010, 2015; 
Winnciott 1971/2005). In this sense, it will follow Winnicott’s definition of ‘creativity’, 
which he introduces with the comment: “I am hoping that the reader will accept a 
general reference to creativity, not letting the word get lost in the successful or 
acclaimed creation but keeping it to the meaning that refers to a colouring of the 
whole attitude to external reality” (Winnciott 1971/2005: 87). The same logic can be 
applied to the ‘reality oriented’ imagination.  
It can be argued that there is a call for an enquiry like the one presented in 
this thesis as my notion of the ‘reality oriented’ imagination presents, at least on the 
surface, a drastic reversal of the classic Freudian conceptualization. Aside from the 
intrinsic interest in studying this conceptual shift, it can be seen as a symptom of a 
much deeper transformation in the implicit understanding of mind and 
psychopathology. My central aim is to propose a view of imaginative processes 
according to which they embody a healthy epistemic attitude towards both internal 
and external reality. According to this perspective, the ‘imagination’ is a consciously 
accessible process which contains several dimensions that grant it a sui generis 
nature: it is sensorial (embodied), contains an implicit recognition of the self-as -
imaginer and instantiates an openness to ‘learning from experience’ (Bion 
1964/1985).  
Defining the ‘Reality Oriented’ Imagination: 
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One of the core aims of this thesis is to unpack how the imagination has transformed 
from a primarily ‘reality indifferent’ process to a primarily ‘reality oriented’ process 
within psychoanalytic theory. This evolution occurs, I argue, in a manner that 
matches the changing conceptualisation of the imagination in philosophy; with the 
‘reality oriented’ view that is expressed in the mentalization model cohering with the 
dominant account of imaginative activity in both contemporary neuroscience and 
phenomenological philosophy. But what is ‘reality oriented’ imagining? I will dedicate 
this section to giving a more in depth outline of reality oriented imagining and placing 
it within an intellectual context.  
My strategy throughout this thesis will be to bring the concept of the ‘reality 
oriented’ imagination into its own by contrasting it with traditional assumptions about 
the imagination’s psychological function and representational content. The traditional 
view, which will be the focus of the first two chapters of this work, asserts that the 
imagination is a form of mental activity which provides an experiential escape from 
reality. This approach, which persists in common-sense views of the imagination to 
this day, facilitates a connection between the imagination, fantasy, dreams and 
works of art or fiction (Sodre 2015). Freud can be seen to exploit this pre-existing 
connection through the creation of a metapsychological construct which he called 
‘the primary process (Freud 1895;1900;1915; 1923). Freud’s ‘primary process’, 
which is characterised by highly visual, ‘reality indifferent’ thinking, is arguably a 
formalised version of the traditional notion of the imagination which he uses to 
account the phenomena listed above; namely dreams, daydreams and works of art 
or fiction (Freud 1901;1908).  
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Historically, the expansive period of intellectual history in which the traditional view of 
the imagination was predominant can be defined (rather simplistically) as the pre-
Kantian era. Until the publication of Kant’s “the Critique of Pure Reason” the 
imagination was generally considered an unsophisticated and inherently deceptive 
force in virtue of the fact that it was presumed to be distinct from perception. Rather 
than provide a necessary aid to perception, the imagination was considered a force 
that clouded the otherwise straightforward access that the perceiving individual has 
to external reality. In Chapter Two, I will briefly outline how this general account of 
the imagination is present in works of philosophy from Plato and Aristotle through to 
the early modern works of Descartes and Hume and is a view which is supported in 
Freud’s own accounts of perception. Kant revolutionized the philosophy of the 
imagination, being the first thinker to systematically outline how imagination is not 
only present within perception but necessary for perception to function successfully, 
and therefore marks a highly important turning point in philosophical 
conceptualizations of the imagination. Kant therefore can be seen as providing an 
initial blue-print for ‘reality oriented’ imagining.  
Kant’s arguments are highly complex and the relevant aspects will be covered in 
more depth later in this work (see, in particular, Chapter Two), although it is worth 
giving a sense of his general position here. Kant believed that two aspects of human 
experience that need to be reconciled are the capacity to be affected by sensory 
experiences and the capacity to make active judgements about these experiences. 
The former, which he call sensibility, involves the ability to take in the concrete 
‘givens’ which are presented as sense data. The latter, which he termed 
understanding is the ability to think about what one is seeing and to make 
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judgements about the world of the basis of it. One of the simplest ways in which 
these two forces work together is in concept recognition: one needs sensibility in 
order to see a particular triangle and understanding to judge that one is seeing a 
triangle which is the same as other instantiations of triangles that the perceiver has 
experienced previously. Kant recognised that there is an inherent problem in the 
compatibility between sensibility and understanding: they are two distinct modes of 
experiencing that rely on different representational formats, so how can they come 
together to produce perceptual experiences? In the ‘schematism’ Kant argues that 
sensibility alone is not sufficient to grant the human mind with the capacity for 
sensory experiences, as it cannot explain the fact that perceptual experience 
presents itself as a unified whole (Kant’s thinking on this point is unpacked in more 
detail in Chapter Two). When we perceive a scene we do not experience a multitude 
of sensory signals barraging the mind in a confused and disjointed competition for 
our attention but rather see one scene situated reliably within time and space. Kant 
introduces the imagination as a mediating force which is shares enough similarities 
with both sensibility and understanding to forge a compatibility between them (Clark 
2015; Kitcher 1990). He argues that the imagination is an active and spontaneous 
mental capacity which transforms sensory ‘information’ into an image which can be 
thought about2(Kant 1781/1900/2007).  
For the purposes of the current argument, Kant’s theory of the imagination is 
important in so far as it portrays the imagination as a ‘reality oriented’ process both 
                                            
2 Much like his traditionally minded philosophical predecessors, Kant therefore saw the imagination as 
a mediating force between two distinct aspects of being.  Yet where philosophers such as Descartes 
granted the imagination the functioning of mediating between the bodily and the mental (see Chapter 
Two), Kant saw the imagination as a necessary in mediating between perception and conceptual 
thought; between sensibility and understanding.  
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of the level of its psychological function and its representational content. The ‘raw 
material’ of the Kantian imagination is representations of the external environment, 
rather than internally generated flights of fancy. Furthermore, the Kantian 
imagination functions to enable the individual to experience the external world, rather 
acting as a distracting interference to external reality.  According to the Kantian 
paradigm, then, the imagination is a highly sophisticated mental process in so far as 
it is what allows humans to go ‘beyond the data of experience’ (Swanson 2016). As 
we shall see in the first two chapters of this work, this differs from Freud’s more 
traditional position in which he portrays the imagination as an unsophisticated and 
primitive mental force that is aligned with pathological mental states.  
. It is more specifically within contemporary neuroscientific accounts of 
perception which stem from Kantian insights that my concept of ‘reality oriented’ 
imagining is grounded (e.g. Clark 2015). Advances in our understanding of the 
mechanisms which underlie perception have shown that even sensory experiences 
such as visual perception are ‘cognitively penetrated’ (subject to influence and 
distortion by higher-order brain mechanisms) (see Raftopolous, 2009). This gives 
perception an ‘active’ rather than a ‘passive’ nature in a manner that can be seen as 
a direct theoretical descendent of Kant’s account of perceptual experience (see 
Swanson 2016 for an extended discussion of this). Throughout this thesis I will adopt 
the current dominant hypothesis that perceptual consciousness is the result of the 
brain generating a predictive model of its environment.  Adopting this view of 
perception, referred to as the “Bayesian Brain” or, more generally “Predictive 
Processing”, has several knock-on effects which rather dramatically alter Freud’s 
theory of the imagination as a psychological process governed by the pleasure 
principle.  A simple example of predictive perceptual consciousness, and one that I 
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shall return to later in the thesis (see Chapter 4) is the ‘Face-House Experiment’ In 
this experiment, a picture of a house is projected onto a participant’s right eye and a 
picture of a face is projected onto their left eye, with the result that they have the 
phenomenological impression of a face gradually turning into a house, and then 
gradually back into a face again. This occurs because the brain “knows”, from 
experience, that there is no such thing as a “face-house”, so it uses the visual data 
available in the right eye to conclude that it is looking at a face and suppresses the 
contradictory data coming in from the left eye. This succeeds momentarily, but there 
is so much contradictory data (it makes up half of the visual field) that the brain is 
forced to change its hypothesis, and concludes that it is seeing a house. The cycle 
repeats, creating the undulating image for the participant. In more technical terms, 
undulating image embodies a tension between the brain’s ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
mechanisms. ‘Top down’ mechanisms act to inhibit any incoming sensory data which 
contradicts the brain’s dominant hypothesis, whereas ‘bottom-up’ mechanisms flag 
up errors in ‘top-down’ hypothesis (they draw attention to anomalies) with the hope 
of updating these predictions so that they more accurately represent the entire range 
of incoming data (Hopkins 2012:11, 2016:4)). The undulating image occurs as a 
result of perceptual system attempting to manoeuvre the contradictory incoming data 
as well as it can in an attempt to reduce the chance that it will be ‘surprised’ by the 
environment. 
Outside of experimental conditions, the brain is constantly creating its own 
perceptual experience in much the same manner by aiming for a predictive model of 
sensory input that accounts for as much of the incoming sensory ‘barrage’ as it can 
(Clark 2015;Swanson 2016). This, I will argue throughout this thesis, has a couple of 
effects that are pertinent to a (neuro) psychoanalytic account of mental health and 
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pathology. Firstly, as above, it means that what we experience on a 
phenomenological level is centred on what is novel or surprising in a perceptual 
scene: the incoming data that does not fit smoothly into the predicted model 
(Hopkins 2015).  This insight can be usefully integrated into work on mental health 
from an attachment perspective, which suggests that health is partly defined by an 
individual’s capacity to recognise and use the novel aspects of experience (see 
Chapters 5-8; Crittenden & Landini 2011). Psychopathology, in contrast, tends to be 
characterised by overly rigid predictive schemas that have diminished capacity to 
pick up on the nuances and subtleties of interpersonal scenarios (Crittenden & 
Landini 2011). 
It is therefore via the predictive processing model that Kant’s concept of the 
productive imagination is most intimately related to ‘reality oriented’ imagining for the 
purpose of the argument presented here. Yet while there are clear structural 
parallels between Kant’s model of the mind and the contemporary accounts of 
predictive perception, one difference sets them aside which arguably draws the 
neuroscientific model in to a psychoanalytic sphere: the role played by dreams and 
‘fictive’ daytime experiences (Hopkins 2016).  
As I shall explore in Chapter Five, for predictive consciousness to work optimally 
‘realistic’ perception must work in concert with night time dreaming in a 24 – hour 
regulating cycle. The fictive conscious experiences of night time dreams allow for the 
brain to process daytime perceptual learning and consolidate new information into an 
overarching ‘model’ of reality (Hopkins 2016). One of the most important aspects of 
this process from a psychoanalytic standpoint is the impact of dreaming in emotional 
learning (Walker & Van der Helm 2009). Dreams, it has been argued, are an 
essential aspect of learning from emotional situations in a manner that removes the 
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‘sting’ from highly affective memories. While this presents a different picture to the 
traditional Freudian theory that dreams provide a form of experience wish-fulfilment 
for unconscious phantasies, we shall see how it preserves his general notion that 
mental disorder is an instance of dream processes operating in waking conscious life 
(Hopkins 2016). The most extreme example of this is the active hallucinations and 
delusions that form the positive symptoms of psychotic disorders such a 
schizophrenia. Freud believed that these symptoms could be explained as the 
abduction of ‘normal’ rational conscious thought by the primitive and reality 
indifferent primary processes, thus making the psychotic individual essentially a 
“waking dreamer” (Hopkins 2016). The contemporary predictive model posits the 
same broad explanation for active delusions and hallucinations, arguing that the 
‘complexity reducing’ mechanisms in sleep (those which allow perceptual data to be 
consolidated into a working model of reality) ‘take over’ waking predictive 
consciousness. This, as I shall discuss in Chapter Five, leads to robust relationship 
between disordered sleep and psychopathology. 
Despite this thematic similarity, the difference between the Freudian and the 
contemporary conception is in the role they grant dream processes vis-à-vis an 
individual’s openness to ‘reality’. While there is no doubt that both approaches view 
dreams as containing ‘fictive’, ‘reality indifferent’ representational content, the 
contemporary approach nevertheless assigns dreams the function of enabling the 
individual to form a greater connection with reality overall. Dreams play a vital role in 
allowing a ‘realistic’ and ‘accurate’ perceptual model to be maintained during waking 
hours. The Freudian perspective, in contrast, does not see dreams as facilitating an 
individual’s openness to reality: although he considered dreaming as one of the most 
healthy and ‘normal’ ways in which the primitive and instinctual parts of the mind can 
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find expression, he did not credit dreams with enabling the individual to form a 
deeper connection with reality.  
Insights into the psychological function and content of dreaming can be used to 
create a theoretical model of the conscious imagination. Conscious, day time 
imagining is seen in both the Freudian and the contemporary neuropsychoanalytic 
literature as an instance of dream mechanisms operative in waking life (Freud 1908’ 
Hopkins 2016). Unlike psychopathological delusions, however, the imagining 
individual implicitly recognises the difference between imagined and veridical 
experiences, and can even exert agency over this process (Freud 1908; McGinn 
2004).  
The difference between the Freudian and contemporary approaches to the 
imagination mirrors that of nocturnal dreaming: Freud construes the conscious 
imagination as an instance of ‘reality indifferent’ processes taking over typically 
‘reality oriented’ conscious thought, whereas the contemporary ‘predictive’ model 
can be used to support an account of the imagination as facilitating an individual’s 
capacity to be open to reality. As there is not currently a fully formulated model of the 
imagination in the ‘predictive processing’ literature, this thesis will aim to suggest a 
potential framework for imagination and outline how this can be applied specifically 
to mental health and psychopathology. Using insights from the neuropsychoanalytic 
and ‘predictive processing’ literature, I will advance the idea that veridical perception 
functions most effectively when it is augmented with complexity reducing 
‘counterfactual’ reasoning; namely, when it is infused with imagination. This can be 
used to explain why the capacity for imaginative ‘mentalizing’ has be identified as a 
cornerstone of robust mental health as well as accounting for the psychological 
function of cultural phenomena such as art and literature. Within mentalizing the 
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need for imagination is arguably the most pronounced, as effective mentalizing 
involves going beyond manifest physical and behavioural features in order to 
envisage mental states which are inherently unobservable (see Chapter X for a fuller 
exploration of the role of imagining in mentalizing).  
The model of the imagination which emerges from the neuropsychoanalytic and 
‘mentalization’ literature can be seen to have several important thematic similarities 
with the account presented in phenomenological philosophy. In contrast with the 
traditional accounts of the imagination, which fit smoothly with Freud’s employment 
of the concept, the phenomenological approach highlights how the imagination 
allows the individual to focus the external environment and the opportunities that it 
presents (Lennon 2015). This has been captured by thinkers such as Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty, who both present the imagination as a process which opens reality 
out to an individual by infusing perceptual scenes with the recognition of absent or 
invisible features and highlighting possibilities for action (see Chapter Seven). 
Merleau-Ponty in particular captures this characteristic of perception using the 
metaphor of ‘pregnancy’ to describe how a perceptual scene is experienced as being 
more than the sum of its sensory parts: the perceiver also experiences the ‘hidden’ 
or ‘invisible’ aspects of the scene, such as occluded surfaces of objects (Merleau-
Ponty 1968). The fact that these ‘absent’ or ‘invisible’ features cannot be removed 
from a scene-as-experienced, he argues, entails that no clean distinction between 
perception and imagination can be drawn (Merleau-Ponty 1968). 
Phenomenological approaches to the imagination are useful for the ‘reality 
oriented’ imagination as they sit squarely within the post-Kantian philosophical 
tradition, therefore allowing for the imagination to be framed as a necessary part of 
rational and affective engagement with the world.  More specifically, the emphasis in 
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the phenomenological literature on the imagination yielding up possibilities for future 
action can be seen complement the important aspects of the ‘predictive processing’ 
model. Much like the phenomenologists, and unlike the analytic philosophical 
tradition which has largely dominated western philosophical discourse, ‘predictive 
processing’ acknowledges that human experience of the world is shaped according 
to the need for pragmatic and bodily action (Clark 2015). It therefore upholds the 
general phenomenological principle that humans do not encounter world as 
detached, passive observers but as agents primed for bodily movement and social 
engagement (see Chapter Seven for an extended discussion of these themes).   
The ‘reality oriented’ imagination is therefore a broad theory of perceptual 
sensitivity and engagement which is rooted with a Kantian metaphysical heritage. 
For the purpose of this thesis, I will focus on how ‘reality oriented’ imagining is 
leveraged in our interpersonal understanding of other minds through the concept of 
‘mentalizing’, as this is the most relevant for a psychoanalytic approach to mental 
health and psychopathology. It is possible, however, that the account presented here 
up could open new avenues for research in other aspects of ‘reality oriented’ 
imagining. 
The ‘Reality Oriented’ Imagination and Psychic Health 
I claim no originality in proposing that the imagination can be a healthy psychological 
process which facilitates a more nuanced and sophisticated engagement with the 
world (Kind & Kung ed. 2016; Lennon 2010, 2015). On the contrary, one of the 
primary aims of this thesis is to demonstrate that many psychoanalytic models – 
from more traditional approaches such those put forward by Winnicott (1971/2005) to 
contemporary empirical accounts like the mentalization model developed by Fonagy 
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and colleagues (Fonagy et. al. 2002, see below) – already adopt a form of ‘reality 
oriented’ imagining as their basis for understanding psychic health. This is in stark 
contrast to Freud’s approach, in which he portrays the imagination as a half-way 
house to psychopathology (Freud 1907, 1915a, see Chapter One).  
One potential explanation for the stark difference between Freudian and 
contemporary ‘reality oriented’ views of the imagination appeals to their differing 
approaches to psychic health. Freud defined health as the absence of 
psychopathology, adopting a view on which one is healthy so long as one is not 
actively symptomatic3 (Breuer & Freud 1895).On this view, as we shall see, there is 
little scope for imaginative functioning to positively contribute to a healthy mind-set 
as there is simply no call for anything to be contributed at all (see Chapters One and 
Two). I will argue that as a result of this Freud tends to portray the imagination as the 
excessive pull of internal, unconscious forces on healthy conscious processing; as a 
force that works against health and should therefore be overcome (Breuer & Freud 
1895; Freud 1907).  
In diametric opposition, Peter Fonagy and colleagues have developed a 
model of infantile development, psychopathology and psychotherapeutic treatment – 
the ‘mentalization’ model - which takes the capacity to imaginatively engage with the 
unobservable psychological states of self and other as the defining feature of health. 
This capacity, which they have termed ‘mentalizing’ or ‘reflective functioning’ is 
                                            
3 Underpinning this view, I will suggest, was Freud’s tendency to take certain features of experience 
for granted. ‘Secondary process’ abilities such as the coming to know the external environment 
through perception, or to adopt language as a medium of thought are presented by Freud as given: so 
long as they are not actively interfered with by unconscious processes, these psychological abilities 
are assumed to be intact and functioning. As we shall see, contemporary perspectives work against 
this assumption and emphasise that many core aspects of psychological functioning are 
developmental achievements (e.g. Fonagy et. al. 2002; Crittenden & Landini 2011).  
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summarized as an “imaginative mental activity, namely, perceiving and interpreting 
human behavior in terms of intentional mental states (e.g., needs, desires, feelings, 
beliefs, goals, and reasons)” (Fonagy et. al 2007: 228). From a mentalization 
standpoint, as we shall see at some length, health requires the active presence of an 
imaginative mentalizing stance.  
The revolutionary idea that health requires more than the absence of 
psychopathology was introduced into psychoanalytic thinking long before the 
development of empirical approaches (such as the mentalization model) through the 
works of Donald Winnicott (1971/2005). In “the Location of Cultural Experience”, for 
example, Winnicott describes his dissatisfaction with the psychoanalytic status quo 
as follows: 
Starting as we do from psychoneurotic illness and with ego defences related to 
the anxiety that arises out of instinctual life, we tend to think of health in terms of 
the state of ego defences. We say it is healthy when these defences are not too 
rigid, etc. But we seldom reach the point at which we can start to describe what 
life is like apart from illness or absence of illness. That is to say, we have yet to 
tackle the question of what life itself is about (Winnicott 1971/2005: 133, 
emphasis in the original). 
On Winnicott’s view, psychic health is not simply the lack of illness, but the active 
presence of something more. It is this something more which I will argue can be 
captured through my construct of ‘reality oriented’ imagining. While the highly 
normative question of “what life itself is about” (ibid) lies far beyond the scope of this 
thesis, I will draw attention to a variety of ways in which Winnicott’s insight is 
supported by empirically oriented models of development and psychopathology, 
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notably attachment theory, neuropsychoanalysis and Fonagy’s ‘mentalization’ model 
(see below Bowlby 1997; Fotopolu ed. 2012; Fonagy et. al 2002), all of which portray 
healthy conscious life as an dynamic, exploratory force that can be set against 
Freud’s rather static portrayal of the ‘secondary process’ (Freud 1915a).  
Imagination and the Strategic Mind 
According to the perspective presented here, the most interesting aspect of the 
‘reality oriented’ imagination for psychoanalysis is not its potential for success as a 
route to knowledge (a question more suited to philosophical epistemology. (See Kind 
& Kung 2016) but what it shows about the motivational forces which drive both 
health and psychopathology. In what follows, I hope to show that the ‘epistemic turn’ 
- which allows us to see the imagination as constitutive of psychic health – also 
paints a picture of the internal world as primarily strategic (concerned with 
understanding, knowledge and prediction (Bowlby 1997; Clark 2016)) rather than 
compensatory (Freud 1895, 1900, 1911). This, I will suggest, stems from the 
epistemologically vulnerable position that the subject finds herself in (McDowell 
1996). From a developmental perspective, for instance, attachment research has 
shown that even pre-verbal, primitive mental processes are designed to explain and 
predict social experiences (Bowlby 1997; Fonagy et. al 2002; Freud 1895). This 
deep-seated need to predict can be mitigated by a predictable early interpersonal 
environment: babies who experience their caregivers as emotionally available are 
able to prioritize exploration and seek out opportunities for learning, whereas those 
who do not trust that their caregivers will be responsive tend to prioritize prediction in 
order to keep themselves safe (Bowlby 1997; Crittenden & Landini 2011; Fonagy et. 
al. 2002; Hopkins 2016).  
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Drawing on these insights, I will propose an epistemic reading of the imagination 
in which it exemplifies the kind of open-minded curiosity that can develop in ‘good 
enough’ early circumstances (Winnicott 1971/2005). My view will suggest that it is 
individuals who have basic level of trust in their social environments who are most 
open to learning from them. I hope to emphasise that trust – a concept which I will 
explore primarily through the mentalization model’s notion of ‘epistemic trust’ (see 
below, Fonagy et. al. 2015, 2016, 2017a, 2017b) – plays an essential role in allowing 
the individual to feel safe enough to access the world on an imaginative level. More 
specifically, it enables the individual to co-opt imaginative processes in order to 
access an affective and experiential dimension of experience that is not given in 
straightforward veridical perception. Following the mentalization model, I will argue 
that this imaginative dimension is centred on the unobservable minds of others and 
rooted in a phenomenological experience of self and agency (Fonagy et. al. 2002; 
Fonagy & Luyten 2009; Lennon 2015).  
The framework I will adopt also leaves room for a more traditional understanding 
of the imagination; one that construes it as fantastical, fictive and indifferent to 
reality. Following the work of Jim Hopkins (2016) on the links between dreaming and 
mental disorder, I will argue that even fantastical experiences can be seen to contain 
an epistemic dimension. This view, which I will discuss at some length in Chapter 
Five, presents ‘fictive’ experiences as pseudo-explanatory: rather than ameliorating 
psychic disturbances by providing a false experience of instinctual gratification 
(Freud 1895, 1911), Hopkins argues that they may generate false explanatory 
hypotheses (Hopkins 2016). Thus conceived, both the reality ‘indifferent’ and the 
‘reality oriented’ forms of the imagination are a far cry from the concept of the 
imagination deployed by Freud in classic psychoanalysis (Freud 1907). In order to 
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differentiate between these three alternate forms of understanding imaginative 
processes, I will adopt the following terminology throughout:  
The Freudian Imagination: The account of the imagination that stems from 
Freudian theory. In the first section of this thesis I will argue that this view 
defines the imagination as a sensorial (mostly visual) process which is inherently 
indifferent to reality and driven by an ‘affective logic’ (Lennon 2015).  
The ‘Reality Oriented’ Imagination: A view of the imagination as inherently 
geared towards knowledge and exploration, particularly of a psychological and 
social nature, exemplifying an attitude in which one is open to ‘learning from 
experience’. It also contains a sensorial dimension, though in a markedly 
different manner to the Freudian imagination as it is concerned with embodied 
perceptual experiences.  
The ‘Reality Indifferent’ Imagination: While this account of imaginative activity 
shares many similarities with the Freudian account, being defined by its 
indifference to reality and forming central features of dreaming and 
psychopathology, it differs markedly from the Freudian conception in being a 
response to epistemic anxieties rather than instinctual tension. In place of 
soothing unmet bodily needs, it provides pseudo-explanations in the absence of 
‘reality oriented’ ones (Hopkins 2016). 
Defining the Imagination 
As these three variations on the term ‘imagination’ demonstrate, it is a difficult 
concept to pin down (McGinn 2004; Kind ed. 2016). Arguably, the three highly 
distinct processes outlined above can only be brought under the umbrella concept of 
the ‘imagination’ because the term has such a broad scope. In an influential paper 
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for the British Journal of Aesthetics, for instance, Leslie Stevenson has sketched out 
twelve most common uses of the term in academic discourse, showing that it can 
range in meaning from the incredibly general definition of “the ability to think of 
(conceive of, or represent) anything at all” (Stevenson 2003:1) to the far more 
specific “the capacity to produce works of art that express something deep about the 
meaning of life” (Stevenson 2003:1).  
Recognizing the seemingly unbounded nature of the term ‘imagination’ 
highlights a major potential objection to the current project: if the Freudian and the 
mentalizing conceptions of the imagination are so wildly different, could this not 
simply represent a linguistic quirk? As Stevenson’s paper demonstrates, the 
imagination is a term capable of being applied to such a wide range of mental 
activities that when two highly diverse definitions arise this does not necessarily point 
to anything of significance. There are likely a whole range of processes co-occurring 
in the mind (or brain) which can all reasonably be referred to as imaginative under 
our current conceptual-linguistic categories, but this may reflect more about our 
failure to apply rigorous descriptive terms to mental processes rather than to 
comment on the mental processes themselves. As a result, attempts to uncover 
what an ‘imaginative’ process ‘really is’ are misguided.  
The argument that I will present over the course of this thesis takes this into 
account. In highlighting how we have an increasing need within psychoanalytic 
theory to appreciate the imaginative nature of healthy, conscious thinking I will make 
no attempt to define the imagination as solely a ‘reality oriented’ process, nor to 
claim that it’s ‘reality oriented’ forms are more worthy of being described as 
imaginative than, for example, acts of fantasy or daydreaming. As evidenced by the 
definitions above, the Freudian Imagination, the ‘reality oriented Imagination’ and the 
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‘reality indifferent’ imagination are recognised in this study as different mental 
processes. For the sake of the current argument, it is interesting to consider why 
psychoanalytic theories would draw on a particular account of the imagination at a 
particular time or within a particular theoretical context. Assessing why different 
psychoanalytic models appeal to different definitions of the imagination at different 
times can arguably shed light on the underlying theoretical assumptions that the 
models embody (Hardy 2016).  
The breadth of the term imagination has led to widespread debate regarding its 
nature and function (Kind 2001, 2016; Lennon 2015; McGinn 2004). Although a full 
discussion of the various philosophical issues at stake regarding the imagination is 
beyond the scope of this thesis (see Kind ed. 2016, Kind & Kung ed. 2016) – and 
some, such as the relationship between imagination and perception will be covered 
in the course of the argument that follows – there is one which it will be necessary to 
deal with before continuing: the relationship between the imagination and mental 
imagery. This issue will be highly important for my discussion of the Freudian 
imagination, as Freud operated on the assumption that the imagination is a primarily 
imagistic mental process (Freud 1907, 1923 also see Varendonck 1921). In adopting 
this position, he was (unsurprisingly) more in keeping with his own time than with 
current thinking on the subject. For the majority of its theoretical history, the 
imagination has been treated as a visual phenomenon as a matter of course (Kind 
2016). Yet in the latter half of the twentieth century imagistic accounts of the 
imagination began to fall rapidly out of favour, potentially incited by the behaviourist 
school’s rejection of mental imagery as a leftover ‘myth’ from the outdated 
philosophy of Rene Descartes (see Chapter Two for more on Descartes) (Kind 
2001). Despite the subsequent decline of behaviourist approaches themselves, the 
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fact that mental images are generally difficult to accommodate into a scientific (or 
‘naturalized’) account of the mind has led visual accounts of the imagination to 
remain unpopular over the last 50 years during the rapid growth of cognitive science 
and the neurosciences (Kind 2001). The alternative, cognitively-oriented view of 
imaginative processes has been bolstered through the recognition in philosophy that 
any definition of the imagination as necessarily imagistic runs into conceptual 
problems due to the fact that it is clearly possible to imagine certain scenarios 
without recourse to mental imagery. In her paper “Putting the Image back in 
Imagination” (2001), Amy Kind gives the example of imagining that Bill Clinton has a 
secret desire to be a rock star: although this state of mind may be accompanied by a 
mental image (or mental images) of Bill Clinton, these do not seem to be an 
essential feature of holding this imaginative attitude (Kind 2001).   
Kind, as the title of her paper suggests, nevertheless goes on to defend the idea 
that we can conceptualise the imagination as an inherently visual process. Although 
a contemporary philosopher who is not psychoanalytically oriented, it is worth noting 
her claim that mental imagery, in having a similar ‘phenomenology’ to perception, 
makes it a form of representation with a sensory dimension that ‘thinking’ lacks (ibid). 
Kind’s analysis is useful in the first instance because it presents a clear means of 
conceptually distinguishing the imagination from other forms of psychic activity: the 
imagination has a built in experiential element; other mental processes do not. 
Moreover, her proposal that the imagistic representation imbues the imagination with 
a necessary ‘experiential underside’ (Kind 2001: 97) not shared by acts of ‘thinking’ 
(including those which deal in fictive scenarios, such as supposing, pretending or 
conceiving) that can be helpfully applied to Freud’s own presentation of the mental 
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image, which also uses the sensory nature of the imagination in the understanding of 
its role in psychopathology. 
The notion of an ‘experiential underside’ will be an important substratum in all 
three forms of the imagination that I have discussed, as it is what marks them out as 
forms of imagination rather than varieties of ‘thinking’. Within Freud, as we shall see 
in the following chapter, this ‘experiential underside’ is specifically drawn from 
imagistic forms of representation (Freud 1923). While the ‘reality oriented’ 
imagination also has a sensorial and visual aspect, this does not take the form of 
‘pictures in the head’ but is rather a particular character of embodied perceptual 
experience (see Lennon 2015, Chapter Seven). In both cases, however, I will adopt 
Kind’s general principle that an act of imagination must have an ‘experiential 
underside’; an embodied and felt dimension and will not include ‘attitudinal’ or 
‘propositional’ imaginings within the definition of ‘imagining’ for the purposes of the 
argument to follow.  
Psychoanalysis, Philosophy, Science 
In discussing the nature and function of the imagination, I will draw from relevant 
philosophical works on the subject (for example Clark 2016; Lennon 2015; Kant 
1871/1900/2007). Despite the fact that philosophy and psychoanalysis have different 
overarching concerns and methodologies, there are several ways in which 
philosophy is not only useful but necessary for the task at hand (for a general review 
of the relationship between Freud and philosophy see Livingstone-Smith 1999). I will 
utilize philosophical insights in contextualising my readings of both the Freudian 
imagination and the ‘reality oriented’ imagination (e.g. Lennon 2015; Sartre 
1936/2012), in assessing the impact of naturalization on psychoanalytic theory (e.g. 
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Collin 2011) and in providing a blueprint for the subject’s epistemological relationship 
to reality (e.g. McDowell 1996).  
The key aim of this thesis is to assess the nature and function of the imagination 
on a conceptual level. I will not provide new empirical data on imaginative processes 
but look to understand the changing nature of the imagination as a theoretical 
construct. In this respect, philosophical works can provide vital insights for a 
conceptual analysis and draw out how theories of mental representation are linked to 
a broader philosophy of mind (Cavell 1993). I will argue that the difference between 
the Freudian imagination and the ‘reality oriented imagination’ mirrors the differences 
between traditional philosophical views of the imagination (e.g. Descartes 
1641/1924) in which it is seen as mid-point between the body and the mind and 
phenomenological views of the imagination (e.g. Merleau-Ponty 1968) which present 
it as a medium through which the subject can engage with the external world 
(Lennon 2015) (see Chapters Two and Seven respectively).   
Secondly, philosophical works can provide an intellectual arena in which the 
relationship between empirical and non-empirical approaches to mental functioning 
can be discussed (Collin 2011). As evidenced by the discussion so far, the majority 
of the psychoanalytic models which provide the context for my notion of the ‘reality 
oriented’ imagination (the mentalization model and neuropsychoanalysis) are defined 
by their commitment to an empirical knowledge base. While settling issues 
concerning psychoanalysis’ status as an empirical science is far beyond the scope of 
this thesis, a degree of philosophical insight into the issues raised by this will be 
necessary for the task at hand. Firstly, it is in the shift towards an empirical approach 
that many of the core features of ‘reality oriented’ imagining come to light, such as 
the important role played by predictive mechanisms in the ‘Bayesian Brain’ (Friston 
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2012l Hopkins 2012). Furthermore, philosophical insights will be useful in 
ascertaining how advances in perceptual neuroscience have changed the 
epistemological relationship between the subject and the external world (McDowell 
1996).  
The final way in which philosophy is important is through its capacity to provide a 
normative commentary on the issues discussed (Graham 2013). One of the main 
points that I will aim to draw out about the imagination is how it has transformed from 
a quasi-pathologised process to one which is celebrated as a foundational aspect of 
good psychological health (Fonagy et. al. 2007; Freud 1907). Although this entails a 
change of the imagination’s conceptual constitution, it also reflects a change in 
values (Graham 2013). Within psychoanalytic theory, ‘consciousness’ has become a 
privileged term because it is inherently linked with health and adaptation to reality 
(see above). For instance, Freud always recognised that consciousness when 
understood as awareness contains sensory and affective elements (Freud 1923: 20), 
he simply decided that these forms of mental processes should not be described as 
‘conscious’ for the purposes of his theory (Freud 1917: 232), therefore reflecting 
Freud’s values rather than his understanding of mental processes. I will argue that 
an account of psychic health which emphasises imaginative processes also 
informative because of what it tells us about shifting values within psychoanalytic 
theory (Rayner 1991).  
In order to tackle the task at hand, I will proceed as follows: 
Chapter One will focus exclusively on drawing out Freud’s theory of the 
imagination from a range of his pre-psychoanalytic and metapsychological texts. 
I will advance the reading that the imagination is viewed as quasi-pathological in 
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virtue of its sensorial (rather than linguistic) nature and the fact that it is 
incapable of representing rational links between ideas. As part of my argument I 
will aim to draw out important connections between imagination, the 
unconscious primary process and the pleasure principle. 
Chapter Two will aim to elucidate Freud’s theory of the imagination by reading 
in the context of philosophical debates regarding the relationship between both 
imagination and perception and imagination and thought. I will outline a selection 
of prominent philosophical accounts that portray imaginative processes as being 
a ‘lower’ form of mental activity which is inherently deceptive and cannot be a 
means of accessing truth and knowledge and suggest that these are 
conceptually resonant with Freud’s theory of the imagination.  
Chapter Three will consider how developments in psychoanalysis since Freud’s 
time have set the scene for an epistemic, ‘reality oriented’ account of the 
imagination to emerge. By tracing a conceptual path from Freudian 
psychoanalysis to attachment theory via the work of Klein, Bion, Fairbairn and 
Winnicott, I will demonstrate how psychoanalysis has become increasingly 
aware of the importance of interpersonal relationships and real external 
circumstances. This theoretical sea-change opens up room for the imagination 
to be construed as a process which connects the individual with a reality outside 
the self, rather than a means through which internal processes gain a 
representational status. I will argue that this shift can be captured by comparing 
Freud’s notion of the ‘drive’ as a ‘frontier’ phenomenon that genuinely lies 
between the body and the mind with Winnicott’s notion of ‘transitional 
phenomena’ that genuinely lies between the internal and the external worlds.  
36 
 
Chapter Four will consider how developments in empirical accounts of mental 
functioning can be seen to engender an ‘epistemic turn’ in psychoanalysis. I will 
focus on three transformations that introduce epistemic factors more explicitly 
into psychoanalytic theory: the shift in emphasis from rational thought to 
prediction, from drives to affects and from unconscious phantasies to 
unconscious schemas or internal working models. I will then assess how these 
changes result in more nuanced and complex epistemological relationship 
between the individual and the environment.  
Chapter Five will focus on the role of social and emotional learning in dreams 
and waking life. Once again drawing on insights from Winnicottian theory 
sketched in his paper “Dreaming, Fantasying and Living” (Winnicott 1971/2005: 
35-50). I will demonstrate how both dreams and ‘reality oriented’ imagination can 
contribute to emotional learning in a way that promotes psychic health, while 
‘fictive’ or ‘reality indifferent’ experiences in waking life represent a two-fold 
epistemological failure by simultaneously being evidence that the neural 
processes underlying emotional learning have failed and block further learning 
by shutting down the ‘reality oriented’ imagination.  
Chapter Six will provide a developmental basis for my account of ‘reality 
oriented’ imagining by grounding it in attachment theory and a mentalizing 
account of development. This will also allow for a demonstration of how ‘good 
enough’ developmental circumstances create a conceptual link between self and 
agency, which I will later demonstrate provides an important contextual feature 
for a sound imaginative relationship towards the world and provide an account 
of. I will also give an account of how adverse developmental situations may 
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develop a tendency to rely on ‘fictive’ explanations which preclude opportunities 
for emotional learning. 
Chapter Seven will offer a re-conceptualisation of the imagination based upon 
the advances discussed in earlier chapters. Using phenomenological accounts 
of the imagination as a theoretical framework, I will argue that the ‘reality 
oriented’ imagination embodies an epistemic attitude that can be compared to 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of ‘perceptual faith’ and John Keats’ notion of ‘negative 
capability’. An affectively grounded sense of self and agency, I will argue, is 
necessary to stabilise simple uncertainty into an attitude of ‘negative capability’.  
Chapter Eight will conclude my argument by revisiting the relationship between 
imagination and language. Freud assigned language the function of connecting 
to reality and the visual imagination the function of insulating the individual from 
it, a set-up which is drastically challenged by the very notion of ‘reality oriented’ 
imagining. In this chapter I will argue that, while the ‘reality oriented’ imagination 
cannot itself be defined simply as language, in adult life it is able to co-opt 
language in its service. I will challenge the Freudian view that psychological 
health involves reconnecting a particular idea with the words that describe it and 
suggest instead that health involves the establishment of an imaginative 
relationship towards language and communication as a global phenomenon.  
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Introduction Part Two: Freud and the Mentalization Model  
I have opted primarily to centre my theory of the ‘reality oriented’ imagination on the 
mentalization model, as it is arguably the psychoanalytic model which most explicitly 
calls for the necessary use of the imagination in a sound and adaptive relationship to 
reality (Bateman & Fonagy 2010). It also has the benefit of offering a detailed 
developmental account of how the capacity for ‘reality oriented’ imagination unfolds 
in normal development, outlining how this can be affected by an adverse 
interpersonal environment. Another aim of this thesis, however, will be to highlight 
the implicit presence of the ‘reality oriented’ in schools of psychoanalytic thought 
other than the mentalization model, most notably those of Donald Winnicott 
(1971/2005). Additionally, I will aim to suggest some interdisciplinary links that can 
be drawn between the psychoanalytic ‘reality oriented’ imagination and 
contemporary philosophical writings on the imagination (e.g. Gallagher & Zahavi 
2008, Lennon 2015). As the mentalization model is an empirically rooted model that 
frequently draws on disciplines such as cognitive psychology (Fonagy et. al. 2002) 
drawing out conceptual links between the presentation of the imagination in the 
mentalization literature and other psychoanalytic and philosophical theories may 
allow us to capture the ‘reality oriented’ imagination with greater depth and texture. 
Nevertheless, it will be useful to begin by offering a sound introduction to a 
mentalizing approach and to consider some of the factors which make a comparison 
between this model and traditional Freudian theory useful and interesting. This is 
especially pertinent in light of the fact that the two models are rarely discussed 
together within the psychoanalytic literature.  
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Introducing the Mentalization Model 
Mentalization is simultaneously a model of psychopathology, an account of 
psychological development and a method of psychotherapeutic treatment. Its basic 
principle is simple but compelling: psychopathology originates from a failure in an 
ability to ‘mentalize’, or, interpret both self and other in terms of underlying 
psychological states (Bateman & Fonagy 2010). Although often focused on the 
individual’s own thoughts and feelings, mentalization differs from straightforward 
introspection in that its goal is not knowledge of the mind per se but the regulation of 
affect and behaviour that this generates. It is a profoundly interpersonal process that 
must be both developed and employed within social interactions (ibid). 
The mentalization model does not lay down a specific thought process but rather 
aims to capture a style of psychological attitude towards self and other. It operates 
across multiple dimensions (Fonagy & Luyten 2009, Liljenfors & Lundh 2015:37) and 
therefore draws on more than one ‘version’ of the imagination, ranging from purely 
cognitive ‘attitudinal’ imaginings implicit in cognitive (or ‘explicit’ dimensions) of 
mentalizing to affectively driven (or ‘implicit’) forms of mentalizing (Fonagy & Luyten 
2009: 4). Nevertheless, all dimensions of imaginative mentalizing are geared 
towards the outside world in an attempt to glean knowledge and understanding from 
the interpersonal environment and thus provide a sound basis for a discussion of the 
‘reality oriented’ imagination. 
Before continuing, some clarifications are in order. Despite their initial similarity, 
‘mentalizing’ differs substantially from the broader concept of ‘theory of mind’ 
commonly found in developmental psychology (Baron-Cohen 1995, Fonagy et. al. 
2002:26-29). ‘Theory of mind’ refers to the comparatively straightforward ability to 
interpret other people’s actions as motivated by psychological intentions; a cognitive 
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capacity which is believed to develop in all children around the age of four (Gopnik 
2009). While making a ‘theory of mind’ interpretation captures a mentalizing stance 
to some extent, the latter also focuses on the individual’s subjective response to their 
‘theory of mind’ interpretations: successful mentalizing does not take interpretation of 
other minds as an end in itself, but rather uses this understanding in the aid of 
regulating affect and behaviour (Fonagy et. al. 2002:248). As a result, ‘mentalizing’ is 
a process that informs our experience of ourselves as much as our experience of 
others (Fonagy et. al. 2002: 263).  
There is also a necessary experiential or affective dimension to ‘reflective 
functioning’ which ‘theory of mind’ lacks (Davidsen & Fosgerau 2015; Fonagy et. al 
2002: 435 – 468). Later in this thesis I will argue that this dimension is particularly 
important in the characterisation of reflective functioning as an act of imagination 
rather than an act of thought. Drawing insight from philosophy, I hope to demonstrate 
that it is through acts of imagination that affect can achieve representation while 
retaining an experiential dimension (Kind 2001, Lennon 2015). For the purposes of 
the current discussion it is simply worth noting that the bodily, experiential dimension 
of mentalizing differentiates it from pure cognitive psychology and grounds it in a 
psychoanalytic tradition. Despite the fact that mentalization draws on a range of 
disciplines, therefore, its concern with the meaning an individual assigns to their 
affective experiences deems it a broadly psychoanalytic approach.   
Comparing the Freudian and Mentalizing Approaches: Representing Reality 
Perhaps the most striking difference between the mentalization model and the 
classic Freudian approach is the different levels of interest they grant to the 
interpersonal environment (Fonagy et. al. 2002; Freud 1905b). As an instinct 
theorist, Freud was relatively unconcerned with the intimately interpersonal, 
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preferring instead to focus on the dynamic conflict engendered between ‘thoughtless’ 
biological instincts and civilized human society at large, which he characterised as 
impersonal and moralistic (See Chapter Four) (Freud 1930, Sulloway 1979). 
Although many of his case studies focus on his patient’s interpersonal 
circumstances, these are taken to be a stage on which the patient’s instinctual 
conflict plays out (e.g. Freud 1905a, 1909); the ability of the patient to adequately 
process and represent the psychological world is taken for granted.   
Yet despite this rather substantial divergence between the two approaches, it 
can be argued that the mentalization model’s focus on differentiation between ‘reality 
oriented’ and ‘reality indifferent’ modes of thought allows it to establish a greater 
resonance with classic Freudian theory than other contemporary interpersonal 
models. For instance, the interpersonal model of psychoanalysis famously put 
forward by Harry Stack Sullivan (1968), deals in a generalised notion of subjectivity 
which precludes the possibility of ‘truth’ or ‘knowledge’ outside the context of a 
shared experience (Greenberg & Mitchell 1983). Such models tend to focus more 
explicitly on two-person experiences and often restrict themselves to an analysis of 
the clinical situation in particular (rather than human interaction in general) (Stern 
2003, Wallin 2007). While the mentalization model is not necessarily incompatible 
with the underlying philosophy of this approach, it has a vested interest in the 
difference between thinking which aims at a world outside of the mind and that which 
does not; psychic processes which have been labelled ‘reflective functioning’ (‘reality 
oriented’) and ‘psychic equivalence’ (‘reality indifferent’) respectively (Fonagy & 
Luyten 2009: 1383).  
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Fonagy and colleagues have noted that they have chosen to adopt the term ‘psychic 
equivalence’ to denote failures in ‘mentalizing’ rather than using Freud’s original term 
‘psychic reality’ (Fonagy et. al 2002: 254). The term ‘psychic reality’, they argue, has 
become misused in the psychoanalytic literature as a term for the patient’s subjective 
experience in general, rather than to denote a specific psychological attitude of 
indifference to a world outside the mind. Their terminology therefore paradoxically 
moves away from Freud’s in order to stay conceptually closer to his initial intention: 
to highlight the profound significance of the individual’s psychological relationship to 
reality when differentiating psychopathology from sound mental health (Fonagy et. 
al. 2002: 254 -255). It is important to emphasise at this point that ‘reality oriented’ 
mental activity (imaginative and otherwise) should not be defined by its success at 
connecting with reality (a feat which could easily be attributed to any number of 
factors, including luck) but should be understood, rather, as a psychological attitude 
or intention in which the individual adopts a mind-set that is geared towards reality. 
An individual is not necessarily in good mental health because the majority of their 
beliefs are veridical; nor does holding beliefs that are not veridical necessarily imply 
psychopathology (Graham 2013). The relevant concern is whether the individual (or, 
to speak on a sub-personal level, a thought or belief (see Gardner 2000)) takes the 
idea of a reality outside the mind into account. This, as we shall see through the 
course of this thesis, is an observation which becomes all the more pertinent as 
psychoanalytic theory moves towards a working definition of ‘reality’ as an 
interpersonal phenomena concerned with internal psychological states (which, by 
their very nature, are unobservable entities which cannot be directly experienced 
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(Leudar & Costall ed. 20094), as it becomes increasingly hard to draw a clean line 
between veridical and non-veridical judgments, making the subject’s intent to adopt a 
‘reality oriented’ attitude all the more significant. Moreover, this entails that in both 
the Freudian and the mentalization approach the difference between ‘reality oriented’ 
and ‘reality indifferent’ thinking does not first and foremost concern the content of the 
mental states (what is a belief or thought about) but the stance that an individual is 
able to adopt in regards to that content. 
The Role of Mental Representations 
Another of the main ‘meeting points’ between the Freudian approach and the 
mentalization model is their shared focus on the nature and function of mental 
representations (Fonagy, Gergley, Jurist & Target 2002; Fonagy, Luyten, Allison & 
Campell 2017a, 2017b; Freud 1900, 1915b, 1923). In the mentalization model, a 
reflective, ‘reality oriented’ stance is explicitly engendered by the capacity for an 
individual to form metarepresentations (thoughts about thoughts (Bermudez 2003). 
The theoretical details of this, along with the presumed developmental process that 
underpins it, will be explored in due course (see Chapters Five and Six). For the 
sake of a comparison with Freudian psychoanalysis, it is simply worth noting how the 
use of metarepresentations in the mentalization model may employ similar 
theoretical constructs to Freud’s theory of concrete and symbolic thought (Freud 
1900, 1925). In Freudian metapsychology, as I shall explain in depth in Chapter One, 
‘primary process’ thinking (governed by the pleasure principle) is defined by its 
equation of thought and reality (Freud 1900, 1915a), whereas the ‘secondary 
process’ (under the sway of the reality principle) is portrayed as inherently geared 
                                            
4 Some contemporary philosophers of mind have even argued that the mental states are 
indeterminate (i.e. that there is no objective fact of the matter regarding what an individual believes, 
thinks etc.) (see Ludwig 2003). 
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towards the external world and capable of tolerating the difference between thought 
and reality (Freud 1911, 1915a, 1925). A similar guiding principle is employed by the 
mentalization model to differentiate ‘reflective functioning’ and ‘psychic equivalence’. 
‘Reflective functioning’ can be seen as a ‘reality oriented’ process precisely because 
it implicitly grasps that mental states are representational and thus does not, in the 
manner of ‘psychic equivalence’ lead to a confusion between one’s own mental 
states and either external states of affairs or the mental states of others (Fonagy et. 
al. 2002:253- 255).  
Freud theorized that the aforementioned ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ processes 
represented in terms of concrete ‘thing’ presentations and symbolic ‘word’ 
presentations respectively, claiming that concrete ideas become ‘conscious’ only 
when linked with the words that describe them (Freud 1915a, 1923). Aside from its 
explicit linguistic axis (or potentially because of it), symbolic ‘secondary process’ also 
differs from the concrete ‘primary process’ in its ability to tolerate negation, 
contradiction and degrees of certainty; psychological capacities which arguably allow 
the individual enough psychological distance from an idea to tolerate the notion that 
it may not match external states of affairs (Freud 1915a, 1925). So although Freud 
does not explicitly work with an individual’s metarepresentational capacities (a 
theoretical development that came long after his time) he nevertheless draws an 
important link between the capacity for symbolic thinking and the capacity to tolerate 
the notion of an external world (Freud 1925). In this regard, the mentalization model 
and the Freudian model place modes of representation as central in determining a 
thought’s ability to connect with external reality; linking types of thinking inherently 
with different attitudes towards the external world. 
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Representation as Regulation 
Another manner in which the mentalization model arguably signifies a ‘return to 
Freud’ is in their shared view of the functional role of representations as intrapsychic 
regulators. Freud developed his model of the mind based on the central biological 
premise that sophisticated organisms need the capacity for self-regulation in order to 
survive (Freud 1895/1950, Hopkins 2016). This capacity to self-regulate, in Freud’s 
view, corresponds with the release of psychic tension; a feat which can only be 
achieved adequately through the satisfaction of an instinct (Freud 1895/1950) 
Secondary process ‘reality oriented’ thinking plays an important part in this process 
by allowing a suspension of automatic release (which produces an ultimately fruitless 
hallucinatory experience) in order for the individual to navigate the external 
environment to find genuine, lasting satisfaction (Freud 1895/1950, 1911). Following 
a similar format, the mentalization model proposes that bringing affect under 
cognitive representations can stabilize dysregulation and thus allow the individual 
greater adaptability to their interpersonal world (Fonagy & Luyten 2009). 
Metarepresentations also function to allow the individual to attribute somatic and 
affective experiences to themselves, while simultaneously adopting a reflective 
stance on thoughts and feelings that may be motivating others (Fonagy & Luyten 
2017).  
There is no doubt that clear and substantial differences remain between the 
Freudian approach and the mentalization model even leaving aside the obvious 
difference in emphasis on interpersonal perception. For instance, it is arguably not 
unsubstantial that in the mentalization model ‘affects’ rather than ‘instincts’ or ‘drives’ 
are delineated as the psychic force that requires reigning in with representations ( 
Panksepp 2012, Solms & Zellner 2012). Perhaps even more importantly, the 
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mentalization model’s account of development, derived as it is from object relations 
and attachment theory (Bateman & Fonagy 2010), envisages the infant moving from 
a state of dependency to one of reflective independence; effectively reversing the 
Freudian narrative of the infant growing out of autoeroticism into mature object 
sexuality (Freud 1905b). Yet despite this, their shared emphasis on the existence of 
two basic forms of mental representations which have different inherent capacities to 
represent ‘reality’, with the ‘reality oriented’ mode of representation playing an active 
role in biological regulation gives the two approaches a broadly common ground that 
should not be missed.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the mentalization model, as a developing theory, 
has matured over time in a direction that strengthens the role of mental 
representations and somewhat diminishes its intersubjective elements, granting it 
more potential for resonance with Freudian theory at its current stage of 
development than at its inception (Fonagy et. al 2015, 2016, 2017a, 2017b). Within 
the mentalization model, the capacity for ‘reflective functioning’ is thought to develop 
within an infant-caregiver relational dyad which is characterised by a secure 
attachment style, thus establishing a link between attachment security and the 
capacity for mentalization (See Chapters Five and Six for a full account) (Fonagy et. 
al. 2002: 44-46). Drawing on empirical studies which suggest that attachment style in 
infancy could act as a good predictor of attachment style in adulthood (Crittenden & 
Landini 2011), the developers of the mentalization approach proposed that once the 
capacity for ‘reflective functioning’ is set up early in life, mentalizing and attachment 
security continue to mutually reinforce one another, providing the individual with an 
inherent resilience against psychopathology into adulthood (Fonagy et. al. 2002). 
Analogously, it has been suggested that insecure attachment style in infancy 
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correlated with vulnerability to psychopathology in later life, with both manifesting a 
diminished capacity to take a reflective stance on the mental states of self and other 
(Fonagy et. al. 2002: 45).  
Despite this, more recent empirical studies have failed to replicate the finding 
that attachment style remains relatively stable throughout the life span, and suggest 
instead that attachment tends to vary both over time and in the context of different 
interpersonal relationships (Fonagy 2001, Fonagy et. al 2017a, 2017b). This poses a 
substantial risk to the mentalization model’s account of development, prompting the 
question of how the capacity for mentalizing in adult life can be determined during 
early development when secure attachment itself, the psychological context in which 
mentalizing is allegedly set up, is not. This hurdle, along with insight gleaned from 
clinical experience of working with patients who present as ‘hard to reach’ (such as 
those diagnosed with a Personality Disorder) led the developers of the mentalization 
model to propose the notion of epistemic trust (Fonagy et. al. 2015, 2016, 2017a, 
2017b). This concept will come to play a highly important role in the present 
argument (see, in particular, Chapters Five and Seven) and is worth outlining briefly 
here as it demonstrates the importance, once again, that representational capacities 
assume in the mentalization approach. 
Epistemic trust, briefly summarized, refers to the attitude an individual takes 
towards social and emotional communication. More specifically, it denotes whether 
the individual treats such communication as relevant to the self and generalizable to 
other contexts (Fonagy et. al. 2015, 2016, 2017a, 2017b). An attitude of epistemic 
trust is thought to develop within a securely attached relationship: within the context 
of a secure dyad the caregiver is able to mirror the infant’s emotional states back at 
them in a way that implicitly communicates to the infant that others have minds, 
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thoughts and feelings much like the infant’s own (ibid). This, in turn, fosters both an 
attitude of openness to learning from others and the capacity to learn from one’s own 
experiences (Csibra & Gergely: 2009; Fonagy et. al. 2015, 2016, 2017a. 2017b. See 
Chapters Five and Seven for a full account). For the purpose the current discussion, 
it is simply worth noting that despite the fact that epistemic trust is set up within the 
context of a securely attached relationship, it can then function independently over 
the course of an individual’s life. This has the consequence of making an individual’s 
psychological relationship to the representation and communication of ideas 
paramount over their relationship to other individuals per se; a fact which reinforces 
the arguably Freudian idea that it is representational capacities and the 
psychological attitude an individual adopts towards them which determines 
psychopathology.    
It also serves to emphasise the fact that the mentalization model, in spite of its 
focus on the interpersonal world, should not be classed as a form of relational or 
intersubjective psychoanalysis (Stern 1968). Leaving aside the fact that the 
mentalization approach has a vested interest in defining ‘reality’ more sharply that 
intersubjective approaches, the focus on representations that is engendered by the 
theoretical constructs such as ‘psychic equivalence’, ‘reflective functioning’ and 
‘epistemic trust’ creates a system of theories that arguably approach a 
metapsychology. These, much like the Freudian account, aim to situate 
psychological representations within a biologically grounded account of the mind. In 
contrast, intersubjective and relational approaches have tended to eschew 
metapsychology in an aim to more accurately capture the experience of the clinical 
situation unburdened by rigid theoretical systems (Stern 2003, Wallin 2007). 
Furthermore, this act of characterising clinical interactions takes place within the 
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context of an implicit philosophy which deems scientific accounts of developmental 
and mental functioning as unnecessary and irrelevant (Stern 2003). The 
mentalization model, in contrast, is an unapologetically empirical theory which stays 
close to Freud’s initial aim to ground psychoanalysis in evolutionary biology, aiming 
to understand how different representational processes can arise out of various 
bodily and sensory experiences (Csibra & Gergely 2009; Fonagy et. al. 2017a, 
2017b; Freud 1895; Sulloway 1979). The most striking resemblance between the two 
that can be taken away, therefore, is that the imagination plays an important part in 
creating the link between felt experience and representation.  
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Chapter One 
Insulated from the World: Daydreaming and Mental Imagery in Freudian 
Metapsychology 
“One shuts one's eyes and hallucinates; one opens them and thinks in words”  
- Sigmund Freud ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’ (Freud. 
1950 [1895]: 434) 
“We may lay it down that a happy person never fantasies, only an unsatisfied 
one. The motive forces of fantasies are unsatisfied wishes, and every single 
fantasy is the fulfilment of a wish, a correction of unsatisfying reality”   
– Sigmund Freud. ‘Creative Writers and Daydreaming’ (Freud 
1907:146) 
This first chapter will lay out an in-depth reading of Freud’s theory of the imagination 
through a survey of his pre-psychoanalytic and metapyshcological texts (Breuer & 
Freud 1895, Freud 1895, 1900, 1911, 1912, 1915a, 1915b, 1923, 1937; Freud & 
Stengel 1891). I will demonstrate that Freud presents the imagination as a mental 
process that occupies an intermediate area between the conscious and the 
unconscious minds (Freud 1923:21), a fact that can be attributed to the qualities that 
the imagination shares with Freud’s theory of the ‘primary process’ (Freud 1895, 
1900, 1915a). As evidenced by the quote above (Freud 1907:146), Freud also 
creates strong links between imagination and the pleasure principle; a psychic 
driving force that he defined by its indifference to reality (Freud 1915b). This, 
alongside the imagination’s visual character, creates an account whereby 
imaginative processes insulate the individual from reality by generating visual scenes 
52 
 
which both interfere with their capacity to focus on external perceptions, and focus 
the gratification of internal needs rather than the consideration of the external 
environment (Freud 1907, 1900, 1911).  
Although the juxtaposition between imagistic and linguistic representations will 
be a strong theme in the argument that follows, it should be noted that Freud, to his 
credit, does not create hard and fast distinctions between visual and verbal forms of 
representation. It is clear that he did not hold the belief that all reality-indifferent 
mental activity was imagistic; a notable exception being the streams of delusional 
thoughts – often portrayed in a verbal form – that are clung to by sufferers of 
obsessional neurosis (see the section entitled ‘Reality Indifferent Verbal Thought’ 
below for a broader discussion of this (Breuer & Freud 1895: 177-8). Rather than 
force a dichotomy between the visual and the verbal in Freud’s work, therefore, this 
chapter sets itself the more modest but also more enlightening task of considering 
how Freud applies (what he considered to be) the inherent properties of mental 
imagery to capture and characterise states of fantasy. In other words, it will consider 
why imagistic representation ‘suits’ reality-indifferent thinking (Freud 1900, 1923:21). 
This will involve an analysis of the relationship between the mode of representation 
(how an idea is depicted in the mind) and the mental function (what the mind can 
subsequently ‘do’) with an idea. Before delving into Freud’s dense 
metapsychological theory, however, it is worth giving a broad sense of how I will 
read his theory of the conscious imagination. I will not aim to assess, at this stage in 
my argument, whether or not Freud’s theories themselves are accurate; it will be 
enough to aim for a clear picture of what he says on the matter, which is an intricate 
enough task in its own right.  
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Half-way to the Unconscious 
Freud’s works do not contain evidence that he made a meaningful distinction 
between the terms imagination, fantasy and daydreaming but suggest that he 
construed the imagination a priori as a reality-indifferent mode of thought (Freud 
1907). This is most likely a simple result of his pre-theoretical understanding of the 
term ‘imagination’ which served to shape his construal from the outset5 (Hardy 2016; 
Kind 2001; Lennon 2015). This is not to say that Freud did not offer his own highly 
unique psychoanalytic account of the imagination: although he may have begun with 
several assumptions regarding its nature, Freud then sought to offer an explanation 
both its genesis and its function that revolved around his understanding of the 
unconscious mind (Breuer & Freud 1895; Freud 1907). The account he arrived at, I 
will argue, is the very same that is used to explain the pleasure principle, the 
unconscious, dreams, neurosis, infantile thought and several other processes that 
are definitive of the Freudian thought: the wish-fulfilling hallucination; an internally 
generated sensory process in which instinctual wishes are represented as though 
they are being fulfilled.  It is around this central theoretical node, I shall argue below, 
that Freud’s theory of imagination should be read and understood. 
In many ways, conscious acts of fantasy seem to represent an element of the 
unconscious in the conscious mind. Like dreams, they are mental processes whose 
essential purpose is the temporary satisfaction of an instinct through wish-fulfilment 
(Freud 1900, 1907). They also tend to have a sensorial and associative element 
which aligns them conceptually with Freud’s primary process (a feat only made 
stronger by the fact that Freud’s portrayed conscious thinking – the ‘secondary 
                                            
5 In the next chapter I will consider some common philosophical theories of imaginative 
processes which may have led him to adopt the view that he did. 
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process’ -as inherently linguistic). Conscious fantasy is also presented as borderline 
pathological. In ‘Creative Writers and Daydreaming’, for instance, Freud actively 
warns against the perils of an over active imagination, stating: 
If phantasies become over-luxuriant and over-powerful, the conditions are laid 
for an onset of neurosis or psychosis. Phantasies, moreover, are the immediate 
mental precursors of the distressing symptoms complained of by our patients. 
Here a broad by-path branches off into pathology. I cannot pass over the relation 
of phantasies to dreams. Our dreams at night are nothing else than phantasies 
like these, as we can demonstrate from the interpretation of dreams (Freud 
1907: 148). 
There is also, it can be said, a parity with which Freud speaks of conscious and 
unconscious acts of imagination, at times making the two processes appear almost 
interchangeable6. In “From a History of an Infantile Neurosis” Freud gives the 
following account of the neurotic mind in which the imagination portrayed as the 
mechanism at work in the unconscious: 
If neurotics are endowed with the evil characteristic of diverting their interest 
from the present and of attaching it to these regressive substitutes, the products 
of their imagination, then there is absolutely nothing for it but to follow upon their 
tracks and bring these unconscious productions into consciousness; for, leaving 
on one side their lack of value from the point of view of reality, they are of the 
utmost value from our point of view, since they are for the moment the bearers 
                                            
6 It perhaps worth noting here that Freud uses the term ‘phantasy’ rather than ‘fantasy’ to refer to 
both. I have not opted to do the same here as a way of reducing the confusion with Melanie Klein’s 
theory of ‘unconscious phantasy’ which, as we shall see in Chapter Four, comes with a range of 
theoretical baggage attached.  
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and possessors of the interest which we want to set free so as to be able to 
direct it on to the tasks of the present (Freud 1918: 49). 
Freud’s liberal use of the term ‘imagination’ to refer to unconscious as well as 
conscious acts can be taken to strengthen the claim that it is a form of functioning 
that lies conceptually closer to the primary unconscious processes than other 
aspects of conscious thought which tend, as a general rule, to come under the sway 
of the Reality Principle. Yet there are also important ways in which daydreaming is 
more like conscious thought than unconscious processing, even leaving aside the 
obvious fact that one has, by definition, a greater awareness of the conscious 
imagination. Firstly, Freud argued that daydreams differ from dreams in so far as the 
individual experiencing them does so with the attendant recognition that the fantasy 
does not align with reality. A daydream taken, unquestioningly, to be veridical (in the 
same manner, say, as a dream) would not be an act of fantasy but a hallucination 
(Freud 1933). Thus Freud states than we are under the sway of a daydream “we do 
not experience or hallucinate anything in them but imagine something, we know that 
we are having a phantasy, we do not see but think” (Freud 1933:98).  
To continue the comparison with dreams, it is possible to conclude that 
daydreams have both an increased level of structure and coherence than night 
dreams and also a greater availability to linguistic resources; two features which I 
shall argue below are most likely connected to each other. Although I will argue that 
Freud saw acts of conscious imagination as containing a sensorial element (which 
likely aids their capacity for instinctual wish-fulfilment), they are also capable of 
constructing sophisticated chains of verbal thinking, alongside a much higher quality 
of narrative cohesion. In this sense, they are undeniably ‘conscious’ in terms of their 
level of psychic structure alongside the awareness attached to them. 
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The Structural Place of the Image in Freud’s Metapsychology 
The Freudian imagination, in occupying a ‘twilight zone’ between conscious and 
unconscious processing, arguably suffers from a lack of structural position in Freud’s 
schematic account of the mind. Alongside a differing theory of the nature of the 
imagination, it can therefore be argued that the Freudian model and the 
mentalization approach differ in the theoretical emphasis they grant the imagination. 
Freud’s model, which does not place an individual’s imaginative capacities at the 
heart of their psychic health, contains a theory of the conscious imagination that 
portrays as an inevitable but unnecessary process; a fact which is arguably reflected 
in the imagination’s lack of structural position in Freud’s schematic models of the 
mind. The mentalization model, in considering the imagination as central to 
psychological good health, unsurprisingly places it as a central concept in its 
taxonomy. Thus understanding the changed role of the imagination within the 
psychoanalytic landscape does not simply entail noticing its different 
conceptualisation, but also the differing degree of focus lent to it. 
Both the imagination (as a general phenomenon) and mental imagery (in 
particular) are, somewhat paradoxically, granted many features of unconscious 
processes, despite the fact that they are mental events which – on the level of 
awareness – are fully conscious. Conscious imaginings are treated as an offshoot of 
unconscious modes of processing; a relic from infancy and childhood which in the 
adult mind is best dampened as much as possible (the notable exception to this 
being sublimation through artistic creation (e.g. Freud 1910)). In what follows, I hope 
to demonstrate that appreciating the imagination’s schematic ‘place’ (or lack thereof) 
in Freud’s theory is an integral part of grasping he believed it to work in the mind. 
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Freud’s Developing Theories 
Freud’s theories of mental representation are inextricable from his 
metapsychological models of mind, so before continuing with an analysis of his 
commentary on the imagination I will first lay the groundwork of his 
metapsychological theory. Freud’s theories of mental functioning were in flux 
throughout his career and any attempt to be too schematic about his changing 
formulations of the mind is arguably doomed to fail; it would be unable to capture the 
fact that Freud’s theories were often subtly responsive to both the intellectual climate 
surrounding him and the clinical work taking place at his practice. Nevertheless, 
sketching the main structural features of the Freud’s theories and charting the major 
shifts across his career should help put the rest of the chapter, which involves an in-
depth analysis of some key Freudian concepts, into a broader context. As the aim is 
not to provide a comprehensive account of Freudian theory, many of the subtleties 
will be missed: the hope is that the details relevant to this thesis will be filled out in 
more depth throughout the course of the thesis as a whole.  
Joseph Sandler has argued that the chronology of Freud’s models of the mind 
can be broken down usefully into three periods of work: the pre-psychoanalytic 
‘affect-trauma model’ the ‘topographical model’ and the ‘structural model’ (Sandler 
1997). The first chronologically, the ‘affect-trauma’ phase, which may be best 
exemplified by Freud’s work on hysteria with his colleague Joseph Breuer, lasted 
until approximately 1897 (ibid). Although at this stage many of Freud’s key 
theoretical constructs were already in play (for example, Freud and Breuer drew on 
the notions of conflict and defence in order to explain the formation of hysterical 
symptoms) few had reached theoretical maturity. Freud and Breuer famously posited 
that hysterical symptoms could be cleared up through the ‘talking cure’ or ‘cathartic 
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method’, so-called because it was based on the hypothesis that transforming 
traumatic memories into speech served the function of reducing the dammed- up 
affect attached them in a process known as ‘abreaction’. Visual representation had a 
key part to play in this process, as memories would initially rise to consciousness in 
the form of a vivid recollection, often with a hallucinatory quality, and had to be 
‘translated’ from visual scenes into linguistic utterances in order for the ‘abreaction’ 
of affect to take place (Breuer & Freud 1895). The pathologisation of the image, I will 
argue below, begins in this early pre-psychoanalytic period with Freud urging his 
early patient’s to ‘describe what you see’ and become cured through their conversion 
of imagistic representations into language7 (Breuer & Freud 1895).      
What definitively marks the ‘affect-trauma model’ as pre-psychoanalytic (Freud, 
notably, used neither the terms ‘psychoanalysis’ nor ‘metapsychology’ until 1896) is 
its emphasis on external reality over internally-generated phantasy. Freud believed 
that his hysterical patients were reacting to genuine memories of seduction and did 
not take into account what he later came to see was an inherent fluidity in such 
memories as they became open to distortion by unconscious wishes. The second 
phase of writings, which introduced the ‘topographical model’, arguably came into 
being at this point, with death of seduction theory making way for a new emphasis on 
the role of fictive, ‘reality indifferent’ states of mind. This new approach 
complemented the role of childhood sexual trauma with that of fantasy and wish-
fulfilment: psychopathology and could still be seen as a reaction to infantile sexual 
experiences, yet these could have happened merely in fantasy and not in reality 
(Freud 1896b). In order to bring about psychoanalytic cure, therefore, to sift through 
                                            
7 For a discussion on the arguably contentious difference between ‘speech’ and ‘language’ see the 
section below entitled ‘Behaving like Language: Freud’s Theory of the Secondary Process’ 
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a patient’s history one must tap into the psychosexual fantasies housed in their 
unconscious mind (Freud 1900, Sandler 1997).    
Unconscious fantasies can have the same effect on the mind as real events as a 
result of the unconscious mind’s inability to distinguish between real and imagined 
scenarios (Freud 1915a). Freud proposed that this definitive feature of the 
dynamically unconscious mind is a preserved relic of the very first mental act in 
infantile life, in which the hungry infant has a wish-fulfilling hallucination of feeding in 
order to temporarily stave off instinctual cravings (Freud 1895/1950, 1911). It was 
with the introduction of the topographical model and its accompanying 
conceptualization of the dynamic, primary process unconscious that Freud 
acknowledged the existence of a mode of thought which has neither the interest nor 
the ability to connect with external reality. In the 1900 publication of The 
Interpretation of Dreams Freud dedicated an entire chapter titled “The Psychology of 
Dream Processes” to outlining this new ‘topographical model’; using it to explain how 
the mind can simultaneously generate ‘reality oriented’ and reality-indifferent thinking 
(Freud 1900:509-610). When these two modes of thought are in conflict, Freud 
asserted, psychic symptomatology arises.  
Pathology in a Freudian Context 
Before moving onto a deeper explanation of how the topographical model provides 
the context in which Freud’s characterisation of the imagination as quasi-pathological 
manifests, it is worth pausing to consider what the notion of psychopathology means 
in a Freudian context.  
Freud was revolutionary, in part, precisely because he insisted on a continuum 
between mental health and psychopathology drawing out, across an impressive 
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array of works, how the universal developmental narrative could explain both healthy 
and pathological states of mind in adulthood, with psychological growth primarily 
concerned with the resolution of a series of psychosexual conflicts that could be 
achieved in a variety of adaptive and non-adaptive ways (Freud 1905b). To take just 
one example, Freud’s comments on the development of a sexual fetish in Three 
Essays on the Theory of Sexuality show the sexual overvaluation of seemingly 
asexual objects is equally present in a ‘normal’ sexual attraction: 
What is substituted for the sexual object is some part of the body (such as the 
foot or hair) which is in general very inappropriate for sexual purposes, or some 
inanimate object which bears an assignable relation to the person whom it 
replaces and preferably to that person’s sexuality (e.g. a piece of clothing or 
underlinen ). The point of contact with the normal is provided by the 
psychologically essential overvaluation of the sexual object, which inevitably 
extends to everything that is associated with it. A certain degree of fetishism is 
thus habitually present in normal love, especially in those stages of it in which 
the normal sexual aim seems unattainable or its fulfilment prevented (Freud 
1905b:52). 
A Freudian view, then, can be seen as one in which psychopathology exists in 
degrees rather than as a set of discrete taxonomies. This fundamental guiding 
principle allowed Freud to assert that dreams and pathological states of mind 
operate according to the same underlying mechanism with the result that the 
psychological structure of one could be studied via an analysis of the other (Freud 
1895/1950). In The Interpretation of Dreams, for instance, Freud credits his success 
in understanding the origin of dream processes to his prior work on clinical 
psychopathology. In unpacking the psychological origin of the dream work he writes: 
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We have already in Chapter VI segregated this second psychical process as 
being the dream-work proper. What light have we now to throw upon its origin? It 
would not be possible for us to answer this question if we had not made some 
headway in the study of the psychology of the neuroses, and particularly of 
hysteria. We have found from this that the same irrational psychical processes, 
and others that we have not specified, dominate the production of hysterical 
symptoms… We accordingly borrow the following thesis from the theory of 
hysteria: a normal train of thought is only submitted to abnormal psychical 
treatment of the sort we have been describing if an unconscious wish, derived 
from infancy and in a state of repression has been transferred on to it. (Freud 
1900: 597 - 598). 
Dreams, an everyday occurrence, therefore serve as a reminder that primary 
process mechanisms are constantly operative in everyone; with psychopathology 
simply representing an increased influence of such processes on conscious waking 
life. Their inherently reality-indifferent nature aligns them with dream processes to a 
greater extent than other forms of conscious thought, and may therefore be guilty of 
opening up the conscious mind to a greater influence from the unconscious in 
waking life.  
Psychic Conflict 
I have argued that Freud’s claim that day-dreams are the ‘immediate mental 
precursor’ (Freud 1907: 148) of psychopathological symptoms is due to his theory 
that the imagination is a mental act which inherently pulls the individual away from 
external reality. Yet within Freudian paradigm it is psychic conflict and not reality-
indifferent processes themselves which cause the individual to fall ill. Such conflict 
may arise because the conscious part of the mind finds the unconscious wish 
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unpalatable, or because two unconscious wishes strive for different outcomes (as we 
shall see below, the lack of the principle of contradiction in the unconscious mind 
makes space for incompatible wishes or ideas to co-exist without being recognised 
as mutually exclusive) (Freud 1915a).  
Daydreams are, then, not sufficient in themselves to constitute symptoms; each 
fantasy can only account for one side of a conflictual dyad. Yet in strengthening the 
pleasure-driven side of the mind, conscious acts of fantasy can be seen to weaken 
the ‘reality oriented’ ego’s dominion over mental life, encouraging conflict by making 
wish-fulfilling states a worthy rival of ‘reality oriented’ processes. This may explain 
why Freud can be seen to adopt a moralistic tone when speaking of an individual’s 
tendency to slip into the realm of the imagination. For instance, when describing his 
preference for alternating psychotherapy with a rest-cure in Studies on Hysteria, he 
quotes:   
Moreover, I have adopted the habit of combining cathartic psychotherapy with a 
rest-cure which gives me the advantage of being able on the one hand to avoid 
the very disturbing introduction of new psychical impressions during a 
psychotherapy, and on the other hand to remove the boredom of a rest-cure, in 
which the patients not infrequently fall into the habit of harmful daydreaming 
(Breuer & Freud 1895: 267). 
Elsewhere, he seems to lament the inevitable occurrence of daydreams even in 
mentally disciplined individuals: 
Even in people who do not habitually allow day-dreams to pass through their 
minds alongside their usual activity, some situations give rise during 
considerable periods of time to this simultaneous existence of changing 
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impressions and reactions from external life on the one hand, and an affectively-
coloured group of ideas on the other. Post equitem sedet atra cura [‘black care 
sits behind the rider’]. Among these situations the most prominent are those of 
looking after someone dear to us who is ill, and of being in love (Breuer & Freud 
1895:234). 
An individual’s openness to daydreaming can be considered important because 
unconscious wishes that drive psychoneuroses are not necessarily generated in the 
unconscious, but often appear initially in a conscious form. Towards the beginning of 
“Hysterical Phantasies and their Relation to Bisexuality”, for example, Freud states: 
Unconscious phantasies have either been unconscious all along and have been 
formed in the unconscious; or - as is more often the case - they were once 
conscious phantasies, day-dreams, and have since been purposely forgotten 
and have become unconscious through ‘repression’. Their content may 
afterwards either have remained the same or have undergone alterations, so 
that the present unconscious phantasies are derivatives of the once conscious 
ones (Freud 1907: 161). 
In light of this, it can be argued, Freud’s conceptualisation of the day-dream as the 
‘precursor’ of a psychic symptom is highly apt: they are a form of mental experience 
which can initiate a series of psychological events that may conclude with the 
manifestation of a psychic symptom.   
Freud’s theory of the imagination cannot, I hope to argue below, be understood 
without appreciating his notion of psychological wish-fulfilment; a mental process 
which enacts a futile attempt to soothe the body through the mind. Taking this core 
mental act as a blueprint allows us to see how Freud adopted a notion of the 
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imagination that was not only inherently indifferent to reality, but also that should be 
juxtaposed with “secondary thought consciousness” (Freud 1897: 208, emphasis in 
the original). I will not aim to assess, at this stage in my argument, whether or not 
Freud’s theories themselves are accurate; it will be enough to aim for a clear picture 
of what he says on the matter, which is an intricate enough task in its own right.  
Word and Image in Freud’s Pre-Psychoanalytic Texts 
The pathologisation of sensorial thought processes, taken to be essentially visual in 
nature, is arguably a prominent theme in Freud’s early pre-psychoanalytic work. This 
is especially true of his work with hysterics (as mentioned above), which he took to 
be a form of neurosis that particularly afflicted ‘visual’ types. Following John 
Forrester, I will suggest Freud’s theory of language and imagery in ‘Studies on 
Hysteria’ is best understood in the context of his lesser known theory of the language 
disorder ‘aphasia’ (Forrester: 1980).  
Although neither “On Aphasia” nor “Studies on Hysteria” are metapsychological 
texts in the strict sense, they both contain explicit theories regarding the juxtaposition 
of imagistic and linguistic representation which can helpfully inform a reading of 
Freud’s later works. Rejecting the intellectual status quo at the time, Freud proposed 
explanations of both aphasia and hysteria which hinged on their conceptualization as 
psychological rather than neurological disorders. Although Freud was writing strictly 
as a neurologist at the time, the importance of this work to the development of a 
psychoanalytic approach to the mind has been recognised several times, with John 
Forrester famously concluding in “Language and the Origins of Psychoanalysis” that 
“Freud’s work on aphasia…is the sine non qua birth of psychoanalysis” (Forrester 
1980: 1).  
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One of Freud’s major contributions to the field of aphasia scholarship was his 
proposal that aphasic symptoms, rather than being the result of a lesions in the 
brain, are caused by a general lowering of function which disrupts chains of 
association between the different components of a linguistic representation (Freud & 
Stengel 1891). He re-characterised aphasia as a disorder that targets the coherence 
of mental representations by stripping words of their proper meaning. Rejecting the 
dichotomy between sensory aphasia (the inability to understand language) and 
motor aphasia (the inability to produce language), Freud proposed two new 
categories he called “verbal aphasia” and “asymbolic aphasia”. In the former, the 
internal structure of a word presentation is broken apart, in the latter it is the 
connection between word and object presentations which falls apart (Freud & 
Stengel 1891).   
Forrester has argued that Freud’s writings on hysteria paint it as a form of 
asymbolic aphasia, where ideas become fundamentally split off from the linguistic 
representations that accompany them. The difference between the aphasic and the 
hysteric, it could be argued, is that the former’s condition is global (it does not 
necessarily apply to one idea over others) whereas the hysterics ‘aphasic repression’ 
applies only to a particular, psychologically significant idea (Forrester 1980).     
Freud was also controversial in his assertion that hysteria should be understood 
as a mental rather than a physical affliction and therefore one which can be cured 
through psychotherapy; ‘the talking cure’ (Breuer & Freud 1895:30). Talking was 
believed to be ‘cathartic’: speech acts as a means that allowed the affect that built up 
in certain memories to dissipate (Breuer & Freud 1895). As mentioned above, Freud 
believed at this stage that he was working with memory rather than fantasy: the 
remembered scenes that hysterics suffered from were genuine, unelaborated on by 
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the mind in any significant way, and therefore as good as evaporated when they 
were articulated. This should be taken in context of the recognition that the aim of 
therapy at this time was the reduction of affect: a goal which became increasingly 
more nuanced as Freud’s work progressed into the realm of unconscious wishes and 
fantasies (rather than forgotten memories) (Breuer & Freud 1895, Freud 1937).  
Freud and Breuer linked the development of hysteria with the tendency to 
disconnect with reality through habitual states of reveries that quickly descends into 
psychopathology. States of reverie, if they became habitual, quickly laid the path for 
the development of full blown hysteria:  
We have nothing new to say on the question of the origin of these dispositional 
hypnoid states. They often, it would seem, grow out of the day-dreams which are 
so common even in healthy people and which needlework and similar 
occupations render women especially prone (Breuer & Freud 1895: 13). 
Anna O. in her notorious treatment by Breuer, was described as exhibiting this 
pathological tendency: 
This girl, who was bubbling over with intellectual vitality, led an extremely 
monotonous existence in her puritanically minded family. She embellished her 
life in a manner which probably influenced her decisively in the direction of her 
illness, by indulging in systemic daydreaming, which she described as her 
‘private theatre’. While everyone thought she was attending, she was living 
through fairy tales in her imagination; but she was always on the spot when 
spoken to, so that no one was aware of it. She pursued this activity almost 
continuously while she was engaged on her household duties, which she 
discharged unexceptionably. I shall presently have to describe the way in which 
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this habitual daydreaming while she was well passed over into illness without a 
break (Breuer & Freud 1895: 20 -21). 
Freud and Breuer acknowledged the pathological influence of breaking away from 
reality in states of daydreaming; so called ‘hypnoid’ or ‘twilight’ states of mind 
(Breuer & Freud 1895: 26). Importantly, they emphasise that such states are only 
pathological when they are affectively imbued; absent states of mind, when they are 
not particularly emotionally charged, do not pose such a risk8. Here we see an 
explicit manifestation of an assumption (which arguably remains intact throughout 
Freud’s writings) that affect and visuality share a close conceptual link (see also 
Freud 1923). This text also introduces the notion that linguistic thought is a healthier 
alternative to the visual imagination: hysterical symptoms, brought on by a tendency 
for imaginative thought, disappear once the highly visual memories that accompany 
them have been diffused through speech (Breuer & Freud 1895). 
Introducing Metapsychology: Language and Imagery in Freudian Theory 
Freud remained loyal to the idea that language is the dominant mode of 
representation for the ‘conscious’ mind throughout his work. In his 1915 paper ‘The 
Unconscious’, which develops and streamlines the topographical model introduced 
in ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, Freud lays out the metapsychological foundations 
for this claim (Freud 1915a).  
The topographical model, though schematic, is highly useful for a discussion of 
the imagination because of its focus on different modes of representation, which 
                                            
8 “Thus neither ‘absence of mind’ during energetic work nor unemotional twilight states are 
pathogenic; on the other hand, reveries that are filled with emotion and states of fatigue arising from 
protracted affects are pathogenic. The broodings of a care-ridden man, the anxiety of a person 
watching at the sick-bed of someone dear to him, the day-dreams of a lover - these are states of this 
second kind” (Breuer & Freud 1895:26) 
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have seen above are of paramount importance when assessing the imagination’s 
connection to a reality outside the mind. Where the later and better-known ‘structural 
model’ (Freud 1923) focused on the three components of mind the id, ego and 
super-ego (often anthropomorphically characterised as agents with conflicting 
intentions), the topographical model takes the mode of representation of a thought 
as definitive regarding its status as conscious or unconscious (Freud 1915a). 
Dynamically unconscious thoughts are represented according to the primary 
process, whereas conscious and pre-conscious thoughts must be represented 
according to the secondary process (preconscious thoughts are descriptively 
unconscious, but there is nothing preventing them being conscious per se).  
The topographical model centres on three distinct mental systems: the system 
unconscious, the system preconscious and the system conscious (Freud 1915a). 
According to this model, an idea is dynamically unconscious (or repressed) if it 
resides within the system unconscious which represents mental activity in “primary 
process” thought structures. The “primary process” is a mental event that predates 
conceptual thought and continues to exist unconsciously in the adult mind 
throughout life. It only rises to the level of awareness in dreams, psychosis and to a 
smaller extent in jokes and slips of the tongue. In “The Unconscious” Freud sums up 
the features of the primary process as follows: 
These instinctual impulses co-ordinate with one another, exist side by side 
without being influenced by one another, and are exempt from mutual 
contradiction…there are in this system no negation, no doubt, no degrees of 
certainty… To sum-up: exemption from mutual contradiction, primary process 
(motility of cathexis) timelessness and replacement of external by psychical 
reality (Freud, 1915a: 185) 
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The secondary process, in contrast, represents according to language (the word 
presentation), tolerates causal and temporal relationships, does not tolerate 
contradiction and can contain negations. Both the preconscious and conscious 
minds represent according to the secondary process as although the preconscious 
mind contains ideas which are descriptively unconscious, these ideas are capable of 
becoming conscious. The conversion of an idea from dynamically unconscious to 
preconscious involves the addition of a linguistic element as Freud describes below:  
We now seem to know all at once what the difference is between a conscious 
and an unconscious presentation. The two are not, as we supposed, different 
registrations of the same content in different psychical localities, nor yet different 
functional states of cathexis in the same locality; but the conscious presentation 
comprises the presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the word 
belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the 
thing alone (Freud 1915a: 200). 
It is hard to assign conscious, visual thinking a position within the Freud’s 
primary/secondary process distinction, even if we allow for the fact that the primary 
and secondary processes may represent two ends of a spectrum rather than a 
binary distinction (Freud 1915a: 190). By virtue of being non-verbal, visual thought is 
considered outside of the secondary process and thus, in one sense, unconscious. 
On the other hand, by virtue of being a phenomenally conscious act that the 
individual is able to “own”, thinking visually is a conscious act.  
It was with the introduction of the structural model in the ‘Ego and the Id’ that 
Freud first acknowledged the problem of a form of ‘visual consciousness’ head-on. 
This may have been part of a general overhaul of his metapsychological theorising 
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up to this point, which was failing to adequately reflect what Freud was experiencing 
in his clinical practice. By taking the conscious/unconscious nature of an idea as the 
most important feature of the mind the topographical model risks an inherent 
contradiction: if there is a part of the self that ‘knows’ illicit unconscious desires and 
another part of the self which neither knows nor cares to know, which part of the self 
decides what to repress and what to allow into consciousness? (Also see Sartre 
1943). One of Freud’s motivations for introducing the structural model was to 
mediate this problem by proposing an unconscious part of the ego: a part of the mind 
that prevents ideas from becoming conscious only by operating outside of 
awareness itself (Freud 1923).  
This, although monumental for Freudian theory in general, admittedly did not 
have a major impact on his theory of the imagination. In fact, it is during a passage of 
the “Ego and the Id” in which Freud reaffirms his belief that consciousness is 
linguistic, bound up with the secondary process word-presentation, that he 
acknowledges ‘thinking in pictures’ as an outlier: 
We must not be lead, in the interests of simplification, perhaps, to forget the 
importance of optical mnemic residues, when they are of things, or deny that it is 
possible for thought-processes to become conscious through a reversion to 
optical mnemic residues, and that in many people this seems to be the favoured 
method. The study of dreams and of preconscious phantasies shown in 
Varendonck’s observations can give us an idea of the special character of this 
visual thinking. We learn that what becomes conscious in it is as a rule is only 
the concrete subject-matter of the thought, and that the relations between the 
various aspects of this subject matter, which is what specially characterises 
thoughts, cannot be given visual expression. Thinking in pictures is, therefore, a 
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very incomplete form of becoming conscious. In some way, too, it stands nearer 
to unconscious processes than does thinking in words, and it is unquestionably 
older than the latter both ontogenetically and phylogenetically (Freud 1923: 21) 
This brief but theoretically rich passage draws together Freud’s insights on visual 
mental activity from elsewhere in his work. His opening recognition that for some 
people the process of becoming conscious relies on images rather than words can 
be seen to refer to Charcot’s notion that individuals have a disposition to be ‘auditifs’, 
‘moteurs’ or ‘visuels’ (Breuer & Freud 1895). Freud, as we have seen, drew on these 
distinctions in his understanding that hysteria is a form of psychopathology that 
typically affects ‘visual types’(ibid).   
The passage goes on, however, to draw out the universal features of visual 
thinking that cannot be consigned to individual disposition. Most notably, he claims 
that visual thinking is more primitive than verbal thought, which entails that it is an 
‘incomplete’ form of conscious awareness that can also be seen to characterise early 
development. These claims all arise elsewhere in Freud’s work. The enigmatic 
notion, for example, that pictorial thought is an ‘incomplete’ form of conscious 
awareness is repeated in ‘A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of 
Dreams” in which he attempts a delineation between the system conscious and the 
system preconscious: 
The answer can be given if we now proceed to define more precisely the third of 
our psychical systems, the system Cs., which hitherto we have not sharply 
distinguished from the Pcs... Nevertheless, even so, the fact of a thing’s 
becoming conscious still does not wholly coincide with its belonging to a system, 
for we have learnt that it is possible to be aware of sensory mnemic images to 
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which we cannot possibly allow a psychical location in the systems Cs. or Pcpt 
(Freud 1917: 232, emphasis added).  
Freud’s relegation of imagistic thought outside of ‘the system conscious’ (also 
referred to as ‘secondary thought consciousness’ in a letter to Fliess (Freud 1896a)) 
can be linked with its prominence in dreams and early childhood experiences, both 
of which are under the sway of the pleasure principle and the primary process. While 
acknowledging that people’s tendency to ‘think in pictures’ varies in adulthood, Freud 
argues that in childhood visual representations predominate. This fact can be used 
to explain why formal regression in dreaming takes the form of a translation back into 
visual scenes:  
It is moreover a familiar observation that, even in those whose memory is not 
normally of a visual type, the earliest recollections of childhood retain far into life 
the quality of sensory vividness. If we now bear in mind how great a part is 
played in the dream-thoughts by infantile experiences or by phantasies based 
upon them, how frequently portions of them re-emerge in the dream-content and 
how often the dream-wishes themselves are derived from them, we cannot 
dismiss the probability that in dreams too the transformation of thoughts into 
visual images may be in part the result of the attraction which memories 
couched in visual form and eager for revival bring to bear upon thoughts cut off 
from consciousness and struggling to find expression. On this view a dream 
might be described as a substitute for an infantile scene modified by being 
transferred on to a recent experience (Freud 1900: 546). 
The final theme that can be drawn from Freud’s analysis of ‘thinking in pictures’ in 
the ‘Ego and the Id’ comes from his reference to Johan Varendonck’s The 
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Psychology of Day-dreaming (Varendonck 1921). The reference to this work on 
daydreams as a means of elucidating the nature of visual thought implies a strong 
link between imagistic representation and acts of fantasy, implying that the nature of 
daydreaming can be explained via the nature of imagistic representation and vice 
versa. This, as I shall discuss below, is reinforced by Freud’s ample comments on 
the active role of sensory processes in shaping the manifest content of psychological 
acts such as dreams, daydreams and hallucinations, all of which distance the 
individual from reality. In particular, Freud appeals to the fact that sensory forms of 
mental representation (which are largely visual but can also be auditory) represent 
ideas in a different manner to linguistic thought (Freud 1915a).  
Freud’s extensive analysis of the active role of visual processes in shaping the 
nature and function of dreams in The Interpretation of Dreams, taken in conjunction 
with Varendonck’s rich account of their waking counterpart will be essential in 
drawing out links between visual forms of representation and reality-indifferent 
processes. Throughout the Interpretation of Dreams, for instance, Freud 
demonstrates how a visual form of representation lends itself naturally to many of the 
natural quirks of dream processes: for example, two concepts can be pictorially 
represented within one image creating the effect of condensation (Freud 1900: 334).  
The primitive form of mentation that dreams employ involves a formal regression 
back to an earlier mode of thinking, in which thoughts are unravelled into sensory 
elements and then believed with the automaticity of an external perception. This, in 
essence, is a preserved fragment of the infantile wish-fulfilling hallucination in which 
instinctual needs are represented as being met.  
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The wish-fulfilling hallucination can be considered the most important theoretical 
construct for an understanding of the Freudian imagination, as it can be used to 
explain its motivational force; its raison d’etre. Before returning to a deeper analysis 
of how visual forms of representation aid the function of conscious imagination, it is 
worth beginning with the Freud’s theory of this primitive mental act.  
The Wish-Fulfilling Hallucination as a Blueprint for the Imagination 
Freud’s link between the sensory nature of the imagination, its equation with fantasy 
and its role in insulating the individual from reality are best understood in the context 
of his theory of the wish –fulfilling hallucination. This psychological act embodies the 
basic premise of Freud’s notion of the pleasure principle: instinctual needs and 
wishes that are not being met in reality can be momentarily held at bay through the 
hallucination of their satisfaction (Freud 1895/1950, 1911).   
Freud presented a highly in-depth account of the wish-fulfilling hallucination in 
his unpublished draft Project for a Scientific Psychology, another pre-psychoanalytic 
text which, with the value of hindsight, has arguably become an integral part of 
understanding his body of work. The detailed account of hallucinatory versus ‘reality 
oriented’ thinking that Freud sketches in the project is worth considering in all of its 
theoretical depth, as it is within the context of this model that it becomes clear how 
Freud’s theory of bodily instincts leads to his conceptualisation of the imagination as 
an internally generated act which grants expression to instinctual needs. This will 
provide an important counterpoint for ‘mentalizing’ accounts of the imagination which 
arguably is presented as a form of social cognition aimed at knowledge of the 
interpersonal world. 
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Although Freud’s aim in “The Project” was “to furnish a psychology that will be a 
natural science” (Freud 1895/1950: 294) and the explanations he grants are largely 
neurophysiological, two distinct theories of mental representation nevertheless arise 
which form the backbone of Freud’s theory of the primary and secondary processes. 
The first is the wish-fulfilling hallucination of feeding, the secondary a theory of 
‘cognition’ that is developed in relation to an external world through a rudimentary 
form of language (Freud 1895/1950). It is here, therefore, that we begin to see 
substantial links form between mental imagery and a reality-indifferent attitude on the 
one hand, and language and ‘reality oriented’ thought on the other.  
Freud’s intricate neurobiological account of brain functioning in this paper is 
centred on an early version of his theory of the pleasure principle. He begins by 
positing a universal biological premise that the aim of any organism is, essentially, to 
rid itself of ‘Q’; a form of neurological energy that causes tension and pain in the 
organism as it builds. Where simple organisms (such as amoebas) are limited to this 
basic reflex arc, complex organisms like human infants have the in-built capacity to 
also develop a sophisticated manner of interacting with their environment (Freud 
1895/1950: 296).  
‘Reality oriented’ mental activity only develops once biological needs fail to be 
met through wishing alone; at the initial stage, the infant has no need to pass beyond 
a basic model of drive discharge through satisfaction. Freud sketched the 
architecture of drive discharge as follows: a felt experience of satisfaction passes 
from the infant’s perceptual system (the ‘o’ system) to another system which is able 
to register it as a mental experience (the ‘t’ system). Once it reaches this second 
system, the physical need is registered as met and the endogenous tension (that 
flowing up to the mind from the body) is released (Freud 1895/1950: 295-306). The 
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difference between the ‘o’ and the ‘t’ systems can be seen to pre-empt Freud’s later 
ideas on the distinction between the primary and secondary processes. In the 
perceptual ‘o’ system, neurones are ‘permeable’ making it easy for ‘Q’ to flow 
through them uninhibited, whereas in the more sophisticated ‘t’ system neurons are 
‘impermeable’ due to their higher resistance to ‘Q’ (Freud 1895/1950: 299).   
The ‘basic satisfaction’ format of experience falls down as soon as the infant 
feels hunger and is not instantly fed; she now has a rising level of Q from 
endogenous needs and no clear path to release. To deal with her painful hunger the 
infant performs her first mental act, a wish fulfilling hallucination which repeats the 
satisfaction she felt during the previous feed. Although the hallucinated experiences 
must be based on a genuine satisfactory experience, the wish-fulfilling hallucination 
is not a memory per se, as the infant, at this stage, does not have cognitive capacity 
to tolerate the representation of the passage of time. Freud believed that the past 
experience remains available to the infant without the capacity for memory due to a 
natural quirk of the impermeable ‘t’ neurone system: when neurones that relate to a 
perception are cathected simultaneously the contact barriers between them are 
‘facilitated’, a process by which their resistance to Q is lowered. This facilitation 
allows Q to flow more easily between these two neurones than it can through others 
and the two become linked by association (Freud 1895/1950). When the infant next 
experiences a desire for the breast, the perceptual image of the breast will become 
filled with Q (“cathected”) at the same time: a hallucination is experienced.  
Freud’s account here not only shows how wishes can lead to the hallucination of 
their satisfaction but highlights how desire can set of a chain of associative thinking 
that operates indifferently to the ‘laws’ of logic and reality. In “Formulations on Two 
Principles of Mental Functioning” this pleasure driven mode of functioning gradually 
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gives way to the Reality Principle, so called because it is a ‘reality oriented’ form of 
mental processing in which attention is directed towards incoming sensory data over 
and above internally generated hallucinations (Freud 1911). His description of the 
on-set of the Reality Principle makes specific reference to daydreaming, arguing that 
it preserves the essential qualities of earlier modes of thinking: 
With the introduction of the reality principle one species of thought-activity was 
split off; it was kept free from reality-testing and remained subordinated to the 
pleasure principle alone. This activity is phantasying, which begins already in 
children's play, and later, continued as daydreaming, abandons dependence on 
real objects (Freud 1911:221). 
Although this passage can be read as a description of origin of dynamic unconscious 
processes (which are, in essence, phantasying), Freud also explicitly directs our 
attention towards acts of conscious daydreaming, singling them out as governed by 
the pleasure principle. This sets up a clear parallel between the conscious 
imagination and unconscious processes, a fact which is bolstered by Freud’s 
frequent analysis of daydreams in terms of dreaming.  
Visual Representation in Dreams and Daydreams 
Freud’s comparison between dreams and daydreams arguably presents the richest 
source in his text for understanding his theory of the imaginative. In this section, I will 
consider some of his comments on the similarity between dreams and daydreams, 
including some suggestions drawn from both Freud’s work and Johan Varendonck’s 
The Psychology of Day-Dreams (a text which Freud, as we saw above, refers to in 
his analysis of conscious visual thinking in “The Ego and the Id”). In ‘Creative Writers 
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and Daydreaming’ Freud begins his analysis of conscious fantasy with the 
proclamation that: 
I cannot pass over the relation of phantasies to dreams. Our dreams at night are 
nothing else than phantasies like these, as we can demonstrate from the 
interpretation of dreams (Freud 1907: 148). 
One of several passages in the Interpretation of Dreams that Freud could be 
referring to above reads as follows:  
Closer investigation of the characteristics of these day-time phantasies shows us 
how right it is that these formations should bear the same name as we give to 
the products of our thought during the night - the name, that is, of ‘dreams.’ They 
share a large number of their properties with night-dreams, and their 
investigation might, in fact, have served as the shortest and best approach to an 
understanding of night-dreams (Freud 1907:148). 
It is important to begin by noting a key difference between the dream and the 
infantile wish-fulfilling hallucinations. The dream, unlike the hallucination, does not 
have the wished for object as its perceptual content; the wish itself is not represented 
directly to the dreamer. If a repressed infantile wish were to become conscious 
during sleep it would cause the ego so much anxiety that the dreamer would wake 
up. Dreams allow sleep by creating a compromise formation between the ego’s 
desire to repress the wish and the wish’s desire to be discharged via representation, 
therefore expressing wishes in a distorted or disguised form. The distortion occurs by 
a process Freud coins “dream work” in which ideas are symbolised by other, 
distantly related associations and important connections are replaced by seemingly 
trivial ones (Freud 1900:235). The dream work censors unconscious wishes in part 
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by using “day residue” (sensory impressions from the previous day) to create a 
somewhat intelligible structure to the dream (Freud 1900). The same applies to day-
dreams in arguably a much more marked degree, due to the fact that they occur 
during waking hours under the watchful eye of the conscious mind.  
I will shelve issues concerning dream censorship as they do not bear direct 
relevance to the current task. The aim, rather, is to examine the psychic 
consequences of visual representation as a general format, rather than focusing on 
the particulars of a dream’s content. Freud argues that the visual nature of dreams 
accounts for several features of dreams that make them bizarre. One side-effect is 
that dreams are taken as real before the question of belief in them arises: the dream 
is “believed” with the same unreflective immediacy that external visual perceptions 
are believed (Freud 1900:535). The linguistic, causal and rational abilities of the 
secondary process are normally able to mediate these features of visual thought but 
in the dream they have no influence, meaning that a true regression to the primary 
process always gains the status of an external perception (Freud 1900:535). The 
visual hallucination of a scene necessarily brings it into the present, it cannot be 
experienced as a possible or future scene as in normal day dreaming, where the 
secondary process influence is felt.  
Although daydreaming does not involve a full regression to hallucination, the 
secondary process influence on imaginative acts is greatly reduced. In The 
Psychology of Daydreams Varendonck argues that this allows them to benefit from 
imagistic representation in a similar manner to night dreams:  
We really see these castles before our mind's eye. We believe because we see. 
And the fore-consciousness is not alone in believing what it sees or in wanting to 
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see before believing. Even Thomas wanted to see before he would recognize 
Christ. He thereby proved himself to be merely human, a man of simple mind. 
Not only the simple in mind want to see before they believe. We may even say 
that simple-minded people believe because they have seen (Varendonck 1921: 
145). 
On this view, visual representation is a necessary step in wish-fulfilment. We may 
desire a certain outcome, but we cannot “believe in it” without having some form of 
perceptual experience to the effect that our desire has come true. Cognitive 
imagination does not have the same force as visual imagination because it is unable 
to offer anything in the way of sensory gratification. This could suggest why as adults 
much of our fantastical thought is imagistic, despite the fact that – unlike the 
Freudian infant – we have a range of cognitive capacities to employ.    
Secondly, Freud’s claim that visual thought cannot express logical connectives 
is highly similar to the ideas expressed in Varendonck’s The Psychology of Day-
Dreams. Varendonck developed a theory of the “second self” which is governed by 
the ‘foreconscious’ mind: a term which aimed to describe part of psychic life which is 
governed neither by the ‘will’ nor by practical concerns and simply seeks satiation of 
affective desires (Varendonck 1921: 13-25). One of Varendonck’s strongest 
observations is that the foreconscious mind is dependent upon visual imagery in a 
way that the rational, conscious mind is not:  
Only after I commenced the present study of fore-conscious thinking did I, to my 
great surprise, make the discovery that my second self operates distinctly by 
means of optical images, and I have reasons to think that most persons share 
this peculiarity with me (Varendonck 1921: 57). 
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When it comes to the specifics of episodes of visual thinking Freud and Varendonck 
are therefore in agreement: episodes of thinking in pictures cannot express logical 
links, including linguistic hypotheticals, which means that any idea expressed visually 
is expressed as an actuality. This gives visual thoughts a degree of felt reality to the 
extent that they compete with an individual’s attention to actual states of affairs. 
From the commentaries here, it is possible to see how visual representation as a 
form of mental content can aid wish-fulfilment as a psychological aim: by presenting 
experiential scenes that do not spell out logical connectives, visual thinking provides 
the perfect arena for ‘reality indifferent’ thought.  
‘Reality Indifferent’ Verbal Thinking 
A strong objection that could be made to the proposed link between reality-indifferent 
thinking as visual representation is the simple fact that verbal thought itself also has 
a proven capacity to keep individuals at a distance from the external world. A quick 
look at an instance of reality-indifferent linguistic thought may therefore help to clarify 
the issues at hand and help to bring Freud’s theory of the nature of reality-indifferent 
thinking into sharper relief.  
One of the most striking exceptions of language becoming actively associated 
with a disconnection from reality can be found in Freud’s theory of schizophrenic 
speech, in which language comes to exhibit many of the qualities of unconscious 
processing; forming chains of ideas that are associative and concrete while failing to 
test that the connections between ideas are even minimally realistic (Freud 1915a: 
196-204). In his 1915 paper “The Unconscious” Freud gives the following outline of a 
schizophrenic female patient seen by a colleague of his:  
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A patient of Tausk's, a girl who was brought to the clinic, after a quarrel with her 
lover, complained that her eyes were not right, they were twisted. This she 
herself explained by bringing forward a series of reproaches against her lover in 
coherent language. ‘She could not understand him at all, he looked different 
every time; he was a hypocrite, an eye-twister, he had twisted her eyes; now she 
had twisted eyes; they were not her eyes any more; now she saw the world with 
different eyes (Freud 1915a: 196-197). 
Here we can see the patient forming rapid chains of associations based on an overly 
literal interpretation of language, including a concrete reading of metaphor (the fact 
that he lover had deceived her led to the conclusion that he had – in a literal, 
physical sense - twisted her eyes). The importance of the (false) association of ideas 
in this example could be seen to highlight the importance of the ‘rules’ or 
‘mechanisms’ of thought over and above its representational format: the definitive 
feature of ‘schizophrenic language’ is the manner in which verbal representations are 
linked together associatively without reality-testing, not their linguistic nature per se. 
Yet in Freud’s analysis of this case, he seems to suggest this psychotic disorder 
provide a unique instance where verbal representations behave like non-verbal 
unconscious processes, contradicting the usual ‘laws’ of language: 
In schizophrenia words are subjected to the same process as that which makes 
the dream-images out of latent dream-thoughts—to what we have called the 
primary psychical process. They undergo condensation, and by means of 
displacement transfer their cathexes to one another in their entirety. The process 
may go so far that a single word, if it is specially suitable on account of its 
numerous connections, takes over the representation of a whole train of thought 
(Freud 1915a:198). 
83 
 
In schizophrenia, therefore, language paradoxically does not behave like language 
but is governed by processes normally reserved for dreaming and dynamic 
unconscious. Freud’s analysis here is worth considering in juxtaposition with another 
comment on dream images drawn from the Interpretation of Dreams, in which he 
states: 
Dreams, then, think predominantly in visual images - but not exclusively. They 
make use of auditory images as well, and, to a lesser extent, of impressions 
belonging to the other senses. Many things, too, occur in dreams (just as they 
normally do in waking life) simply as thoughts or ideas - probably, that is to say, 
in the form of residues of verbal presentations. Nevertheless, what are truly 
characteristic of dreams are only those elements of their content which behave 
like images, which are more like perceptions, that is, than they are like mnemic 
presentations (Freud 1900: 49, emphasis added).  
This theoretically rich passage simultaneously acknowledges the interchangeability 
of visual and verbal presentations while maintaining that visual processes have their 
own inherent properties and a unique internal logic. Thus in psychotic states, just as 
in dreams, language is characterised by the fact that it behave like an image. As a 
result, it could be argued that although instances of ‘reality indifferent’ linguistic 
thought may initially seem simply like outliers in a picture where verbal thought tends 
to be ‘reality oriented’, the fact that Freud accounts for this by positing that in such 
cases verbal thought acts as though it were imagistic can be seen to reinforce the 
idea that visual representations are inherently indifferent to reality and thus ill-suited 
to ‘reality oriented’ thought. Rather than claiming, as a brute fact, that Freud saw 
visual thinking as pulling the individual away from reality, it therefore may be more 
apt to conclude that mental imagery is a prime example of ‘reality indifferent’ thought.  
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Indeed, Freud’s theory of the primary process, which governs the unconscious 
mind, could be aptly summed up as thinking which behaves like imagery without 
necessarily being imagery. We saw above in the discussion of aphasia and hysteria 
how, historically, the primary process grew out of Freud’s pathologisation of the 
visual imagination generally until it came to take its place in his metapsychology: 
leaving Freud’s theory of the imagination not only loosely associated with 
psychopathology but, it can be argued, cast aside and theoretically underdeveloped 
as a mental process in general.  
‘Behaving like Language’: Freud’s Theory of the Secondary Process 
A discussion on the role of language in Freudian theory is an essential part of 
understanding his theory of the visual imagination. After all, it is Freud’s assertion 
that human consciousness is linguistic which excludes imagistic thought from the 
‘conscious’ mind and renders it an enigmatic player in the psychic sphere. But why 
did Freud believe that linguistic thought is inherently more realistic than visual 
thought? The reason is not clear cut: at times Freud appears to champion verbal 
thought for its important role in the clinical practice of psychoanalysis, with 
repression lifting as soon as unconscious ideas are expressed in speech with the 
appropriate accompanying affect (Breuer & Freud 1895, Rizzuto 2015). At others, 
especially in the context of his writings on development, he constructs a more overtly 
theoretical framework for language in which linguistic concepts and perception must 
interact in order to make the apprehension of external reality possible (Freud 
1895/1950, Livingstone-Smith 1999 87-88). Both views can be seen to pathologise 
the imagination. 
Once again, we may return to his early work on the Project to fully understand 
this link between linguistic thought and ‘reality oriented’ thought, in which he explains 
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in great detail how the infant uses language-like thought processes to link together 
perceptions of reality in a realistic rather than simply associative manner. It is first 
necessary return to the narrative of the hungry infant who is attempting to satiate her 
desires through perceptual hallucinations. In order to break the pleasure-unpleasure 
cycle the infant must inhibit the easy flow of Q between the desire and hallucination 
so that wishful act of imagination may be replaced by the veridical perception of 
actual external states of affairs. This repositioning of attention onto the external world 
requires an “indication of reality”, which allows the infant to begin to recognise that 
the real world does not mirror the wishful hallucination (Freud 1895/1950: 326). 
The painful “remembering” of failed attempts at satisfaction through hallucination 
prompts the growth of the ego, a mental entity defined by Freud (at this stage of his 
work) as the total sum of all of the permanently cathected neurones that are able to 
inhibit the flow of Q so that the infant need not repeat a painful experience. The 
infant uses the ego’s ability to redirect Q to help her find drive satisfaction in reality 
rather than hallucination. After blocking the direct path between desire and 
hallucination, the function of the ego is to match the image of the desired object with 
a real one through experimentation in her environment and in this way establish a 
more secure path from wish to fulfilment. The ego expects to find a matching 
perceptual image to the desired object that comes from the sense organs; when the 
perception tallies with the expected image, Q can be safely discharged. Thinking is 
active when the indications of reality coming from the outside do not match the 
mental image of the desired object and attention continues to guide perception. 
Thinking ends when the infant’s need is met (Freud 1895/1950: 326). 
In order to cognise the array of differing information coming from the 
environment the ego forms a new kind of representation: a predicate. This allows the 
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infant to understand the changing attributes of an object without having to treat each 
change as a new object entirely. Freud does this by ascribing different mental 
functions to different parts of the psyche: the part of the mind which lies external to 
the ego (not yet conceptualised as id and super-ego) understands the object as a 
physical thing whose parts stay together, whereas the ego is able to understand the 
thing along with its changing activities and properties (Freud 1895/1950:327 -333).  
The predicate is cognised via a “speech-presentation”, which allows the infant to 
understand both their environment and themselves by linking the “thing” with its 
“attribute”. Through hearing their own scream at times of unpleasure the infant links 
the two together and begins to understand her own screams as a signal of bodily 
pain. She will also be able to link it to a perceptual image of the withholding or 
absent caregiver. While the infant will not yet be able to reason that she is suffering 
because of an absent care-giver, as association is established between the self and 
environment that allows it to be characterised in a certain light that will carry over to 
future experiences. These associations will build, so in later development the infant 
will not only link their own cries with feelings of unpleasure but will also be able to 
understand that the benevolent and absent caregiver is in fact that same “thing” 
through repeated exposure to their identical physical characteristics: 
Let us suppose that the object which furnishes the perception resembles the 
subject-a fellow human-being. If so, the theoretical interest [taken in it] is also 
explained by the fact that an object like this was simultaneously the [subject's] 
first satisfying object and further his first hostile object, as well as his sole 
helping power. For this reason it is in relation to a fellow human-being that a 
human-being learns to cognize (Freud, 1985/1950: 331). 
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This process of linking is what makes up the part of secondary processes that Freud 
terms “judgment” or “cognition”. It is the part of the secondary that is most intimately 
connected with linguistic ability; it is only through bringing a range of associations 
under one word that they can be united and understood as objects. Although 
intricate, Freud’s careful portrayal of the growth of language in tandem with ‘reality 
oriented’ mental activity can help us see why he came to view it as the mode of 
representation characteristic of the Reality Principle: language allows us to tie 
experiences together in a manner which creates a unified and realistic experience. In 
this sense, Freud has been deemed with adopting the philosophical outlook of 
Immanuel Kant who famously acknowledged that humans must have the capacity to 
unify experiences through the application of concepts (Brook 2003). In the following 
chapter, I will turn to the relationship between Freud and Kant in more depth. 
Two Further Considerations: Sublimation and the Death Drive 
Before concluding this reading of the Freudian imagination, there are two potential 
objections that it will be necessary to deal with. Although space will not permit a 
satisfactory review of either, it will be worth outlining them briefly and demonstrating 
why they do not necessarily pose a threat to the reading of Freud’s theory of the 
imagination which I have presented over the course of this chapter. The first 
objection is the role of the death drive in psychic life: so far, and also in the chapter 
to follow, I have linked Freud’s theory of the imagination with Freud’s portrait of the 
mind as a pleasure-seeking entity. Yet Freudian theory underwent a significant 
paradigm shift with the publication of Beyond the Pleasure Principle in which he 
notoriously introduced the ‘death drive’: a negative psychic force which aims to 
reduce the tension in the organism and return it to an inert state (Freud 1920). This 
raises the question of how a ‘pleasure principle’ reading of the Freudian imagination 
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can be rendered consistent with his later works. There are two points worth noting 
quickly in relation to this: firstly, although the ‘death drive’ works against the idea that 
pleasure is the sole driving force when pleasure is linked with the appetitive forward 
looking quality of the ‘life drive’, Freud’s notion of ‘death drive’ can nonetheless be 
seen to preserve his key insight from the Project that pleasure is equal to the 
discharge of psychic tension (Freud 1895/1950). Defined as such, all psychic activity 
remains geared towards pleasure in so far as it aims for energic release. While such 
a reading may iron out many subtleties in Freud’s works, it will suffice for the current 
argument as it retains a strong contrast between Freud’s approach and those which 
place the imagination at the heart of psychic health (e.g. Bateman & Fonagy 2010). 
More importantly, the conclusions that Freud drew in Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
did not seem to impact his theories of daydreaming and the imagination. This is 
noteworthy, as Freud’s formulation of the ‘death drive’ was inspired in part by 
existence of traumatic dreams which did not fit into his theory that all dreams 
express disguised wish-fulfilments (Freud 1920: 13-14). As we have seen throughout 
this chapter, Freud’s theory of the imagination was strongly drawn from his ideas 
about dreaming, yet he did not revise his account of daydreams in light of the 
developments presented in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. There are a couple of 
potential reasons for this. Firstly, it is possible that daydreams simply remain under 
the sway of the pleasure principle though the entirety of psychic life, entailing that 
Freud’s theory of the imagination can be read in terms of his earlier theories. 
Perhaps more likely, however, is that Freud simply did not bestow enough 
importance upon the conscious imagination to systematically reform his theories in 
light of his own developments. As I have aimed to show throughout this chapter, 
Freud did not only bestow a pathological character upon the imagination, but failed 
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to formulate a structural position for it in his otherwise highly systematic accounts of 
mental functioning. While the impact of the ‘death drive’ on Freud’s theories of 
conscious imagination and daydreaming would be an interesting line of further 
research, pursuing it here is not necessary within the confines of the current 
argument.  
Another potential objection to the reading of Freud which I have presented here, 
in which the imagination is a force which insulates the individual from external reality, 
is the positive role granted to imaginative acts via sublimation (Freud 1914). In “On 
Narcissism: An Introduction” Freud defines sublimation as follows: 
Sublimation is a process that concerns object-libido and consists in the instinct’s 
directing itself towards an aim other than, and remote from, that of sexual 
satisfaction; in this process the accent falls upon the deflection from sexuality. 
(Freud 1914: 94). 
Freud did not consider himself a creative type but despite this (or perhaps, indeed, 
as a cause of it) he had a lifelong fascination with art, artists and the creative 
process, penning no less than 22 papers on the subject in his lifetime ( see, for 
example, Freud 1908, 1910, 1927/1928). As noted by Lionel Trilling in his Freud 
Anniversary Lecture “For Freud there is an honorific accent in the use of the word 
culture, but at the same time, as we cannot fail to hear, there is in what he says 
about culture an unfailing note of exasperation and resistance” (Trilling 1995 quoted 
in Winnicott 1971/2005:223). Freud potentially had difficulty in carving out a place for 
artistic pursuits for the same reason he failed to grant the mental image a structural 
place in his metapsychology: art exists in a psychological space that Freud found 
hard to assimilate with his general philosophy of human nature; a view which, as we 
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have seen, tends to pathologise that which is internally generated9. In his analysis of 
Leonardo Da Vinci, he even resigned himself to the fact that “Since artistic talent and 
capacity are intimately connected with sublimation we must admit that the nature of 
the artistic function is also inaccessible to us along psycho-analytic lines” (Freud 
1910: 136).  
Despite these reservations, Freud believed that acts of sublimation have the 
ability to bridge the gap between internal pathology and external achievement 
through the creation of something tangible (Freud 1910). Although this does provide 
the imagination, in a sense, with a positive aim within the Freudian paradigm, it does 
not offer a strong challenge to the view of Freud I have presented here, nor does it 
allow for the Freudian imagination to be ‘reality oriented’. Freud tended to explicitly 
link acts of sublimation to artistic and intellectual achievements whereas the view of 
‘reality oriented’ imagination, as we shall see, adopts a more general approach to 
creativity which includes a distinctly social focus (Fonagy et. al 2002). In this sense, 
‘reality oriented’ imagining is ‘creative’ according to Winnicott’s unique use of the 
term, on which he says: “I am hoping that the reader will accept a general reference 
to creativity, not letting the word get lost in the successful or acclaimed creation but 
keeping it to the meaning that refers to a colouring of the whole attitude to external 
reality” (Winnicott 1971/2005: 87). Moreover, while Freud argued that the creation of 
artistic works is a means through which one can glean some benefit - dredging it out 
of the internal world into an external, public arena - he nevertheless presents 
sublimation as the capacity to make the best of an ultimately negative psychic force. 
                                            
9 This deficit, it can be argued, was noticed by Donald Winnicott in “the Location of Cultural 
Experience” when he claims that “Freud used the word "sublimation" to point the way to a 
place where cultural experience is meaningful, but perhaps he did not get so far as to tell us 
where in the mind cultural experience is” (Winnicott 1971/2005: 128) 
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While sublimation can bend the imagination towards the external world, it remains far 
from ‘reality oriented’ imagining which, as we shall see later on is form of conscious 
experience which opens reality out to the individual. Neither ‘sublimation’ nor the 
‘death drive’ can therefore be seen to advance pertinent objections to the reading of 
Freud presented here.  
Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter I have advanced a reading of Freud’s theory of the 
imagination as force which insulates the individual from the world, capitalising on its 
sensory dimension in order to offer pseudo-gratification for unconscious wishes and 
their derivatives. I traced the development of Freud’s theory of the visual imagination 
from his pre-psychoanalytic work through to his metapsychological papers with the 
aim of demonstrating how his early theories of visual thought as the pathological 
form of representation gave way to the primary processes, leaving no structural 
position for conscious acts of imagining in Freud’s topographical model. The 
Freudian imagination nevertheless retains strong ties with primary process thinking, 
and can be considered a sophisticated elaboration of the wish-fulfilling hallucination. 
Above all, this leads to a picture of imaginative processes as distracting, distancing 
and insulating the individual from external reality. Now that a reading of the Freudian 
imagination has been laid out, I will turn to offering some context to it through a 
comparison between Freud’s theories and philosophical writings on imagining.  
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Chapter Two 
The Temptations of Dualism: Contextualising Freud’s Theory of the Imagination 
“If the present speaker had to choose among the views of the philosopher, he 
could characterize himself as a dualist. No monism succeeds in doing away with 
the distinction between ideas and the objects they represent”    
-Sigmund Freud (Minutes IV (11Dec 1912): 11) quoted in Forrester, J. (1980: 
25) 
“Dignity never goes without weakness; thoughts never go without images” 
- Jean Paul Sartre (1936:31)  
The previous chapter aimed to capture Freud’s theory of the imaginative through a 
survey of his metapsychological texts, with a particular emphasis on his juxtaposition 
of the verbal and imagistic forms of representation (Freud 1915a, 1923). I argued 
that daydreams10 are presented within Freud’s works as a visual expression of the 
internal world; a piece of psychic reality brought to life in a ‘private theatre’ (Breuer & 
Freud 1895:22). As such, their aim is not to bring the individual into contact with 
external reality but to provide an experientially infused representational format for 
instinctual wishes in a vain attempt at cathartic release (Freud 1907: 146-147). 
Where the imagination is granted a productive role, this is only in a limited sense 
through its links with sublimation and child’s play in which fantasies can be used to 
master the drive in a realistic manner (Freud 1914).  
                                            
10 As we saw in the previous chapter, an interesting feature of Freud’s account of the 
imagination is that he does not differentiate between acts of imagination, daydreaming and 
fantasy in the way that a modern reader may.  
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The ultimate aim of this thesis is to offer an alternative reading of the role of the 
imagination in psychoanalytic theory of mind. According to the view I am proposing, 
we can see the imagination11 as inherently geared towards reality, rather than 
inherently indifferent to it. For the imagination to function thus, I will argue, we need 
to appreciate that it has an often unrecognised epistemological dimension (see ed. 
Kind. & Kung. 2016). When it functions well, the imagination serves to open up both 
internal and external reality to us in a richer and more subtle form than 
straightforward veridical perception (Lennon 2015), when it functions pathologically 
this is largely in response to deep seated epistemic anxieties (Hopkins 2016). The 
mentalization model, on which I am largely basing my account of the ‘reality oriented’ 
imagination also forges links between the capacity for the imaginative representation 
of mental states (belonging to both self and other) and a felt sense of self and 
agency (Fonagy et. al. 2002, Fonagy & Luyten 2009). As we shall see later in this 
thesis (see in particular Chapters Five and Six), failures in mentalizing of various 
degrees can lead to an impoverished experience of a coherent self who is able to act 
as an active agent in her environment (Fonagy et. al. 2002 203- 253).  
Before we turn to outlining some major shifts in psychoanalytic theory that have, 
arguably, created prime conditions for a theory of the ‘reality oriented’ imagination to 
emerge, it is important obtain a richer understanding of Freud’s thoughts on the 
                                            
11 It is worth reiterating a point discussed at some length in the introduction: my aim in this 
thesis is not to ring-fence the term ‘imagination’ for a particular form of psychological 
experience, or to imply that certain psychological experiences are more worthy of the name 
‘the imagination’ than others. Furthermore, it is not my intention to claim psychological 
experiences that Freud refers to as ‘imaginative’ (such as daydreams and conscious acts of 
reverie) do not occur and have a significant impact upon the individual experiencing them. 
Rather, I hope to draw out one way of conceptualising the imagination which I believe has 
not been made explicit in psychoanalytic theory, despite the fact that advances in the field 
suggest that it is integral to a sound understanding of psychopathology. This will be referred 
to specifically as the ‘reality oriented’ imagination throughout the thesis.  
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matter. Where does Freud’s theory of the image come from? Why does it have 
different properties to conscious ‘thought’? What about mental imagery makes it 
suited to ‘reality indifferent’ thinking? Although the previous chapter offered answers 
to these questions, they were answers that were internal to the Freudian paradigm. 
While we may appreciate that Freud’s pathologisation of the image might stem from 
his early ‘cathartic’ method used with his hysterical patients (Breuer & Freud 1895), 
or that his focus on dreams as a gateway to the study of primary processes may 
have tightened the link between visuality and unconscious processes (Freud 1900), 
these observations alone do not tell us why Freud believed that mental imagery has 
the qualities that it does. Even Varendonck’s in-depth study of the image claimed to 
glean its properties through introspection, rather than a conceptual analysis 
(Varendonck 1921). 
It can be considered somewhat fruitless to search Freud’s texts themselves for 
an answer to this question as he was often highly preoccupied with establishing 
psychoanalysis’ base as a positivistic science; keen to present his findings as though 
they were the result of a sound empirical investigation (e.g. Sulloway 1979, Tauber 
2010). But, as Marcia Cavell succinctly put it: “no psychology which treats mental 
states as mental states can be a science in the sense that Freud claimed for 
psychoanalysis” (Cavell 1993: 57). In other words, if the psychological nature of 
mental states is to be preserved, their psychological nature cannot be ‘explained 
away’ by reference to the ‘mind-less’ biology underlying them. Cavell’s assertion also 
points to the fact that mental representations (whether they be imagistic, linguistic or 
something else entirely) are unobservable entities whose existence must be inferred. 
The qualities we assign mental representations cannot, be the result of an objective, 
third-person empirical investigation: one cannot look at mental representations 
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through a microscope. Freud must therefore have had prior assumptions about the 
nature of mental imagery; preconceptions that he brought to bear on his 
metapsychological formulations. As a result, philosophical texts on the image which 
deal directly with these assumptions have the potential to grant an illuminating 
context for a reading of the Freudian imagination. This does not, of course, entail 
that Freudian theory itself should be read as philosophy but merely points to areas in 
which philosophical concepts may be used as ‘tools’ to clarify complex theoretical 
postulates in his works. Moreover although Freud seems to adopt a similar theory of 
the imagination to dualist philosophers, this should not be taken as evidence that 
Freudian metapsychology is reliant on a dualist metaphysics. Freudian theory has 
been noted for its deep philosophical inconsistencies and does not seem to reliably 
adhere to one philosophical stance on the relation between the mind and body 
(Livingstone-Smith 1999). However, throughout this chapter I will argue that Freud 
seems to employ a form of representational dualism in which imagination and 
conceptual thought are seen as different in kind. It is worth noting at this stage that 
the ‘predictive processing’ models which underpin ‘reality oriented’ imagining do not 
uphold a form of representational dualism, and in fact support the notion that all 
forms of mental activity stem from the core activity of generating predictive sensory 
models (Clark 2015, Hopkins 2015). It could therefore be argued that a further 
attraction of the ‘predictive processing' model of mind is that it does not rest on 
outmoded philosophical assumptions but is compatible with a range of contemporary 
positions from within both philosophy and neuroscience 
The ‘Problem of the Image’ 
As we saw in the previous chapter, teasing out Freud’s theory of the visual 
imagination is not straightforward. Neither visual representation nor conscious 
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daydreams can be easily assimilated into Freud’s topography of the primary and 
secondary processes, even when these are conceptualised as a sliding scale rather 
than as binary categories. Mental imagery is one of only two exceptions that Freud 
gives to his general rule that human consciousness is linguistic (see Freud 1923: 
14). As the other is affect (Freud 1915a: 177-180), visual thought is the only 
exception to this rule with an inherently representational character. Unlike language, 
which Freud affords a definite structural position as the representational vehicle of 
conscious thought, mental images are presented as neither part of the conscious nor 
unconscious minds. In contrast to other forms of non-verbal representation, such as 
a conversion hysteria, an act of visual thought does not achieve the status of 
psychopathology, yet Freud nevertheless states that it is incapable of reaching the 
level of ‘full’ consciousness which, in turn, involves the ability to make connections 
between ideas (Freud 1923: 14). 
Freud’s placement of mental imagery ‘outside’ the standard metapsychological 
framework has conceptual similarities with a widespread tendency in early modern 
psychology that was identified by Jean Paul Sartre in one of his earliest philosophical 
works “The Imagination” (1936)12. In terms resonant with Freud’s contrast between 
‘word’ and ‘thing’ presentations, Sartre argues that philosophers of the early modern 
period cast the mental image as a ‘thing’: inert and causally determined, comparable 
to a passively received sensation and therefore different in kind to the activity of 
thought (Sartre 1936/2012: 20). He argues that the manner in which a philosophical 
model characterises the interaction between imagery and ‘thought’ is indicative of 
the fundamental metaphysical commitments it embodies. As he summarises:  
                                            
12  Not to be confused with his far more famous work “The Imaginary: A Phenomenological 
Psychology of the Imagination” which he published a few years later (Sartre 1940/2004). 
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In these three solutions, the image remains an identical structure. It remains a 
thing. Only its relations to thought change according to the point of view that one 
has taken on the relations of man to the world, of the universal to the particular, 
of existence-as-object to existence-as-representation, of the soul to the body. 
(Sartre 1936/2012: 20). 
Sartre’s analysis is particularly striking because he shows that philosophers who 
otherwise adhere to radically different worldviews, such as empiricists and 
rationalists, nevertheless use the same strategy in regards to the mental image: they 
characterise it as an entity which has more in common with the natural world than 
with the rational mind. As a result, imagination is not part of ‘thinking’ but a force that 
assails it from the outside.  
Sartre’s insight can be used to demonstrate that Freud’s theory of the 
imagination as a ‘low’ form of thought is overdetermined. Below, I will show that 
Freud can be seen to pathologise the image through two routes: by adopting an 
associationist theory of perception as from an empirical standpoint and from implicitly 
adopting a dualist stance which opposes rational ‘thought’ with imagination in his 
later works.  
Perception and Imagination 
One the philosophical issues that is most pertinent to the current analysis is the 
relationship between imagination and perception. In terms of his metapsychological 
theory, Freud seems to set up a contention between them (e.g. Freud 1911). The 
hungry young infant, after all, is forced to choose between letting her attention be 
taken over by imagined satisfaction and directing it to her perceptual experience of 
the external environment (Freud 1895/1950). This general set up goes on to inform 
99 
 
Freud’s portrayal of the imagination in mature adult life: although he adopted the 
term ‘imagination’ in a rather general way, the species of imaginative activity that 
Freud paid the most attention to was fantastical daydreaming, which he 
characterized as instances of unconscious processes rising into awareness in the 
form of semi-structured visual scenes (Freud 1907). On the other hand, Freud 
implicitly recognised the possibility that unconscious, imaginative forces might hijack 
an otherwise veridical perceptual experience of external reality, an insight which 
crystallizes in his theories of transference (and countertransference) (Freud 1909b, 
1912). Freudian transference is a targeted a form of psychological experience in 
which one’s perceptual experience of another becomes infused with imaginative (or, 
more technically, ‘phantastic’) elements with the result that the one experiences a 
current figure (typically the analyst) as though they were an important figure from 
one’s past (Freud 1912). One of the most notorious reports of transference 
phenomena occurred in Freud’s treatment of the ‘Rat Man’ (1909b). In the case 
notes for one of his sessions with this patient, Freud describes how his patient 
‘transfers’ an unconscious fear of his father onto Freud himself:  
Things soon reached a point at which, in his dreams, his waking phantasies, and 
his associations, he began heaping the grossest and filthiest abuse upon me 
and my family, though in his deliberate actions he never treated me with 
anything but the greatest respect. His demeanour as he repeated these insults 
to me was that of a man in despair. ‘How can a gentleman like you, sir,’ he used 
to ask, ‘let yourself be abused in this way by a low, good-for-nothing fellow like 
me? You ought to turn me out: that's all I deserve.’ While he talked like this, he 
would get up from the sofa and roam about the room,—a habit which he 
explained at first as being due to delicacy of feeling: he could not bring himself, 
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he said, to utter such horrible things while he was lying there so comfortably. But 
soon he himself found a more cogent explanation, namely, that he was avoiding 
my proximity for fear of my giving him a beating. If he stayed on the sofa he 
behaved like some one in desperate terror trying to save himself from 
castigations of terrific violence; he would bury his head in his hands, cover his 
face with his arm, jump up suddenly and rush away, his features distorted with 
pain, and so on. He recalled that his father had had a passionate temper, and 
sometimes in his violence had not known where to stop. (Freud 1909b: 209). 
In this instance, the Rat Man’s experience of Freud in external reality is infused with 
unconscious phantasy, dissolving the clean-cut division between internally focused 
imagination and externally focused perception that is set up in elsewhere in Freud’s 
writings.  
How can Freud’s theory of transference be accommodated within the reading of the 
Freudian imagination given in the previous chapter? Clearly, both daydreaming and 
‘misinterpretations’ of external reality are phenomena which are of great interest to 
the psychoanalyst which demand clear explanatory frameworks. Both can also, in a 
broad sense, be classed as imaginative in so far as they add something to 
experience which is not given in sensory perception. However, the influence of 
imaginative processes in ‘transference’ points to an alternate view of the relationship 
between the imagination and perception, one which has arguably grown far more 
dominant since Freud’s time, in which the two are understood as existing along a 
continuum (Merleau–Ponty 1968). From this point of view perception always 
contains imaginative elements: it is a simply a matter of degree13.   
                                            
13 Despite the fact that this position allows the individual to gear their attention towards 
external reality while remaining in a state of imagining, this is far from a case of ‘reality 
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The case of transference does not pose as much of a problem for interpreting 
Freud’s theory of the imaginative as it may initially seem. Following Jean Schimek 
(1975), I will argue that Freud adopts an implicit theory of perception as the 
straightforward registration of sense data that is free from imaginative influence. 
When imaginative distortions do occur, such as in the Rat Man’s experience of 
Freud, these are attributed to unconscious processes hijacking perception as though 
from the outside. This view is at odds with dominant views in contemporary 
neuroscience which state that perception is inherently and constantly subject to 
distortion, not because it is being taken over by a process that is external to 
perception, but as an intrinsic part of its nature (Clark 2016; Raftapoulos 2009) . 
Although in both cases there is a potential for perception to contain imaginative 
elements, the difference between the two is of great importance for consideration of 
the ‘reality oriented’ imagination. Firstly, Freud leaves space, if only as a theoretical 
‘ideal fiction’ (Freud 1937: 235), for perception to be the simple registration of objects 
in the external environment14. It is no surprise, therefore, that when imaginative 
elements are drawn in they have the effect of drawing the individual away from 
external reality. Contemporary theories also reject the notion that perception is the 
passive registration of sense data, although in their case ‘imaginative’ elements are 
brought in as a means of unifying and predicting a perceptual scene, with the 
paradoxical effect that brings them as close to external reality as possible (Clark 
2016; Hopkins 2012). In Chapter Four, I will outline this model of perception (which is 
                                            
oriented’ imagining. As I will outline throughout this thesis, one of the key features of the 
‘reality oriented’ imagination is that it motivated by a sense of openness and curiosity about 
the external world. Where it generates aspects of experience from within itself, these are 
concerned with providing a felt sense of self and agency.  
14 The same could be said of conscious thought. Freud seemed to take the human capacity 
for rational thought for granted and did not construe it as a developmental achievement (See 
Schimek 1975). 
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known as the ‘Bayesian Brain’ (Friston 2012; Hopkins 2012, 2016)) in greater depth 
and draw out how it underpins a view of imaginative functioning, in both its healthy 
and pathological forms, as bound up with epistemological concerns. In this chapter, I 
will simply aim to show how Freud’s portrayal of the imagination as inherently 
indifferent to reality can be better understood by reading it alongside philosophical 
works which assert a notional difference between perception, imagination and 
thought respectively.   
One of the most pressing objections to the reading of Freud that I will present is 
his frequent mentions of Kantian philosophy. Kant famously asserted that all 
perception requires imagination in order to present humans with a unified perceptual 
scene that is situated in space and time (Kant1781/1900/2007) Freud demonstrated 
a keen awareness of Kantian principles and often drew on them, establishing both 
the unconscious and psychoanalysis’ base as an empirical science (Freud 1915a, 
1915b). This establishes a potential continuum between Freud’s view and 
contemporary neuroscience: neuroscientific models that construe perceptual 
experience as predictive, such as the Bayesian Brain are founded on a Kantian 
legacy (Friston 2012; Hopkins 2012).  
Pioneering neuroscientists such as Hermann von Helmholtz and Theodore 
Meynert adopted Kantian principles as a starting point from which to describe brain 
processes that inform perception (Hopkins 2012; Makari 2008). Freud would have 
been well aware of these approaches as he was influenced by both Helmholtz’s and 
Meynert’s work (Hopkins 2012). Furthermore, George Makari has suggested that 
Freud’s knowledge of ‘active perception’ can be used to explain his developments of 
constructs such as transference (Makari 1994).  
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How can Schimek’s reading of Freud’s theory of perception be maintained in the 
face of these Kantian influences? I will deal with this objection by suggesting that, 
while Freud’s work is certainly consistent with the notion of ‘active perception’ (as 
evidenced by constructs such as transference), his own references to Kant appear to 
adopt a properly metaphysical interpretation of Kant (Tauber 2010). Freud uses Kant 
to theorize about the unknowability of certain experiences (notably unconscious 
processes) (Freud 1915a: 171) and to speculate about the role of legislative science 
(Freud 1915b: 117). So while Freud was certainly aware of evidence which 
suggested that perception was not the straightforward registration of sense data, he 
arguably did not carry this insight forward in the same manner as it has been done in 
contemporary models such as neuropsychoanalysis and attachment theory (e.g. 
Rees in Fotopoulo ed. 2012). As we shall see in some depth in Chapter Four the 
active nature of perception can be understood as driven by the brain’s need to 
predict (Clark 2016; Raftopolous 2009). It is through this view of perception that an 
epistemological dimension is introduced and a picture of the internal world as 
strategic emerges. Yet these issues, as we have seen in the previous chapter, are 
not defining features of Freud’s work. As Schimek has argued, discussing Freud’s 
implicit conceptualization of ‘external reality’:  
The reality referred to is not an absolute one, but is conditioned by the nature of 
the sensory apparatus of the human organism (involving some scaling down of 
the intensity of external stimuli by a 'stimulus barrier'). But this epistemological 
Kantian position is not extended to a psychological level, namely the relativity of 
reality to the developmental stage and motivational state of the perceiver 
(Schimek 1975: 172). 
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While Freud may sympathise with Kant’s metaphysical position (and at times even 
exploit it in the name of classifying psychoanalysis as a natural science) he does not 
frame the inherent unknowability of the world as a quotidian problem for the 
individual or a relevant factor in unconscious motivational forces. This is in direct 
contrast to the theoretical models that I will use as a basis for my conceptualization 
of the ‘reality oriented’ imagination, which construes mental activity largely arising 
out of the organisms need to predict its environment via representation (see Chapter 
Four).  
Freud’s scattered references to Kant are debatably better interpreted in another 
way. Sticking close to the aims of Kant himself, Freud appears to be seeking a 
framework which can incorporate free and rational thought within a world of natural 
causes. Following Alfred Tauber (2010), I will aim to show that Freud’s appeal to 
Kantian metaphysics is felt most in the clinical situation, in which Freud implicitly 
adopts a model of psychological ‘freedom’ that depends on the rational capacity to 
understand events in terms of their causes (Tauber 2010). I will end this chapter by 
briefly sketching out readings of Freud which have emphasised this Kantian theme in 
his work (e.g. Brook 2003, Tauber 2010), as it simultaneously reinforces the 
‘pathology’ of the visual imagination (which I have argued adopts imagistic 
representations as a means of avoiding the representation of realistic cause-and-
effect explanations) and grants an interesting point of contrast for the notion of 
‘psychological freedom’ that will be attributed to the ‘reality oriented’ imagination later 
in this work.  
Freud’s Theory of Perception 
As we have seen in the discussion above, Jean Schimeck argues that Freud 
implicitly adopts a theory of perception in which the individual has straightforward, 
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unmediated access to objects in the external world. Now that Freud’s theory of 
perception has been introduced in the context of the perception-imagination debate, 
it will be useful to consider it in more depth.  Drawing in particular on Freud’s 
comments on the perceptual system in “Formulations on Two Principles of Mental 
Functioning” (Freud 1911) and “The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis” 
(Freud 1924b) Schimek reconstructs Freud’s theory of the pathway between 
perception and mental representation as follows: 
In brief, Freud's theory of cognition implies a three-stage process: first, objective 
perceptions and memory images; second, their distortion through the discharge 
tendency of drives (mobile cathexis, primary process); and third, the partial 
undoing and restraining of this distorting process, in the service of adaptation to 
reality (bound cathexis, secondary process). Stage one, of course, does not 
exist as a distinct developmental stage but is merely the assumed cognitive 
input for stages two and three (Schimek 1975: 174). 
As described in the ‘Rat Man’ example above, this process entails that ‘objective’ 
perception is the default state which then becomes interfered with by unconscious 
processes, resulting in phenomena such as transference (Freud 1909, 1912). In 
order to bring thought and perception back in line with reality, associative paths of 
distortion must be delayed. As Schimek explains: 
In short, Freud does not question a theory of cognition which takes for granted, 
from the start, the capacity for objective, veridical perceptions and their 
automatic storage as undistorted memory contents. How could such a theory 
serve as the basis for an approach which focuses on the subjective, irrational, 
drive-dominated aspects of mental functioning, on the work and struggle to 
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separate wishful fantasy from reality? The answer is clear and familiar: by 
assuming that the distortions of initially objective and impersonal contents are 
the result of motivational factors, of wishful thinking, of drives and their inherent 
discharge tendency (pleasure principle) (Schimek 1975: 173).  
In adopting this model of perception, Schimek argues, Freud was simply falling in 
line with the dominant associationist model of perception that was dominant during 
the nineteenth century (Makari 2008, Sartre 1936/2012). This model, based on the 
empirical and materialist philosophy of David Hume (1739/1985, 1777/1977), was 
appealing during the time which Freud was working, as George Makari has 
summarised: 
Associationalism held great advantages for a scientific psychology, for it did not 
speak of the soul or insist on hypothetical faculties that in the end often seemed 
arbitrary. Instead, this theoretically minimal tool allowed for a close analysis of 
the fleeting currents of inner experience (Makari 2008: 13). 
Hume, as an empiricist, operated at the opposite end of the philosophical spectrum 
to rationalist philosophers such as Rene Descartes (discussed below) who were 
keen to draw sharp conceptual distinctions between rational thought and sensory 
experience. Indeed, Hume’s associationist philosophy of psychology entailed the 
inherent arationality of the mind, demonstrating how seemingly rational connections 
between ideas were in fact no more than connections drawn from habitually 
experiencing two (or more) ideas congruently. As he says: 
Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses, it immediately, by 
the force of custom, carries the imagination to conceive that object which is 
usually conjoined to it. (Hume 1777: 31). 
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Whether or not Freud was acquainted directly with Hume’s philosophical writings, he 
would have been suitably immersed it the language and principles of associationism 
as it formed one of the major doctrines of empirical psychology during the time that 
he was working. In Studies on Hysteria, Freud demonstrates how the same 
associative mechanism governs the formation of symptoms by linking affect 
associatively with streams of sense impressions:  
Every sense-perception calls back into consciousness any other sense-
perception that appeared originally at the same time. (Cf. the text-book example 
of the visual image of a sheep and the sound of its bleating, etc.) If the original 
affect was accompanied by a vivid sense-impression, the latter is called up once 
more when the affect is repeated; and since it is a question of discharging 
excessively great excitation, the sense-impression emerges, not as a 
recollection, but as a hallucination (Breuer & Freud 1895: 208).  
In later papers, Freud adopts the same associationism in describing the operation of 
the primary process in the system unconscious, where chains of ideas form 
associatively through the mechanisms of ‘condensation’ and ‘displacement’ 
connecting ideas that have a circumstantial link or affective resonance with one 
another. We see this manifesting in the famous example of Little Hans, whose 
phobia of horses was formed through the unconscious association between horses 
and Hans’ father (see Freud 1909a). Based on these examples, it is possible to 
conclude that the primary processes mirror the structure of perception in so far as 
they consist of the associative connection of images, yet their content, rather than 
being given in experience is generated by the unconscious and, as a result, 
unrealistic. 
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How does the Freudian imagination fit into the Schimek’s reading of Freud? As 
we saw in the previous chapter, conscious acts of imagination draw on primary 
process structures to a greater extent than secondary process ‘thought’ but cannot 
be equated with them; while they follow a general ‘associative’ logic, daydreamed 
scenarios are clearly more than a string of associated images (often involving, for 
instance, a rudimentary form of plot) (Freud 1907).  
There is nothing in Freud’s writings to suggest that his work is incompatible with 
Humean philosophy on a metaphysical level; in fact the two share an ostensible 
enthusiasm for empiricism and materialism that makes them natural allies. Yet the 
purpose of the argument presented in this chapter is not to align Freudian theory as 
a whole with a philosophy of mind, but to use philosophical insight to investigate why 
Freud ‘projects’ certain qualities onto the image in a manner that it prevents it from 
being a vehicle for knowledge. While the associationist theory of mind captures the 
character of both the image and the unconscious it does not seem fitting to interpret 
Freud’s concept of mind as associationist simpliciter. Hume, along with those who 
adopted his principles in empirical psychology, did not believe that there is an aspect 
of mental functioning that is associative, but that mental activity is governed by 
associative principles in its entirety (Hume 1777/1997).  
For the purposes of drawing out the sui generis nature of the imagination in 
Freud’s works, therefore, an in depth comparison with Humean philosophy is not 
especially useful as it fails to grasp the difference in kind between primary process 
and secondary process thought that creates a dynamic tension between the 
imaginative and ‘reality oriented’ aspects of mental experience. One of the means by 
which Freud manages to create a mind through which one form of thinking structures 
and controls the other is precisely by granting language a series of properties that 
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non-linguistic thought does not have (Freud 1915a, Freud 1923). As a result of its 
non-linguistic character, the most interesting features of the Freudian imagination for 
the current discussion are its negative qualities: how it fails, and what it lacks. In 
order to clarify Freud’s claim that the image lies outside the system conscious, I will 
turn to alternative philosophical approaches.The Freudian account of the imagination 
can be seen to resonate more deeply with dualist philosophical models which 
characterise imaginative processes as an intermediary between bodily sensation and 
the ‘thinking’ mind (e.g. Descartes 1641/1924). These approaches tend to cast the 
imagination as a species of perception that is anchored to the physical body in a way 
that ‘thinking’, a primarily mental activity, is not (Sartre 1936/2012). On this basis, 
they deny it many of properties that are considered unique to a human ‘thought’ or 
‘intellection’. The most relevant of these for the current discussion is the ability for 
the imagination to act as a vehicle for knowledge. 
Freud and Dualism 
First, it will be useful to provide some context. ‘Dualism’ is a somewhat general term 
that does not refer to any one philosophical position but invokes a wide range of 
views spanning centuries of philosophical scholarship. Dualist positions share the 
common the belief that the mind and the body have different properties, whether this 
is because they are in fact different substances (e.g. Descartes 1641/1924) or simply 
that from our limited, human point of view they seem to operate differently (e.g. 
Hasker 2003). Freudian psychoanalysis has been considered open to similarities 
with this approach as his concept of personhood includes both a biological, 
psychically determined unconscious and a rational ego that can freely bring about 
change in the mind (Tauber 2010). In light of this, comparisons have been made 
between Freud and Descartes, Kant and Spinoza (among others) (e.g. Brook 2003, 
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Tauber 2010)15. In what follows, I will suggest that Freud’s theory of imagery and 
imagination should be considered within the context of his juxtaposition between 
conscious ‘thought’ and the natural, biological world: a space which includes the 
external world, the five senses, the body, the imagination, and (for Freud in 
particular) the unconscious mind. However, it should be emphasised that 
‘representational dualism’ which I am adopting in reading Freud’s works does not 
commit him to substance dualism: an archaic philosophical position in which the 
mind and body are conceived of distinct entities which not only have differing 
properties but are formed of different substances (Descartes 1641/1924, Zimmerman 
2003). At several points in his work Freud vehemently denied the dualist position; an 
arguably natural stance for him to adopt given that dualist metaphysics strongly 
contradicts the positivistic empiricism that Freud held to be the gold standard of 
intellectual pursuits (Schimeck 1975). Nevertheless, Freud can be seen to adopt 
several dualist principles in framing the imagination as he does.  
The Image as a Middle Ground: Philosophical Accounts of Imaginative Thought 
The notion that the imagination (characterised as an inherently visual phenomena) 
represents a middle ground between the ‘thinking’ mind and the sensorial body, thus 
representing a ‘lower’ form of mental activity than conceptual, rational thinking was a 
common theme throughout the history of philosophy from the writings of the Ancient 
Greeks and throughout the Early Modern Period (Sartre 1936/2012: 9 -20). It was 
called into question, arguably, only with Immanuel Kant’s revolutionary theory that 
the imagination underlies the totality of psychological life (Kant (178/1900/2007). The 
influence of Kant on Freud’s thinking will be covered later in this chapter and 
                                            
15 The range of thinkers that have been aligned with Freud is, I believe, a symptom of the fact that his 
theory lies open to a dualist reading in general. He does not seem to adopt any one system in its 
entirety. 
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throughout the next. For now, it is worth taking a deeper look at the delineation 
between ‘thought’ and the sensory imagination in some major philosophical schools 
of thought.  
Throughout history, western philosophy has relied on a notion of ‘thinking’ that is 
different in kind to mental images, perception and other bodily sensations as a way 
of delineating mental from the physical (McDowell 1996; Sartre 1936/2012) . 
Historically, this approach was infused with theological motivations: it was the 
framework within which the existence of a non-corporeal soul could be established in 
line with religious teachings and be said to have different properties to the body, 
such as an unchanging immortal nature (Sartre 1936/2012:28). Adopting an 
underlying dualist philosophy was appealing in so far as it made space for 
physiological science to advance without threatening the dominant religious law of 
the day. Perhaps as a result of these religious sensibilities dualist metaphysical 
systems often exhibit a deep anxiety around physicality, which continued even when 
the soul came to be replaced with more neutral concept of a ‘mind’. Such 
philosophies often adopt the attitude that the ‘purer’ thinking is (the less it is 
contaminated by anything bodily), the better. Imagination and emotion, although 
acknowledged as mental acts, both have an unavoidable physical element: emotions 
come with attendant bodily sensations, imagination with attendant visual sensations, 
which, in turn, grants them both a ‘lower’ status in the mind (Descartes 1641/1924). 
Although each philosophical school adopts a unique take on the specifics of the 
imagination, a few general areas of consensus can be identified that are useful for 
our current purposes. For instance, several philosophical schools agreed that the 
imagination is a ‘low’ form of thinking; a mental act sullied by its similarity with 
physical sensations and its capacity to deceive the imagining subject. Imagination, 
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according to this point of view, should be differentiated from ‘thought’ proper (Modrak 
2016). ‘Thinking’, in contrast, has the capacity to grant the subject knowledge 
through rational insight and, through this application of reason, the individual could 
be ‘free’ in an otherwise determined universe (Descartes 1641/1924, Sartre 
1936/2012). Freud’s account of imagery and imagination arguably resonates with 
accounts given in by a broad range of philosophers through history who have taken 
a similar view of the distinction between ‘thinking’ and imagination, ranging from the 
Ancient Greek works of Plato and Aristotle through the Early Modern period (such as 
Descartes, Spinoza, Locke and Hume) (See Kind ed. 2016). Despite the fact that 
Freud’s discovery of the unconscious dealt one of the greatest blows in history to 
man’s self-image as a rational being, Freud nevertheless promoted psychoanalysis 
“as reason’s best tool” (Tauber 2010: 125). In this regard, Freud’s aims are often 
deceptively in line with rationalist philosophy; considering a knowing self-
consciousness, guided by reason, to be the pinnacle of human mental experience.   
Suspicion against the reliability of sense data in granting the individual access to 
knowledge was a prominent theme in Plato’s early Greek philosophy (Bundy 1922). 
Considering these works can give us a good sense of how deeply entrenched certain 
‘common-sense’ assumptions about the imagination are and, more importantly, show 
how the body and sensation – and by extension, the imagination- came to be set 
against knowledge (Kind & Kung ed. 2016). This view, which I have argued is 
incorporated by Freud, can be dramatically contrasted with the proposed ‘reality 
oriented’ imagination which sees the imagination as inherently knowledge seeking. 
Plato famously posited the realm of The Forms, the timeless and unchanging 
essences of things that exist in a realm beyond the physical world (Bundy 1922: 
363). Physical and material substances, including the body, were regarded by Plato 
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with upmost suspicion, considered too changeable and deceptive to grant the 
individual insight into ‘truth’. The process of gaining true knowledge, for Plato, was 
constituted by the ability to transcend the realm of physical experience. Although he 
did not write on the imagination to the same extent as his disciple Aristotle 
(discussed below), his sparse references to mental imagery demonstrate that he did 
not hold it in good stead arguing that images, as copies of material particulars, are 
doubly removed from reality, being copies of copies (Bundy 1922:363). 
It is the combination of the sensory nature of the imagination and its power to 
deceive that arguably prompts Aristotle to portray it as a ‘middleman’ between 
perception and ‘thought’ (which he called ‘intellection’) (Modrak 2016: 47). This mix 
of properties grants the imagination just enough distance from reality to be 
deceptive, but not enough to allow it to abstract from reality in the form of intellection. 
Aristotle was working with a model of perception as a passive force that takes in the 
external objects presented to it. On his view, imagination could interfere with 
perception in instances or error, but he did not believe that perception itself 
contained imaginative elements.  
Descartes: Imagination as Deception 
A prime example of the presumed connection between sensation and deception can 
be found in Descartes’ notorious sceptical challenge, in which he aimed to disavow 
all knowledge gained through experience in an attempt to ascertain which sources of 
knowledge he could infallibly trust (Descartes 1641/1924). The very first source of 
knowledge that Descartes disavowed was sense experiences, which he reasoned 
carried a high potential for error: after all, if he could be fooled into believing false 
experiences in a dream, how could he be sure that his senses were not always 
deceiving him? Descartes solution, in short, was to only seek knowledge through 
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‘thought’ or ‘intellection’; that which can give rise to knowledge independently of 
sense experience (Descartes 1641/1924). For Descartes, the radical dichotomy 
between thought and sensation parallels several other philosophical dualisms: that 
between body and the soul, rationality and animal instincts, freedom and 
determinism (Hardy 2016). In creating this dichotomy Descartes places the 
imagination closer to the material body than the rational mind. Rather than being a 
mental activity in the strict sense, the imagination is a mechanism of the body that 
mysteriously traverses the abyss between the mind and the brain and excites 
“innate” ideas so that they are experienced as conscious intellectual activity (see 
Sepper 1996). A Cartesian mental image, as Sartre describes it is “an object by the 
same right as external objects. It is exactly the limit of exteriority” (Sartre 1936/2012: 
9). 
Although Freud did not concern himself with a Cartesian level of metaphysical 
speculation, preferring instead to take the individual’s capacity to relate to reality as 
unproblematic (see discussion above), he nevertheless exploits a similar link 
between sensation and deception; creating a theoretical picture in which primary 
process mechanisms take advantage of a sensory (mostly visual) forms of 
representation as a means of negating reality by replacing it with an alternative 
perceptual scene which represents wishes as being fulfilled (Freud 1900, 1907).  
Descartes justifies his denigration of the imagination by appealing to the second 
quality of the image that Freud identifies: its inability to form rational links between 
ideas. Descartes argues that the visual imagining “differs from pure intellection only 
in this respect, that the mind in conceiving turns in some way upon itself, and 
considers some one of the ideas it possesses within itself; but in imagining it turns 
toward the body, and contemplates in it some object conformed to the idea which it 
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either of itself conceived or apprehended by sense” (Descartes 1641/1924 quoted in 
Sepper 1996:1) Although Cartesian Dualism has lost popularity over the years, the 
more neutral idea that imagistic thought differs from its linguistic counterpart because 
it cannot act as a representational vehicle for reflection persists to this day. For 
instance, Jose Luis Bermudez argues in Thinking without Words (2003) that 
linguistic, conceptual thoughts can be differentiated from non-linguistic thoughts 
according to their ability to have “intentional ascent” (2003: 151), a psychological 
function which implies reflective capacity. Reflective thought requires not only 
thinking about the content of the thought, but also its “vehicle” or representational 
structure. Freud’s comments on the differing natures of thought and imagination can 
therefore be placed within an established and continuing tradition. This does not 
necessarily commit him to a metaphysical or functional dualism but it does, arguably, 
reinforce his own claim that acts of visual thought cannot act as vehicles for rational 
thinking in virtue of their pictorial nature. This insight can then be helpfully woven into 
the seemingly paradoxical statement that the conscious experience of a visual 
thought is not fully conscious (Freud 1923). 
I have aimed to offer some theoretical background to my reading of the Freudian 
imagination by demonstrating that the presumption that the image is both sensory and 
deceptive has tended to dominate philosophical discourse. These factors combine to make 
the mental image an unsuitable vehicle for thought and, as a natural extension, for 
knowledge, including the form of self-knowledge that psychoanalysis (in its more traditional 
formulations) prizes so highly. Through considering the treatment of the image from a 
philosophical perspective, we can see how the visual imagination fails in the epistemological 
arena on three counts, all of which map onto Freud’s own metapsychological claims. Firstly, 
the mental image cannot itself express knowledge without being interpreted by more 
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sophisticated secondary process mechanisms: without being described in words. Secondly, 
visual daydreams (being derived from the wish-fulfilling hallucination) tend to interrupt an 
individual’s connection with external reality by taking over the sensory apparatus (Freud 1900, 
1907; Varendonck 1921). We see a similar worry articulating itself through various different 
schools of philosophy, leading to general suspicion of imagistic representation. The third 
epistemic failure of the image, from a Freudian perspective, concerns its content. Much like 
night dreams (although arguably not to the same extent) daydreams are indecipherable to 
their subject in virtue of the fact that they express disguised derivatives of unconscious wishes 
and conflicts (Freud 1901, 1908). 
Freud and Kantian Metaphysics: 
It will now be necessary to move beyond the philosophical theories discussed so far 
and consider Freud’s debt to another metaphysical giant: Immanuel Kant. Kant is a 
highly important figure to consider for the current project because of the manner in 
which he revolutionized our conception of the imagination and provided a blueprint 
for it as a ‘reality oriented’ mental process (Kant 1971/2005/1900/2007). Kant’s 
position will be worth setting out in some detail as it will provide the necessary 
context for both Tauber’s (2010) reading of Kant and the Kantian inspired accounts 
of perceptual neuroscience given later in this thesis (Friston 2012; Hopkins 2012, 
2016, see Chapter Four). Nevertheless, it remains far beyond the scope of this 
argument to give a satisfactory account of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, and as 
a result many subtleties will be missed. 
Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ is cantered on the devastatingly simple 
recognition that no vantage point outside our own experience is possible: one 
cannot, as a matter of principle, obtain an objective picture of the external world or 
mental processes as they are in themselves (Kant (1781/1900/2007). As such, he 
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was overtly opposed to Cartesian metaphysics and its confidence in the power of 
rational intellection to uncover ‘truth’ (Allison 2004: 21-26).If one had to nail down a 
starting point to Kantian metaphysics it would be the question of how mental 
representation is possible at all: what capacities must be present in our minds in 
order to allow us to represent the external environment in the way that we do? Kant 
operates from the starting point that we cannot know things as they are in 
themselves but are restricted to how they appear to us (Kant1781/1900/2007). 
Kant also rejected Hume’s “naïve” empiricism: Patricia Kitcher, in her work 
Kant’s Transcendental Psychology (1990), has argued that Kant is best understood 
as implicitly replying to deep problems in Hume’s philosophy of mind by showing that 
association alone could not possibly account for how we have the stable, unified 
experience of objects (see Kitcher 1990)16.  
Kant’s rebuttal of Hume’s philosophy begins by acknowledging the rudimentary 
fact that to represent an object a set of cognitive states must be consistent and 
coherent. For example, I cannot have the (accurate) representation of a book in front 
of me as both red and blue at the same time; the sensory stream must be united into 
an overarching representation. Although unity is necessary for representing objects, 
we cannot derive it from objects because the unity itself not given in perception. The 
unity of conscious experience must therefore be achieved by the synthesis of the 
manifold of sensory data in the ‘productive’ imagination (Kant 1781/1900/2007). 
                                            
16 As discussed above, Hume attempted to show the experience of objects in our environment as 
constant using the “Law of Association” (Hume 1777: 31). Kant demonstrates that this is problematic: 
if habit alone were responsible for the combination of certain sets of sensations into objects, then our 
constant exposure to a match being struck and catching fire should, in theory, cause us to see the 
match and the flame as the same object but this does not happen. We do, however, consistently see 
different parts of the same telephone as the same object (see Kitcher 1990). Teasing out the 
difference in kind between these two cases requires us to look at the ways in which our minds use 
certain principles to synthesise sense data 
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A key aspect of Kant’s metaphysical project is his assertion that there are two 
forms of imagination: the reproductive imagination and the productive imagination. 
The former, in a comparable manner to the philosophical theories of the image 
outlined so far, consists of the rebirth of inert sensory experiences which occur in the 
mind but are nevertheless ‘thoughtless’. The productive imagination, in contrast, 
consists of the same representational building blocks as thought. The productive 
imagination, importantly, is a ‘transcendental’ faculty of the mind. The term 
‘transcendental’ should not be confused with ‘transcendent’: Kantian metaphysics is 
not concerned with what goes beyond experience but what is constitutive of 
experience itself. So, for example, when Kant argues in the “Transcendental 
Aesthetic” (Kant 1781/1900/2007: 21-35) that whatever we perceive in the world we 
necessarily perceive as occurring within space, he is not trying to establish a 
relationship between the individual and the world where one asserts something 
about the other in a primarily one directional manner. Rather, his idea is that a 
certain kind of being is open to reality in a way that is shaped by the kind of being it 
is. (Kant 1781/1900/2007: 21-35)  
Due this transcendental status, the exact notion of the productive imagination is 
incredibly complex. It is also of paramount importance to the current discussion, as 
whether one views Kantian philosophy as compatible with empirical data depends, in 
part, upon the interpretation of the productive imagination that one adopts. On the 
one hand, the productive imagination may be considered as a metaphysical 
construct which allows for the possibility of organised knowledge which is 
nonetheless grounded in experience. On the other, it can be read as a naturalistic 
theory, a description of the mechanisms that the human brain puts to work when 
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creating experience. The latter interpretation will be the focus of Chapter Four. I will 
turn to the former now.  
Freud, Kant and the ‘Paradox’ of Freedom 
In Freud, the Reluctant Philosopher (2010) Alfred Tauber draws out the Kantian 
themes in Freud’s work without reference to naturalized accounts of the productive 
imagination. Instead, he argues that Freud adopts a Kantian position in trying to 
accommodate both free will and psychological determinism within the same model of 
the mind (Tauber 2010). While Freud championed psychic determinism as one of the 
core features of unconscious functioning and a highly necessary mechanism in 
formation of symptoms which spring from chains of associative ideas, he 
nevertheless makes breaking psychic determinism an essential feature of 
psychoanalysis as a form of therapy. This, Tauber argues, embroils Freud in a free 
will- determinism paradox that mirrors the approach taken by Kant. Like Kant, Freud 
appeals to reason as the bearer of free will in the face of natural causation:  
Although split by a cautious confidence and a despondent resignation, Freud 
tirelessly promoted psychoanalysis as reason’s best tool, an idea lifted directly 
from Kant’s conception of autonomy (Schneewind 1998), which follows a 
complex development of reason’s character (Tauber 2010: 125). 
He continues: 
To fulfil its function, reason must be free of experience, and, on this view, the 
ability to survey the world and make judgements depends on reason’s 
independence of that world. Reason, accordingly, resides outside the natural 
domain, free and autonomous, to order nature through scientific insight and 
regulate human behaviour through rational moral discourse. This allows creative 
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judgment in science and freedom of choice in the social (ethical) domain) 
(Tauber 2010: 127). 
Tauber argues that the conscious aspects of Freudian ego function, much like 
Kantian reason, as a mediating force (ibid 128). For Kant, reason is able to be a 
source of knowledge and normativity in a causally deterministic universe by acting as 
its own legislator, ordering the world according to its own reflection, thus taking an 
active stance in the face of the ultimate unknowability of ‘things in themselves’. 
Analogously, the Freudian ego accesses unconscious thoughts not directly (which is 
impossible) but through translating them into secondary process thought structures, 
forcing unconscious processes to structure themselves according to the ego’s own 
laws, rather than the primary processes native to the unconscious. Thus 
“psychoanalysis would empower the ego’s rational faculty by penetrating the 
unconscious to discern its functions through rational enquiry” (Tauber 2010: 129). 
Kantian reason is careful not to claim omniscience in the manner of the Cartesian 
‘intellect’ but it is nonetheless the medium through which knowledge is possible, 
bounded and qualified though this knowledge may ultimately prove to be. 
Drawing out this element of Freudian theory is useful for the current analysis 
in so far as it reinforces the idea that the imagination (in the Freudian sense of the 
term, rather than the Kantian) is an unsuitable route to self-knowledge. Rather than 
granting the mind a psychological vantage point from which it can be ‘free of 
experience’ in order to rationally understand it, and, by extension, exert some form of 
control over it, acts of imagination submerge the individual even deeper within their 
subjectivity. In drawing on visual imagery as a form of experiential ‘import’, 
imaginative processes not only ensure that they can be sensorially gratifying but that 
they resist organization into rational thought structures. As the rational organization 
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of arational experience is what constitutes psychic freedom, it follows that the 
imagination, especially in its visual form, cannot be a route to liberation from 
unconscious forces.  
Conclusion 
Freud’s assumptions about the nature of perception and thinking arguably place the 
imagination in an epistemologically precarious position. On Freud’s view, the 
inherent ability of the imagination to generate representations (with the relevant 
‘experiential underside’ (see Kind 2001)) of things which are not directly present to 
the observer cannot be used for the benefit of either perceptual or reflective 
processes. Instead, the generative power of the imagination simply exerts a pull on 
the individual away from the reality principle and towards the pleasure principle, 
creating a greater susceptibility for psychopathology in the process (Freud 1908, 
1911). In terms of perception, the imagination is portrayed as having the power to 
both pull the individual’s attention away from external sense data by eclipsing it with 
fantastical daydreams and also by co-opting perception in the service representing 
unconscious phantasies (Freud 1909b, 1912). In both cases, the aim of the 
imaginative process is not to make sense of experience but, much like a night 
dream, to gain a limited amount of psychical release for unconscious drives via the 
process of representation (Freud 1895/1950, 1901).    
Freud also denies a role for the imagination in secondary process thinking. 
While the conscious imagination may be an important signpost to self-knowledge 
(itself one of the pinnacles of secondary process activity) by providing it ‘raw 
material’ through daydreams and streams of imagery in free association, this can 
only be transformed into self-knowledge when (again much like a night dream) its 
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symbolic content is decoded and ‘translated’ into secondary process thought 
structures (Freud 1896b, 1915a)17.  
Both of these views set Freud against contemporary psychological and 
neuroscientific understanding of perception and cognition, which are considered 
psychological processes that are inherently susceptible to bias even in the absence 
of unconscious influence (Clark 2016; Raftopoulos 2009). Where Freud portrays 
failures in clear thinking, seeing and knowing as inevitable, contemporary schools of 
thought present them as necessary. This is highly important in so far as both 
perception and thought can be construed as developmental achievements. In the 
next chapter, I will discuss how an analogous position has been attained within 
traditional psychoanalytic theory by considering the relationship between imagination 
and knowledge from a developmental perspective.  
Philosophical systems which forge a dualism between thought and sensation 
may therefore provide a useful context for interpreting Freud’s theory of the 
imagination. Yet this philosophical approach is also markedly outdated and can be 
seen to project far more philosophical baggage onto psychoanalysis than is either 
necessary or desired. By defining the mind as an entity that cannot, by definition, be 
grasped via the methods of empirical science it also rules out the possibility of a 
union between psychoanalysis and empirical brain sciences a priori.  
 
 
                                            
17 It will be remembered from Chapter One that repression lifts when the relevant word and 
thing presentations are connected and accompanied by the cathartic release of the 
appropriate affect.  
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Chapter Three  
The Imagination, the Object and the Outside World 
The first section of this work introduced the concept of the imagination in traditional 
Freudian psychoanalytic theory. I argued that Freud presents the imagination as a 
sensory phenomenon with psychopathological flavour; a concrete, primitive thought 
process that has a tendency to distract and distance the individual from reality 
(Freud 1900, 1907, 1911). This is significant from a Freudian perspective, according 
to which the ultimate aim of psychoanalysis (unattainable though it may be in 
practice) is to replace the inherently unrealistic primary process with the realistic 
secondary process (a conceptual-linguistic mode of thought, whose chief aim is 
rationally-oriented action in the external world) (Freud 1923). Through a survey of 
Freud’s comments on creativity and daydreaming, we saw that at its best imaginative 
thought may be a vehicle for an act of sublimation which converts unconscious 
drives into material reality in the form of a piece of creative work (Freud 1907, 1910, 
1914). At its worst, imaginative daydreaming is a precursor for hysterical and 
neurotic symptoms, initiating a strong pull away from the external world, towards 
psychic reality (Breuer & Freud 1895; Freud 1900, 1911). 
In order to contextualise Freud’s theory of imaginative thought I drew attention to 
conceptual similarities between Freudian metapsychology and the treatment of the 
imagination in philosophy, suggesting that Freud’s treatment of the mental image 
follows a general trend of considering mental imagery ‘outside’ the mind (Sartre 
1936/2012). Against this backdrop the ‘pathology’ of the visual imagination is 
understandable: it is a psychological act that has a tendency to work against 
‘realistic’ thinking, both because it is naturally deceptive (by pulling the thinker away 
from actualities) and because it is not cognitively sophisticated enough to represent 
125 
 
‘truths’ which require language and concepts alongside mental images (Descartes 
1641/1924; Freud 1914, 1923a).  
My aim in this thesis is to introduce a new way of conceptualising the 
imagination by demonstrating that many characteristics that Freud grants it can be 
effectively reversed. Rather than distracting from the external world of ‘people and 
things’, imaginative thought may be a necessary way of ‘accessing’ the external 
world; in particular when it is characterised as a principally interpersonal 
phenomenon (Fonagy et. al 2002, Fonagy & Luyten 2009).  
Furthermore, imaginative processes may be necessary to convert affective 
experiences into a robust sense of self and agency that can be used in aid of 
establishing and maintaining a sound epistemic relationship with the world (Fonagy 
et. al. 2002:145 -253). Both of these claims are embodied within the mentalization 
model, a psychoanalytic approach which locates successful affect regulation within 
the individual’s capacity to imaginatively interpret affects and behaviour in terms of 
their underlying mental states (Bateman & Fonagy 2010; Fonagy & Luyten 2009). 
From a ‘mentalizing’ point of view the imagination is not an obstacle to knowledge, 
but the mode through which we can know the minds of both others and ourselves. 
Psychic Health Revisited: 
An important consequence of adopting an ‘imaginative’ view of psychic health is that 
it grants health an active character which goes beyond the simple absence of 
psychopathology. This approach can be traced back to the works of Winnicott who, 
as we saw in the introduction, believed that classic instinct theory did not have the 
theoretical resources to account for the quality of experience that defines psychic 
health. In “the Location of Cultural Experience”, for example, he states: 
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That is to say, we have yet to tackle the question of what life itself is about…we 
now see that it is not instinctual satisfaction that makes a baby begin to be, to 
feel that life is real, to feel that life is worth living. (Winnicott (1871/2005: 133).  
Through the argument presented in this thesis I am aiming to demonstrate that 
‘reality oriented’ imagining offers a means of characterising psychic health in a more 
active light. While Winnicott was not overtly concerned with issues surrounding 
knowledge and learning, and only wrote one paper explicitly on the topic of the 
imagination (Winnicott 1971/2005:33-50), he developed a model of mind and 
psychopathology which offered a far more nuanced and compelling view of the 
relationship between the subject and the environment than was offered by earlier 
analysts such as Freud (see Chapters One and Two) and Klein (1921/1975, 1928, 
1946, see below). According to his perspective, the individual’s capacity to make a 
connection with a truly objective reality is a developmental achievement which 
requires both the development of an affectively grounded ‘true self’ and the capacity 
to tolerate the ‘paradoxical’ nature of ‘transitional spaces’ (see below). Following 
Fonagy and colleagues in the mentalization literature, I will argue that these aspects 
of Winnicottian theory will be highly useful in understanding what it means to have an 
imaginative relationship to reality (Fonagy et. a. 2002:253-291).  
The central aim of this chapter will be to chart a conceptual journey between 
Freud’s conceptualization of the imagination and Winnicott’s theory of creativity, with 
a particular focus on the changing status of the external world for the developing 
infant across different theoretical approaches. This will be important for setting the 
scene for a discussion of the ‘reality oriented’ imagination, which centres on the 
epistemic relationship between ‘mind and world” (see McDowell 1996). Importantly, I 
hope to emphasise that Winnicott significantly disrupts Freud’s account of 
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psychopathology by arguing that it can be caused by excessive compliance to the 
external environment and not simply through unmanageable instinctual conflicts 
(Winnicott 1971/2005). Winnicott therefore ‘locates the source’ of psychopathology in 
the relationship between the individual and the environment, rather than 
straightforwardly in the internal world. Both Bion (1962/1984) and Fairbairn 
(1952/1994) follow Winnicott to certain extent in this regard, although with important 
caveats that will be discussed below.  
 ‘Frontier Concepts’ from Drives to Transitional Phenomena 
Freud and Winnicott’s differing approaches to the relationship between internal and 
external reality can be mapped onto the differing conceptions of the imagination 
relevant for this thesis. It will be recalled from the previous section that the 
imagination has often been granted a ‘middleman’ status, whether between 
sensation and ‘thinking’ (as in the works of Aristotle and Descartes) or between the 
subject and her environment (as in Kantian metaphysics). Freud and Winnicott both 
appeal to similar ‘intermediary’ spaces in their conceptualizations of 
psychopathology, Freud through his notion of the drive as a ‘frontier’ phenomena 
between the body and the mind (Freud 1915b), and Winnicott in his emphasis on the 
‘transitional space’ between the internal and external worlds (Winnicott 1971/2005). 
Both drives and transitional spaces involve the toleration of a paradox. As Freud 
describes in ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’: 
If now we apply ourselves to considering mental life from a biological point of 
view, an ‘instinct’ appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the mental 
and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli originating from 
within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made 
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upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body (Freud 
1915b: 121-122). 
In contrast, Winnicott describes his theory of transitional phenomena as follows:  
Transitional objects and transitional phenomena belong to the realm of illusion 
which is at the basis of initiation of experience…this intermediate area of 
experience, unchallenged in respect of its belonging to inner or external (shared) 
reality, constitutes the greater part of the infant’s experience and throughout life 
is retained in the intense experiencing that belongs to the arts and to religion 
and to imaginative living, and to creative scientific work (Winnicott 1971/2005: 
19). 
Freud has been accused of conceptual contradictions in his use of the term ‘drive’, at 
times equating it with the primary process and at others describing the primary 
process as the representation of the drive in the unconscious mind (Greenberg & 
Mitchell 1983; 23). For the purpose of the current argument, the relevant point is 
simply that Freud placed the ‘frontier’ within the individual, a fact which heavily 
informs his understanding of psychopathology and its clinical treatment. As I shall 
unpack below, it also directly accounts for his portrayal of imaginative processes as 
concerned with the internal world of wish-fulfilment.   
Winnicottian theory can be seen to embody a concept of ‘reality oriented’ 
imagining in a way that Freudian theory cannot. Although Winnicott’s concerns in 
formulating the notion of a ‘creative’ relationship with reality are far from Kant’s 
metaphysical aims, he can nevertheless be seen to epitomise the movement of the 
paradoxical ‘imaginative space’ from the internal world, applying it instead to the 
individual’s connection with external reality. In doing so, Winnicott not only forges a 
129 
 
theory of psychic health that goes above and beyond a simple lack of pathology but 
opens up an arena in which the imagination can be considered to be a form of 
accessing reality rather than insulating oneself from it (Winnicott 1971/2005: 133).  
Charting a conceptual course between Freud and Winnicott will allow us to see 
how psychoanalytic theory has transformed in such a way that it has created a 
demand for a form of ‘reality oriented’ imagining and will set the scene for the 
discussion to come in later chapters. After considering Freud’s portrayal of external 
reality for the developing infant, I will explore the contributions of Klein, Bion, and 
Fairbairn, finishing with a deeper look at Winnicott. In what follows, I will aim to draw 
out how this change is tied to different portrayals of infantile development across 
psychoanalytic theory. More specifically, I will argue that in order for the imagination 
to become a celebrated capacity, major assumptions about the nature of the mind 
and psychopathology found in traditional Freudian models need to change. The first 
and most obvious of these is the importance of interpersonal relationships: if 
psychological health involves the ability to understand others as beings with thoughts 
and feelings in their own right, relations with others (‘objects’) must be important 
beyond their role in the release of instinctual tension. Secondly, as the imagination is 
geared towards ‘other minds’ in reality and not only in phantasy, the external world 
must be granted a significant degree of influence over an individual’s development 
and psychological life.   
The ‘Relational Turn’ 
For the purposes of the current chapter I will not consider the contributions of 
attachment theory, the mentalization model or neuropsychoanalysis to the 
understanding of infantile development, as these will be outlined when the relevant 
empirical advances have been unpacked and discussed (See Chapter Six). Rather, 
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this chapter will set the scene by demonstrating how ‘traditional’ psychoanalytic 
theory – that which does not concern itself with empirical justification or methodology 
– has advanced in such a way that it has conceptual similarities to empirical 
approaches, leaving them open to theoretical integration. Rachel Blass and Zvi 
Carmelli describe this as the ‘relational turn’ in psychoanalysis and point to how to 
facilitate integration between psychoanalysis and attachment theory:  
The [Relational] group's basic claim is that psychoanalysis in some very limited 
sense may have always included relational elements, but its true relational 
potential had not until recently been fully recognized and actualized…the true 
father of the Relational approach is Sandor Ferenczi and his relational legacy 
may be seen to run through the teachings of Fairbairn, Balint and Winnicott, 
ultimately coming to fruition in American Relational psychoanalysis. This legacy 
is thought to be supported empirically by the findings of Attachment theory and 
infant research like that of Daniel Stern and to be philosophically grounded in 
post-modern thinking (Blass & Carmelli 2010: 217). 
As psychoanalytic theory has morphed from a reasonably homogenous body of 
knowledge united around a few key thinkers (e.g. Freud, Ferenczi, Jung) into vast 
conglomerate of approaches, one trend arguably sticks out beyond others: the move 
from a focus on individual functioning towards interpersonal approaches. This 
movement is also identified by Greenberg and Mitchell (1983), who argue:  
The most significant tension in the history of psychoanalytic ideas has been the 
dialectic between the original Freudian model, which takes as its starting point 
the instinctual drives, and a comprehensive model initiated in the works of 
Fairbairn and Sullivan, which evolve structure solely from the individual's 
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relations with other people. Accordingly, we designate the original model the 
drive/structure model and the alternative perspective the relational/structure 
model (Greenberg & Mitchell 1983: 20). 
The two schools of thought – drive/structure and interpersonal/structure-adopt 
differing stances on the nature of ‘external reality’ and the role it plays in an 
individual’s development. As discussed previously, the Freudian school places little 
to no emphasis on external reality in development and laments its apparent lack of 
influence over individuals with neurotic and psychotic symptoms (Breuer & Freud 
1895, Freud 1924a). In so far as Freud can be said to have a theory of the nature of 
reality, he characterises it as objective and a-personal (Freud 1930) The 
relational/structure model, which Blass and Carmelli note has become increasingly 
popular in recent years, defines reality as inherently personal and subjective, co-
created by the experiences of those participating in it (Stern 2003, Wallin 2007).    
Greenberg and Mitchell’s trajectory from drive/structure to relational/structure 
approaches is highly useful for the current chapter in identifying an underlying shift in 
emphasis within psychoanalysis towards the external, interpersonal world. It will also 
require the recognition of a third approach, not explicitly mentioned by Greenberg 
and Mitchell above: the object relations approach (Buckley ed. 1986), which I will 
turn to after returning to Freudian theory from an alternate perspective.  
Instincts, Narcissism and the Internal World 
Exploring the impact on instinct theory will require returning to Freud’s theory of the 
imagination from a different viewpoint: rather than considering the imagination in the 
context of Freud’s theories of mental representation, I will look at it as a natural by-
product of Freud’s status as an instinct theorist. Instinct theory, centred on Freud’s 
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theory of the drive described above, entails that psychological life is essentially an 
adaption to needs arising from within. From this vantage point, the external world 
becomes relevant to the developing infant only when it either fails to meet bodily 
needs or puts impositions on their expression (Freud 1905b, 1911, 1915b). 
Greenberg and Mitchell describe how this initial idea, founded in Freud’s 
understanding of biology, leads to a set of philosophical assumptions about the 
nature of man:  
The unit of study of psychoanalysis is the individual, viewed as a discrete entity. 
Man is not, in Aristotle’s terms, a “political animal”: he does not require a social 
organisation to allow him to realise his true human potential. Society is imposed 
on an already complete individual for his protection, but at the cost and 
renunciation of many of his most important personal goals (1912-13, 1930). It is 
thus possible and even necessary to speak of a person divorced from his 
interpersonal context in a way that is not possible given the fundamental 
assumptions of Aristotle, Rousseau, Sullivan or Fairbairn (Greenberg and 
Mitchell 1983:44) 
The developmental narrative that Freud uses to underpin this philosophical view of 
man understands infantile and childhood development as a movement away from 
autoeroticism towards mature object relating (Freud 1905b). In doing so, it 
importantly posits a form of primary narcissism as a developmental stage, rather 
than a pathological deviation (Freud 1914), a theoretical move which only serves to 
emphasise that immature thought processes should be seen as absorbed with the 
internal world at the expense of connecting with external reality (in Chapter Six, I will 
discuss how contemporary perspectives effectively reverse this position). 
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Instincts, in virtue of their general nature, entail that the internal rather than 
external reality is the driving force in psychological life. In addition to this, Freud 
specified that the contents of the instincts are initially focused on the self, primarily 
one’s own body (Freud 1915b: 181- 183).  Although Freud argued that the infant’s 
psychosexual instincts are directed towards an ‘object’, he frames the object as a 
point of instinctual release rather than social or emotional connection (Freud 1905b). 
This object, who in most circumstances is initially the mother, is primarily the means 
through which the instinct has the chance to be satisfied (Freud 1905b). Although the 
relationship between the instinct and the object may be complex (Freud describes 
the instinct’s ‘openness’ to a number of psychological mechanisms such as ‘reversal 
into the opposite’ (Freud 1905b,1915b)), the object remains, in essence, the pathway 
through which a drive can find discharge. Freud’s development perspective thus 
adopts a markedly different stance to approaches such as attachment theory 
(Bowlby 1997; Fonagy 2001). If ‘dependency’ on the object does develop, this takes 
the form of a ‘learned response’: the infant who is used to having her overwhelming 
primary process instincts reduced through a particular person will come to see that 
person as a necessary part of the soothing process. 
At the beginning of life, the very young infant uses her own body as a source of 
pleasure, aiming to recreate early memories of physical pleasure (such as feeding 
from the breast) with bodily movements that simulate the same sensations (such as 
thumb sucking) (Freud 1905b :179). In the following passage ‘Three Essays on the 
Theory of Sexuality’, Freud describes how the sexual satisfaction becomes 
disconnected from the intake of nourishment per se and becomes focused on the 
pleasure generated by an erotogenic zone of the infant’s own body: 
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The need for repeating the sexual satisfaction now becomes detached from the 
need for taking nourishment – a separation becomes inevitable when the food is 
no longer taken in only by sucking, but is also chewed up. The child does not 
make use of an extraneous body for his sucking but prefers part of his own skin 
because it is more convenient, because it makes him independent of the 
external world, which he is not yet able to control, and because in that way he 
provides himself, as it were, a second erotogenic zone. (Freud 1905b: 182). 
Freud justifies his notion of infantile auto-eroticism by theorising that early in life 
sexual and self-preservative instincts are fused, with feeding and other bodily 
pleasure acting as a ‘prototype’ of later genital sexual satisfaction (it should be noted 
here that his claim is not that self-preservative instincts proceed sexual instincts, but 
rather that early in life one cannot differentiate the two (1905b)).  
Another means through which Freud emphasised the internal focus of the 
early infant was in his proposal that narcissism is not an aberration but a normal 
developmental stage (Freud 1914). Freud’s theory of narcissism did not receive its 
first full treatment until his 1914 paper “On Narcissism: An Introduction” in which he 
proposed that narcissism should be considered a normal stage in development; a 
mid-point between autoeroticism and object relating (Freud 1914). This paper, it can 
be argued, only deepened the reliance of Freudian metapsychology on instinct 
theory. For one, narcissism was introduced as a way of saving Freud’s concept of 
libido from Jung’s proposal that it should refer to psychological investment, rather 
than wholly to the sexual instincts (Freud 1914: 74). Jung pointed to schizophrenia 
as the clinical embodiment of this problem: how could the sexual instincts account 
for the symptoms megalomania and renunciation of the external world characteristic 
of psychotic states? Freud, in response, suggested that the symptoms of 
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schizophrenia (which he termed ‘secondary narcissism’) signified a regression to an 
earlier developmental state – a ‘primary narcissism’ – in which the infant takes 
themselves as their first sexual object (Freud 1914: 75)18.Thus the introduction of 
narcissism amplified Freud’s idea that the contents of the instincts are self-focused 
and bolstered the notion that the individual is not object-seeking by nature. It can be 
argued that the first important step in the growth of an understanding of the 
imagination as a ‘reality oriented’ force is the renunciation of the drive/structure 
approach, in which neither the internal world of the ‘self’ not the external environment 
requires supplementing with imaginative processes. 
The Role of External Reality 
Freud’s account of psychosexual development can be seen to corroborate the 
account I gave in the previous chapter, according to which Freud understands reality 
as straightforwardly open to the individual so long as internal processes, generated 
by the body via the unconscious, can be overcome. Imagination, in both the form of 
artistic works and adult daydreaming, is derivative from these internal instincts and 
thus has little to do with establishing a connection between the subject and the 
outside world (Freud 1908, 1920). It is worth emphasising, however, that Freud was 
not suggesting that the individual moves through life in a solipsistic bubble, entirely 
unresponsive to his external affairs. Although the psychosexual stages themselves 
may be biologically determined, he naturally recognised that the subjective colouring 
                                            
18 Jung’s challenge was potentially devastating for Freud’s theory of mind, which could not 
survive the dethroning of sexuality without his metapsychological ‘scaffolding’ collapsing. His 
proposed solution was primary narcissism: a state where sexual investment turns upon the 
ego and treats it as an object.  It is interesting to note that Freud had trouble in establishing 
and justifying primary narcissism on a psychological level, which only served to heighten his 
reliance on biological instincts as a theoretical foundation. As Freud admits: “I should like at 
this point expressly to admit that the hypothesis of separate ego-instincts and sexual 
instincts (that is to say, the libido theory) rests scarcely at all upon a psychological basis, but 
derives its principal support from biology” (Freud 1914:79).   
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of an individual’s experience will depend on the environment in which their instinctual 
fate plays out (Freud 1905a, 1909b). This is true even in early childhood. For 
example, the way that parents approach potty training during the anal stage may 
determine how the young child manages the conflict between the ego and the id: if 
excessive demands for cleanliness during toilet training are made on the child by the 
parents, this may lead to an ‘anal’ personality later in life, with the individual 
exhibiting compulsive levels of neatness and order in their management of external 
affairs (Freud 1905b).  
Freud offers a lucid explanation of the interplay between instinctual forces and 
external experiences at the beginning of his work ‘The Dissolution of the Oedipus 
Complex’ (1924) in which he demonstrates how two views of the process of 
dissolution – an ‘environmental’ versus a ‘hereditary’ account – are not mutually 
exclusive. Freud begins by laying out these two views: 
Even when no special events occur, like those we have mentioned as examples, 
the absence of the satisfaction hoped for, the continued denial of the desired 
baby, must in the end lead the small lover to turn away from his hopeless 
longing. In this way the Oedipus complex would go to its destruction from its lack 
of success, from the effects of its internal impossibility. Another view is that the 
Oedipus complex must collapse because the time has come for its 
disintegration, just as the milk-teeth fall out when the permanent one begin to 
grow. Although the majority of human beings go through the Oedipus complex 
as an individual experience, it is nevertheless a phenomenon which is 
determined and laid down by heredity and which is bound to pass away 
according to programme when the next pre-ordained phase of development sets 
in. This being so, it is of no great importance what the occasions are which allow 
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this to happen, or, indeed, whether any such occasions can be discovered at 
all.(Freud 1924:173 – 174). 
He continues, arguing that both positions influence development: 
The justice of both these views cannot be disputed. Moreover, they are 
compatible. There is room for the ontogenetic view side by side with the more 
far-reaching phylogenetic one. It is also true that even at birth the whole 
individual is destined to die, and perhaps his organic disposition may already 
contain the indication of what he is to die from. Nevertheless, it remains of 
interest to follow out how this innate programme is carried out and in what way 
accidental noxae exploit his disposition (Freud 194a:173-4). 
The Oedipus Complex, like death, is a universal phenomenon which plays out in a 
unique way for each individual: there is no escaping the fact that it will happen, but 
the how, why and when of the situation is unique and likely to be down to a 
combination of environmental and constitutional factors. Freud goes onto specifically 
relate this example to the ‘castration complex’ which he describes as universal (in 
the male child) and yet often brought about by the behaviour of those close to him 
(Freud 1924a: 174). 
Despite Freud’s recognition of the environment is this regard, he nonetheless 
places far less emphasis on it than later psychoanalytic theorists. The external affairs 
in an individual’s life are portrayed with the air of an epiphenomena which can only 
be explanatory up to a certain point. It is tempting to borrow one of Freud’s own 
metaphors to help elucidate this. In the ‘Interpretation of Dreams’ Freud explains the 
relationship between the dream’s ‘day residue’ (memories and impressions from the 
days preceding the dream that contribute to its manifest content) to the unconscious 
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infantile wish which drives the dream by appealing to the metaphor of an 
entrepreneur and an investor (Freud 1900: 561). The entrepreneur (the day residue) 
needs an investor (an unconscious infantile wish) to provide capital in order for their 
idea to materialise (ibid). The day residue could not form a dream if there was no 
unconscious infantile wish striving for disguised expression. While the ‘day residue’ 
might provide the ‘raw material’ or ‘content’ of a dream (at least on a manifest level), 
unconscious wishes are the dream’s ‘reason for being’. In an analogous fashion, the 
incidentals of a person’s life provide filler for the instinctual conflicts which are the 
ultimate driving force behind psychological symptoms and the structure of psychic 
life. Thus Freud’s theory of the instincts can be seen to work in tandem with his 
theories of mental representation to construe the imagination as an immature aspect 
of psychic life which must be overcome in order to adaptation to eternal reality to be 
possible.  
Melanie Klein and the Introduction of Object Relations 
The task of reformulating Freudian metapsychology was taken up by the 
psychoanalytic theorists who followed him, many of whom felt dissatisfied with his 
characterisation of the instincts as blind and ‘objectless’. One of the first prominent 
analysts to do this was Melanie Klein (1946, 1961, 2013), who is worth considering 
in the context of the current argument because her work, it can be argued, 
represents the first important shift away from the drive/structural perspective towards 
the drive/relational perspective. Despite being an instinct theorist, there are several 
ways in which Klein can be seen to contribute to changing perspectives on the 
external world and the imagination. Firstly, Klein’s theory of the innate structure of 
the mind and the processes that govern it places more importance on the external, 
interpersonal environment than Freud’s approach allowed (Segal 1964/1988). Her 
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replacement of the primary process with unconscious phantasy and her development 
of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions allow for a more nuanced 
approach towards the individual’s relationship with reality than Freud’s dichotomy of 
the pleasure and reality principles. For example, Kleinian analysts (such as Ronald 
Britton (1998) and Hanna Segal (1964/1988, 1991) can be seen to use Klenian 
theory to promote a greater role for the imagination in psychological health than 
Freud through linking it with the depressive position. Finally, Klein explicitly 
introduced epistemological elements into development by postulating a drive ‘to 
know’, which she coined the ‘epistemophilic instinct’. Her view on the role of 
knowledge seeking, however is in many ways diametrically opposed to the epistemic 
elements of the ‘reality oriented’ imagination through linking it with sexuality and 
instincts in a manner that makes it incompatible with contemporary approachs 
(Fonagy 2001; Rayner 1991). Despite this, Klein’s contribution will be important to 
include as a point of contrast for how it approaches knowledge-seeking from the 
point of view of early instinctual experiences, and for how it inspired Bion’s theory of 
“K” (which will itself form an important contribution to the epistemological elements of 
the ‘reality oriented’ imagination).  
Development from a Kleinian Perspective 
Klein significantly shifted Freud’s development timeline, arguing that many important 
aspects of psychosexual life, including the Oedipus Complex, could be dated to the 
first year of life (Klein 1928). She argues that, alongside the genital sexuality that 
accompanies the Oedipus Complex, the very young infant also has a rudimentary 
ego whose function was to ward off anxieties through the generation of phantasies. 
Phantasy, from a Kleinian perspective, lies somewhere between conscious acts of 
imagination and the primary process: although it is the most primitive mental activity, 
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it is generated by the ego and is more ‘realistically’ structured than the primary 
process assuming “a higher degree of ego organization than is usually postulated by 
Freud”( Segal 1964/ 1988 quoted in Buckley 1986: xvi) By dating the Oedipus 
Complex to the first year of life, Klein ensures that thought structures which Freud 
would consider relatively sophisticated in virtue of their level of structure and focus 
on objects exist at a deep unconscious level in the mind. As such, development of 
the notion of unconscious phantasy and its inherent ties to object representations 
can be seen to elevate the status of both the external world and the role of other 
people in psychoanalytic theory.  
Klein postulated that even very young infants experience sadistic urges, which 
can manifest as phantasies of attacking, destroying or ridding the breast and the 
inside of the mother’s body of all its goodness, motivated not only by sadistic hatred 
but overwhelming feelings of greed and envy (Klein 1921.1975, 1928). It is these 
strong feelings that Klein believed lead to the first drive for knowledge – the 
‘epsistemophilic’ instinct – in the child. As she describes:  
The early connection between the epistemophilic impulse and sadism is very 
important for the whole mental development. This instinct, roused by the striving 
of the Oedipus tendencies, at first mainly concerns itself with the mother's 
womb, which is assumed to be the scene of all sexual processes and 
developments. The child is still dominated by the anal-sadistic libido-position 
which impels him to wish to appropriate the contents of the womb. He thus 
begins to be curious about what it contains, what it is like, etc. So the 
epistemophilic instinct and the desire to take possession come quite early to be 
most intimately connected with one another and at the same time with the sense 
of guilt aroused by the incipient Oedipus conflict (Klein 1928: 169 -170). 
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Far from the sub-personal predictive mechanisms outlined in the previous chapter, 
Klein’s account of the child’s ‘need to know’, which is first directed towards the 
(phantasised) internal contents of the mother’s body, can be seen as a barely 
disguised need to possess the mother in her entirety. Here Klein is arguably not 
describing a situation in which the drive for knowledge masks an underlying need for 
possession, but rather one in which possessive attitude is enacted in the desire for 
knowledge: the act of knowing becomes an act of possession, which drastcially 
distinguishes its phenomenological character from the ‘reality oriented’ imagining. 
Although it is implicit in Klein’s work that the individual, as for Freud, is fully 
formed before coming to meet the outside world (rather than formed within the 
process of relating to the external world), from Klein’s perspective the individual 
nevertheless has an in-built expectation of the nature of the external environment 
(Segal 1964/1988). This entails that the young Kleinian infant, in contrast to the 
Freudian infant, has a rudimentary capacity for representing the external world prior 
to experience. As a result of its more sophisticated structure, phantasy also has a 
greater capacity to interact with reality than the primary process. In contrast to 
Freud’s description of phantasy in ‘Formulation on Two Principles of Mental 
Functioning’ as a ‘split off’ part of the mind, Kleinian phantasy can be seen as a way 
of meaningfully processing external reality: it is the mind brought to bear on the 
world. Hanna Segal gives the following simple example of how the environmental 
factor can influence phantasy life:  
Take, for instance, the infant who is beginning to get hungry and who overcomes 
hunger by an omnipotent hallucination of having a good feeding breast: his 
situation will be radically different if he soon fed than what it will be if he is 
allowed to remain hungry for a long time (Segal 1964/1988:4).  
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The manner in which Klein transforms Freudian thinking therefore heightens the 
importance of both external reality and its interpersonal dimensions. Klein presents a 
mind in which there is an in-built expectation of objects that exists before objects 
have been meaningfully experienced. Where Freud arguably used Kant’s ‘a priori’ 
ideas to inform his theory of the secondary process conscious ego (which can ‘meet’ 
reality because it is structured according to space, time, cause and effect (Freud 
1895/1950, 1915a,) Klein sees the unconscious ‘a priori’ as a constellation of internal 
object relations. As a result it could be argued that she provides a blueprint of the 
mind which is constructed around an interpersonal external reality. 
The fact the inside/outside dimension is so important in Klein’s model of the 
mind leads to a greater descriptive emphasis on reality which Fonagy has argued is 
in keeping with general trends in post-Freudian psychoanalytic theory (Fonagy 
2001:84). In the paranoid-schizoid position, for example, aggressive phantasies are 
coupled with a subsequent fear of retaliation from the object, leading to persecutory 
anxieties which are experienced as a threat to the self from the outside world (Klein 
1921/1975, 2013). Although the infant’s perception of external world will be highly 
coloured by phantasy and thus ‘unrealistic’, Klein nonetheless grants the infant a 
clear awareness that there is an ‘outside’, coupled with a comparatively 
sophisticated set of assumptions about how objects in the outside world will behave 
in the face of the infant’s destructive feelings (Klein 1921.1975). This differs 
substantially from Freud’s account of the wish-fulfilling hallucination in early 
development, in which the infant is simply overwhelmed by internal instincts (Freud 
1895, 1911).  
Klein therefore implicitly presents the young infant as somewhat in tune with the 
external environment and can be credited with laying the groundwork for an 
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increased emphasis on environmental and interpersonal concerns. Where she 
remains loyal to the Freudian perspective, however, is in the ‘location’ of 
psychopathology within the individual: Klein adheres to the principle that an 
overreliance on primitive thought mechanisms such as splitting and projection can be 
derived from the infant’s internal world and is not a response to events in their 
interpersonal environment (Klein 1921/1975, 1961). Where the environment can play 
a role, this is in ameliorating aggressive phantasies and facilitating the transition to 
the depressive position (Fonagy & Target 2003: 124, Rayner 1991: 24). This creates 
a general picture of psychopathology as an excess of ‘internality’ that can be 
rebalanced by readjusting the individual back towards the external environment; a 
theme which is consistent across Freudian and Kleinian theory. As we shall see 
shortly, it is Winnicott’s challenge of this fundamental psychoanalytic assumption that 
allows for a picture of ‘reality oriented’ imagining to emerge (Winnicott 1971/2005: 
115 – 127).  
Imagination in the Depressive Position 
Before turning to Bion’s elaboration of Klein’s ‘epistemophilic’ instinct, it will be useful 
to consider how some prominent Kleinian analysts have portrayed the imagination as 
a ‘reality oriented’ process. Segal, in her work Kleinian psychoanalysis and art, 
argues that artistic creation represents attempts at psychic repair characteristic that 
is sought to relieve the guilt felt in this state. (Segal 1991). More fitting for the current 
debate is Ron Britton’s (1998) notion of ‘triangular space’; an imaginative mental 
capacity which he argues emerges when one resolves the Oedipus complex within 
the depressive position (the two, he believes, are mutually interdependent). Britton 
highlights how the introduction of a ‘third’ in the mind introduces the notion of 
‘outside’ perspective, one in which we may be watched by another. In a manner 
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resonant with the mentalization model, his opens up ‘space’ in the mind for the 
consideration of alternative perspectives (Britton 1998). Where Segal follows the 
‘sublimation’ approach towards a healthy use of the imagination (see discussion in 
Chapter One), Britton can be seen to provide an account that has many similarities 
to the construct of the ‘reality oriented’ imagining proposed here.  
Furthermore, Fonagy et. al suggest that the depressive position “is at least 
analogous with the notion of the acquisition of [reflective functioning], which 
necessarily entails the recognition of hurt and suffering in the other as well as that of 
one’s own role in the process” (Fonagy et al. 2002: 28). Britton grants the depressive 
position a similar role in granting the individual the recognition that their mental 
states are representative, arguing that “It is the shift from thinking one knows a fact 
to realising that one has a belief which is linked to self-awareness” (Britton 1998:14). 
Describing two situations in which, at different points in his childhood, Britton’s 
beliefs in both God and Santa Claus were drawn into question, Britton points out that 
an important aspect of total belief is that one does not take oneself to be holding a 
belief at all; one simply sees a fact about the external world: 
For me, the doubtful edifice I accepted without question as a young child 
included the existence of God. As a child I did not realise until I first encountered 
the word ‘atheist’ that I believed in God; until that moment I thought God was a 
fact. There was an unnerving precedent for this discovery, which was that at a 
much earlier age I met a child sceptic, and it was only then I realised that Father 
Christmas was not a fact but a belief of mine. (Britton 1998: 14). 
Analogously, reflective functioning requires that one comes to take a view on oneself 
as holding a thought, feeling or belief about another. It is only when mental states 
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can be identified and experienced as mental states that a difference between how 
one takes things to be and ‘reality’ becomes a possibility be entertained. In this 
regard, Britton’s thinking about the psychic space created by triangularity may be 
useful in conceptualizing a ‘reality oriented’ form of imagining. 
While the depressive position seems to make a mentalizing stance possible, the 
two should not be taken as synonymous, as depressive position is not a thought 
process which is geared towards others in an effort to imaginatively understand 
them. Internal phantasy continues to take precedent over external reality in this 
position, with objects being experienced as damaged by aggressive phantasies 
regardless of ‘true’ states of affairs. Klein followed Freud in her notion that the mind 
is constantly striving to express unconscious instincts, even when it attains the 
‘openness to experience’ characteristic of the depressive position (Rayner 1991:24). 
As Hanna Segal describes in her description of phantasy, the psychological 
mechanisms that are thought to underlie the experience of phantasy are those of 
projection, introjection and projective identification: those unconscious movements 
towards expelling the bad and equating it with environment (which then comes back 
to haunt the subject in full force) or internalizing the good and seeing it as part of the 
self (Segal 1991). By extension, the depressive position cannot in itself capture 
‘reality oriented’ imagining. 
Bion: Knowledge as an Emotional Relationship 
Klein’s notion of projective identification was transformed significantly by her disciple 
Wilfred Bion (Bion 1962/1984). Bion can be credited for enhancing the role of the 
external environment in psychoanalytic theory and bringing epistemic issues to the 
forefront through his theory of ‘K’ (and it’s negative ‘-K’) (Bion 1962/1984: 47-49, 68). 
In particular, it will be useful to consider his notions of projective identification, the 
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‘container’ and the ‘contained’ and how ‘K’ (roughly equated with knowledge and 
knowing) is granted a role in psychological transformation (Bion 1962/1984: 91).  
Bion’s reformulation of Klein’s projective identification allows for a greater 
degree of genuine interaction between mental states and the environment. In the 
following quote, for example, he demonstrates how he transforms Klein’s theory of 
projective identification as a form of omnipotent phantasy into a mode of experience 
where both the subject and the object are transformed by the process of projective 
identification. In doing so, he introduces his own concepts of the ‘container’ and the 
‘contained’:  
The activity we know as “thinking” was in origin a procedure for unburdening the 
psyche of accretions of stimuli and the mechanism is that which has been 
described by Melanie Klein as projective identification. The broad outline of this 
theory is that there exists an omnipotent phantasy that it is possible to split off 
temporarily undesired, though sometimes valued, parts of the personality and 
put them into an object (Bion 1962/1984: 31)  
He continues, outlining the possibility that one can unconsciously coerce reality to 
act in accordance with phantasy: 
It is also possible, and in fact essential, to observe evidence which shows that a 
patient in whom the operation of this omnipotent phantasy can be deduced is 
capable of behaviour which is related to a counterpart in reality of this phantasy. 
The patient, even at the outset of life, has contact with reality sufficient to enable 
him to act in a way that engenders feelings in the mother that he does not want, 
or which he wants the mother to have (Bion 1962/1984: 31).  
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In ‘good enough’ circumstance, whether in development or analysis, the 
container/contained relationship can be a productive union. Later in the same work, 
Bion asserts: “Container and contained are susceptible of conjunction and 
permeation by emotion. Thus conjoined or permeated or both they change in a 
manner usually described as growth” (Bion 1962/1984: 90). 
Bion uses these concepts considerably in his understanding of the analytic 
situation and his account of psychic change. His notion of container/contained is 
clearly that of an interpersonal relationship, with each element granted the potential 
to genuinely impact the other. It is within this context that Bion introduces the role of 
knowledge and knowing through ‘K’, where ‘K’ in understood as an act of linking 
within a relationship (Bion 1962/1984:47). Far from the dispassionate grasp of 
declarative facts, Bion believed that ‘knowing’ at its core was a primitive experience 
which is “an emotion on par with love (L) or hate (H)” (Stein 1999: 100). Containment 
by another is essential for knowledge as it is the means through which primitive 
emotional experiences can coalesce into thinking (Bion 1959: 314, 1962/1984:31). 
Bion’s theory of the interpersonal nature of thought itself therefore represents a 
drastic move away from the Freudian secondary process which, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, lies closer to the solitary dispassionate rationality of Cartesian or 
Kantian philosophy.  
For the purposes of the current argument Bion’s thinking is useful in several 
ways. Pertaining to the argument presented in this thesis as a whole, we can see 
that Bion’s conceptualization of thought as an interpersonal activity can be integrated 
into evolutionary theories about the co-operative nature of reasoning and language 
(Csibra & Gergely 2009; Fonagy et. al. 2017a, 2017b, see Chapters Five and Eight 
for a full exposition). His notion that knowledge ‘K’ stems from an emotionally 
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primitive place in the same manner as love (L) and hate (H) may be helpfully applied 
to the notion of epistemic trust (see Fonagy et. al. 2017a, 2017, Introduction ‘Part 
Two’ and Chapter Seven) in which the right emotional environment is needed in 
order for knowledge and curiosity about minds and communication to flourish. These 
issues will be returned to in due course.  
In terms of the argument presented in this chapter, which aims to demonstrate 
how shifts in psychoanalytic theory have created a natural demand for a theory of 
the imaginative which is ‘reality oriented’ and contains an epistemological dimension. 
Bion, it can be argued, not only grants ‘K’ a greater place in his metapsychology than 
Klein granted the ‘epistemophilic’ instinct, but also changed its stimulus. Where Klein 
followed Freud in seeing curiosity as a drive concerned with sexuality and bodily 
functioning (Klein 1928), Bion granted it a much broader psychological function (Bion 
1962/1984). His theory of containment shifts Klein’s characterisation of knowledge 
as a form of sadistic possession operating from the ‘inside out’ and instead shows 
that it can perform a regulating functioning from the ‘outside in’ (Bion 1962/1984: 98-
99). In line with Bion’s claim that he has “suggested an emended version of Freud’s 
pleasure principle theory that the reality principle should be considered to operate 
co-existentially with the pleasure principle” (Bion 1962/1984:31), the notion of 
containment places the drive for knowledge in an intermediary zone between the 
pleasure and reality principles.  
It also shows how being known and understood by another can fundamentally 
impact the subject’s mind. While Bion tends to assign the role of the ‘container’ 
(understandably) to the analyst, he can also be seen to capture something about 
reflective functioning which in turn informs our conception of the ‘reality oriented’ 
imagination. When in a state of imaginative engagement with reality (in a state of 
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‘reality oriented’ imagining) the subject is open to acting as a container for others. 
While they do not necessarily need to enact this ability, it may be an important 
feature of healthy conscious life that it remains a potential (see Allen & Fonagy 2006: 
45). One who could not act as a container for others, it could be argued, may be 
‘reality oriented’ in the limited sense that their experience is veridical (rather than 
delusional) but this does not in itself amount to healthy imaginative engagement. 
This highlights another important divergence between the ‘reality oriented’ 
imagination and the Freudian Reality Principle, which would not consider the lack of 
ability to contain another as a psychological deficit.  
Pathologizing Reality: The Developmental Theories of Fairbairn and Winnicott 
Although Klein transformed the Freudian mind into an entity with a greater degree of 
structure, reality-orientation and focus on interpersonal affairs, it nevertheless 
remains a species of instinct theory which construes the imagination as generated by 
an internal stimulus – the instincts – which then come to cloud the subject’s 
experience of the external world with aspects of internal life (Segal 1991). Thus 
‘internality’ remains pathologised, and a clear vision of ‘external reality’ the cure. 
Bion, while he greatly expands the role of external reality, grants it an interpersonal 
orientation and recognises epistemic issues as important, continues to see internal 
reality as inherently under threat of disorder. As a result, he portrays internal 
experience as requiring structuring from without (Bion 1959). The key difference 
between Bion and Freud in this regard, of course, is that Freud considered reality 
itself (or, more specifically, our experience of reality itself) as an impersonal 
experience organised according Kantian constructs and therefore imposing an 
inherent ‘rational structure’ on thought (Freud 1915a). Bion, in contrast, places the 
structuring forces within another’s subjectivity.  
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Neither of them, however, adopt the much more radical proposal most famously 
asserted by Donald Winnicott that compliance to reality itself constitutes a form of 
sickness (Winnicott 1971/2005). On Winnicott’s view, as I shall unpack shortly, 
pathology is not located within the self to be cured from the outside nor an instance 
of internal factors eclipsing a subject’s access to (and engagement with) the external 
world. Rather, pathology can just as easily take the form of the external world 
drowning out an internal world constituted by a sense of self and spontaneity 
(Winnicott 1971/2005: 71- 87). As I shall explain shortly, Winnicott is the first analyst 
to assert that ‘internality’ risks being ‘too little’ as well as ‘too much’ and ‘too 
structured’ as opposed to ‘disordered’ (as we see in Bion) in a manner that was not a 
prominent worries for the analytic thinkers discussed so far.  
Before we turn to an in depth look at Winnicott’s pivotal role in establishing the 
‘reality oriented’ imagination, it will be necessary to consider another thinker who 
proceeded him: Ronald Fairbairn (1952/1994). Fairbairn is an important thinker to 
consider in the current context for his conceptualization of an internal world that is 
simultaneously strategic and compensatory. As a result he presents an interesting 
picture of the connection between imagination and psychopathology that is distinct 
from those proposed by Freudian and Kleinian analysts. For the purposes of the 
current argument, Fairbairn can be credited with providing a new understanding of 
human motivation that pre-empts many of the theoretical propositions of attachment 
theory19 (Grotstein & Rinsley 1994).  
                                            
19 Fairbairn’s contributions were arguably undervalued and misunderstood in his own time. It 
has been argued that his ‘complete rejection’ of Freud’s structural theory led to an ‘almost 
phobic avoidance’ of the deeper implications of his ideas, as many analysts who were his 
contemporaries were so steeped in classical metapsychology that they could find no space 
for Fairbairn’s unique insights into the nature of the self (see Grotstein & Rinsley 1994). The 
fact that the psychoanalytic landscape was saturated in Freudian terminology only 
confounded the issue, as Fairbairn writes in ‘Freudian language’ referring to ‘objects’ ‘libido’ 
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Fairbairn was revolutionary for his time in his image of man as essentially a 
social creature who seeks affectional bonds as a primary aim (Fairbairn 1952/1994). 
Throughout his writings he argues that psychopathology arises from the (inevitable) 
failures in the relationships with early caregivers, coupled with the internal attempts 
to compensate for these, which often led to the development of both schizoid 
tendencies and a bad self-image derived from the internalisation of bad objects. 
Through analysis, the patient can hope restore their capacity for “making direct and 
full contact with real other human beings”. (Greenberg & Mitchell 1983: 156) 
From the start of life, Fairbairn argued, the infant is object seeking, motivated by 
his extreme dependence on caregivers. In stark contrast to Freud’s notion that 
the goal of the organism is attaining pleasure through the discharge of the drive 
(with even the reality principle being employed with the ultimate aim of achieving 
pleasure), Fairbairn devised a model of the mind that centred on the notion of a 
‘self’ or ‘selfobject’ which is inevitably bound up in relationships with others. He 
replaced Freud’s psychosexual stages with a psychological journey from 
complete ‘infantile dependence’ with its inherently asymmetrical structure of one-
way dependence towards ‘mature dependence’ which involves a mutual, 
reciprocal bond with another (Fairbairn 1952/1994: 42).  
Fairbairn did not deny that infant’s exhibit pleasure-seeking behaviour but he 
believed that signs that the pleasure principle is operating as an end in itself (the way 
that Freud would have conceived) should be taken as evidence of deviation from the 
standard developmental pathway: 
                                            
and ‘the ego’ while granting these terms wildly different meanings to Freud. This, it has been 
argued, led to rife confusion about the content of Fairbairn’s theory despite attempts made 
by Fairbairn to clarify his terms.   
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Explicit pleasure-seeking has as its essential aim the relieving of the tension of 
libidinal need for the mere sake of relieving this tension. Such a process does, of 
course, occur commonly enough; but, since libidinal need is object need, simple 
tension-relieving implies some failure of object-relationships (Fairbairn 
1952/1994: 140). 
In order to account for the existence (and extreme attractiveness) of pleasurable 
feelings, Fairbairn hypothesised that they serve to ‘signpost’ the individual to the 
object but that pleasure as an end in itself leads the individual down a developmental 
cul-de-sac.  
The mind, for Fairbairn, centres on the behaviour of the external object to such a 
degree that the object determines the extent to which an internal, compensatory 
world of phantasy is developed at all. It is only when interpersonal relationships fail 
and disappoint that internal ‘object relations’ are formed: the unbearable 
ambivalence caused by disappointing relationships results in the splitting and 
incorporation of the ‘badness’ of the object into the self, to preserve the connection 
with a rejecting but needed caregiver (Fairbairn 1952/1994). Fairbairn believed that 
the extent to which an internal world of object relations is created has a negative 
correlation with how satisfactory genuine relationships are experienced to be, so that 
the greater the sense of external disappointment, the more invested the individual 
becomes in internalised objects (Fairbairn 1952/1994: 62).  
Fairbairn’s theory could therefore be seen as a mirror image to Freud’s in two 
respects: in terms of the contents of the wish-fulfilling unconscious and in terms of 
the conditions which create the need for wish-fulfilling representations in the first 
place. Where Freud believed that the representational content of wish-fulfilling states 
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is concerned with bodily instincts, Fairbairn saw them as focused on real external 
relationships (Freud 1905b, Fairbairn 1952/1994). Furthermore, where the Freudian 
unconscious is generated by the physical needs which are not being met, Fairbairn 
considers the generation of an internal world as a response to an unsatisfactory 
interpersonal environment (Freud, 1911, Fairbairn 1952/1994). It is a complete 
rejection of Freud’s Darwinian concept of man which allows for such a unique 
theoretical system. Yet he remains loyal to his Freudian and Klenian legacy in an 
important regard: Fairbairn’s understanding of the internal world as, in essence, a 
form of compensation for the external world mirrors Freud’s core model of the 
primary process wish-fulfilling hallucination. This has far-reaching consequences: 
where Freud and Klein believed that psychic life came into being as a means of 
adapting to an internal world of instincts, Fairbairn saw the mind as created in an 
attempt to compensate for the failings of the outside world (Grotstein & Rinsely 
1994). While the content of the internal world, for Fairbairn, is negative in so far as it 
is populated by bad objects, the internal world of the instincts is not itself the root 
cause of psychopathology (Fairbairn 1952/1994: 63-64). Fairbairn therefore can be 
seen to provide a half-way house between traditional object relations and attachment 
theory. He recognises that the importance of the external environment in early 
functioning leads to a strategic rather than wish-fulfilling internal world, yet the 
strategy employed by the individual does not serve to predict the caregiver’s 
behaviour per se but rather to exonerate them on a moral level. In this sense, it is 
still a form of compensatory imagining which seeks to disassociate the individual 
from reality.  
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The ‘Reality oriented’ Imagination as a Transitional Phenomenon 
It can be argued that Winnicott’s theory of psychopathology and development lies 
closer to the mentalization model than those of any other psychoanalytic thinker 
discussed so far (see Fonagy et. al 2002 253- 291). For instance, Winnicott places a 
great deal of emphasis on how an individual subjectively experiences ‘the self’ and 
links this experience of selfhood explicitly with the quality of ‘mirroring’ provided by 
the caregiver during early developmental years (Winnicott 1971/2005: 71-86). 
Although he was not expressly concerned with epistemological issues, his general 
account of mental functioning and psychopathology consists of a general worldview 
(one could say a ‘metapsychology’ although Winnicott himself eschewed this kind of 
technical terminology) which underpins the account of ‘reality oriented’ imagining 
proposed in this project. Across his works Winnicott builds up a nuanced picture of 
infantile and childhood psychological growth in which he grounds the capacity for a 
‘creative’ relationship to reality in a smooth and attenuated relationship with the 
caregiver (Winnicott 1971/2005:109). Much like Bion and Fairbairn, Winnicott 
assigns the external environment an impactful role in psychological development, 
with the ability of the caregiver to sustain an illusion of the infant’s omnipotence and 
agency tied directly to the infant’s capacity for uncovering a creative ‘true’ self. He 
also provides a compelling account of the baby’s discovery of an external 
environment which is genuinely independent of the mind, which I have argued 
makes his open to the form of epistemic concerns discussed here (Winnicott 
1971/2005:116-127).  
Although still primarily concerned with the internal representations of early object 
relations, Winnicott was far more sympathetic to the role of the external environment 
than Klein, seeing the caregiver’s actual behaviour as playing an important role in 
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bringing the infant into genuine contact with the world of external object relations 
(Winnicott 1971/2005:150-151). In the early stages of life, Winnicott argues, the 
infant is unaware of a discrete ‘self’, but experiences self, object and world as one 
undifferentiated unity (Winnicott 1971/2005)20. This feeling of all-encompassing unity 
will be inevitably challenged as she grows and becomes alert to the external world. 
In ‘good enough’ circumstances, the mother will be sensitive enough to her baby’s 
needs (she will be, Winnicott argues, in a state of ‘primary maternal preoccupation’) 
that she allows this illusion of omnipotence to continue and allow the baby to 
gradually accustom to a world outside the self.  
Winnicott believed that the manner in which the infant comes to recognise and 
make use of objective reality in relation to her internal world lays the groundwork for 
various forms of healthy and pathological functioning. In “Mind and its Relation to the 
Psyche-Soma”, for instance, he sketches various stances that the developing infant 
can take in relation to her body and the external world which can establish lifelong 
patterns of relating and experience. In Winnicottian theory the understanding of a 
self and of the distinction between internal and external realities are linked, with the 
self being the entity which (in good-enough circumstances) can help forge a 
connection between the internal world and the external environment (Winnicott 
1971/2005). Winnicott considered the ‘creative self’ to be the product of a 
developmental history in which the caregiver sensitively responds to the infant’s 
needs without being intrusive and impeding a sense of personal expression (by, for 
instance, curtailing their baby’s impulses by substituting them for their own). At the 
                                            
20 This is not, therefore, a narcissistic stage in the sense that the infant believes the object 
exists for the self but rather a state in which the infant cannot differentiate various aspects of 
physical, sensory and emotional experience well enough for the notion of a separation 
between self and not-self to take hold.  
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very beginning of life, creative gestures manifest in physical bodily movements. 
Winnicott, for instance, considered thumb sucking after feeding a creative gesture 
because it is an expression that is the baby’s own. It may also be, as Klein would 
argue, accompanied by a phantasy of taking in milk, but this is not where its 
psychological significance lies. Winnicott can therefore be credited with creating a 
genuine role for the external environment that simultaneously emphasises the 
contribution of an internal self. In this regard, he draws up a sound blueprint for later 
empirical approaches such as those discussed in the following chapter. 
Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter I have aimed to account for the changing role of imaginative 
processes in psychoanalytic theory by arguing that psychoanalysis has gradually 
changed the manner in which it conceptualizes the relationship between the subject 
and the external world. The theoretical changes that I have aimed to capture can be 
seen to work analogously with the increased emphasis on epistemic concerns that 
have arisen as a result of the greater integration of psychoanalysis and empirical 
science, which will be the focus of the next chapter. The resulting picture is one in 
which we can capture the notion of imaginative processes as ‘reality oriented’ from 
both empirical and non-empirical points of view. In what follows, I will turn to 
unpacking the ‘reality oriented’ imagination in greater depth by outlining how 
epistemological concerns can be applied to dreams, psychological symptoms and 
language.  
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Chapter Four 
The ‘Epistemic Turn’: Naturalizing the Imagination, Naturalizing the Mind  
In Chapter Two of this work, I provided a philosophically inspired contextualization of 
Freud’s theory of the imagination, arguing that he implicitly adopts the view that 
imagination is aligned with sensory processes and therefore excluded from the 
‘thinking’ mind (Sartre 1936/2012). This results in a picture of imaginative functioning 
which is enigmatically excluded from the ‘system conscious’ (in spite of the fact that 
it is descriptively conscious) because it adopts many of the principles of primary 
process unconscious functioning (Freud 1900, 1907). The upshot of this, for the 
purposes of the current argument, is that the imagination is a form of compensatory 
wish-fulfilment which, as a result of its natural talent for deception, often works as an 
obstacle to knowledge21. 
While the Freudian account may still chime with our intuitive understanding of 
rational thinking and acts of fantasy, it is arguably outdated and unhelpful as a 
psychoanalytic model. Framing imagination and ‘thought’ as opposing, battling 
forces is a position which is hard to square up with current views from empirical 
science, philosophy and, most importantly, from within psychoanalytic theory itself 
(see Clark 2016; Cavell 1993, 2006, Fotopoulo et. al. 2012). As we have already 
seen from the brief exposition of the mentalization model given in the Introduction, 
the imagination has the potential to be viewed, among other things, as constitutive’ 
of reflective thought rather than its antithesis (Fonagy & Luyten 2009:1362)  
                                            
21 Somewhat paradoxically, imaginative experiences can become instances of self-
knowledge only on the condition that they are transformed from imaginative experiences into 
something else, namely secondary process thought structures (Freud 1915a).   
159 
 
Understanding the transformation from the Freudian notion of the imagination as 
a fantastical, ‘reality indifferent’ act of daydreaming to the notion of the ‘reality 
oriented’ imagination exemplified in the mentalization model, requires investigation 
from a couple of perspectives. The first involves looking at how shifts internal to 
psychoanalytic theory itself have set prime conditions for a new theory of the 
imaginative to emerge. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that psychoanalytic 
theory reliably shows evidence of becoming 1.) increasingly interpersonal and 2.) 
increasingly focused on the impact of genuine external circumstances of the 
individual. These factors, I will demonstrate, combine to create a view of the 
imagination as a positive force which enables the individual to transcend a set of 
concrete circumstances in a manner that facilitates emotional and social learning22. 
Understanding the role of the imagination in this way dramatically reverses the 
Freudian perspective in which the imagination is presented as being both created by 
internal factors and then focused narcissistically onto the internal world (e.g. Freud 
1907).  
Naturalizing Psychoanalysis 
Unlike the majority of post-Freudian psychoanalytic theory, the notion of the ‘reality 
oriented’ imagination which I am proposing is grounded in two models which are 
unapologetically empirical: the mentalization model and neuropsychoanalysis. The 
empirical status of these modes is important to recognise, both on a global level in 
terms of its general impact on psychoanalytic research as a whole and on a specific 
level for how it impacts our conceptualization of the imagination. The former issue is 
a task that lies far beyond the scope of the current project, although I will consider it 
                                            
22 This form of imaginative attitude, I will argue, is also defined by the fact that it instantiates a 
phenomenal experience of the self-as-agent. 
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briefly in due course (also see Fotopoulo et. al 2012); the second is the central aim 
of this chapter. In what follows I will attempt to examine the impact of adopting 
insights from developmental psychology (e.g. Bowlby 1997) and the neurosciences 
(e.g. Panksepp 2010, 2012) on psychoanalytic understandings of the mind and 
psychopathology with a particular emphasis on how this encourages a new 
psychoanalytic approach to the imagination.  
Contemporary empirical theories of mental functioning, such as those found in 
empirical psychology and the neurosciences, are naturalistic theories (Collin 2011). 
According to Finn Collin this entails that they are committed to the “view that reality is 
coextensive with nature and that, hence, human knowledge has no object beyond 
the natural realm” (Collin 2011: 1). Adopting a naturalistic perspective requires that 
one recognises: “There is no higher, transcendent sphere; in particular, the human 
mind (or “soul”) does not itself inhabit any such higher realm, nor does any aspect of 
man’s activities or thoughts bring him in contact with such higher spheres” (ibid). 
This is in sharp contrast to philosophers of mind such as Descartes and Kant 
(discussed earlier) who aimed to uncover metaphysical truths about human 
existence which they believed could not be uncovered through traditional scientific 
experimentation (Descartes 1641/1924, Kant 1791/1900/2007). According to a 
naturalist view, even philosophical approaches to the mind should aim to be 
consistent with an empirical understanding and therefore should not posit ontological 
entities that lie outside of the material realm (Collin 2011). 
Despite Freud’s abandonment of the ‘Project’ and his recognition that he could 
not, at the time of writing, marry up his theories with neurophysiology, he 
nevertheless made it a priority to sketch the kind of theory that could reunite with 
empirical neuroscience once the relevant knowledge became available (Freud 
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1915a, 1915b). This set him aside from many prominent psychoanalysts who 
followed him (such as Klein, Winnicott and Fairbairn), who saw their line of work as 
simply different in kind to empirical science (Klein 1961). After years of divergence 
between psychoanalysis and science, Freud’s desire for the formulations of 
psychoanalysis to someday reunite with their underlying neurophysiology seems 
hopeful. The theoretical school of ‘neuropsychoanalysis’ has taken on the task of 
investigating the compatibility of Freudian theory and recent advances in 
neuroscience (Solms & Turnbull 2011), particularly pertaining to the psychological 
nature of perception, affect and dreaming (Hopkins 2012, 2016; Panksepp 2012).  
Such an ambitious move brings with it issues of suitability as well as those of 
possibility: even if it can be done, should psychoanalysis be granted an empirical 
basis? Is it the kind of discipline that can be captured in empirical terms? Opinions 
on this front are strongly divided, with many arguing that psychoanalysis risks 
unpicking its own unique contribution to the human condition by merging with 
disciplines such as neuroscience and cognitive psychology (see Blass & Carmelli 
2007, 2015; also see Gardner 2000 for a philosophical perspective). Furthermore, 
while Freud himself may have announced strong neurobiological ambitions (Freud 
1915b, 1920; Sulloway 1979), his failure to make good on such promises set the 
trajectory for psychoanalytic theory to develop along a different track to scientific 
advancement throughout the twentieth century. Take, for example, the following 
quote from Melanie Klein: 
It has to be kept in mind that the evidence which the analyst can present differs 
essentially from that which is required in physical sciences because the whole 
nature of psychoanalysis is different. In my view, endeavours to provide 
comparable exact data result in a pseudoscientific approach, because the 
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workings of the unconscious mind and the response of the psychoanalyst to 
them, cannot be submitted to measurement nor classified into rigid categories 
(Klein 1961: 12). 
The fact that Klein, as a direct intellectual descendent of Freud, could positively 
assert such a sentiment may stand to highlight how little influence Freud’s initial 
scientific aims have had on the growth of psychoanalysis as a discipline and a 
clinical practice. However, the potential benefits of allowing for a modern day 
consilience between psychoanalysis and empirical approaches may well outweigh 
the costs, especially in light of the direction towards affective and social concerns 
that neuroscience has taken since the 1990s (Cozzolino 2010: xiii- xiv, Solms & 
Turnbull 2011:6).  
In outlining the tenets of naturalism, Finn Collin acknowledges that it impacts our 
stance on methodology as well as ontology: 
It follows that all phenomena are to be investigated by the same methods that 
are brought to bear upon the humbler parts of the natural world. Naturalism thus 
canvasses a monistic claim both with respect to ontology and methodology, to 
the effect that the world is a uniform realm that must be explored with one and 
the same set of methods (Collin 2011:1). 
Despite this, it is important to stress that aiming for unification of psychoanalytic and 
empirical approaches does not necessarily lead to the scenario, forewarned by Klein 
above, in which the therapeutic process is replaced by the dispassionate 
categorization of mental phenomena. Naturalized psychological and psychoanalytic 
theories are able tolerate a notion of the mental as distinct from the physical.  For the 
purposes of this thesis, therefore, the form of ‘naturalization’ that I will adopt is drawn 
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from a position known as ‘dual-aspect monism’.  Philosopher Donald Davidson 
argues that all things are physical, but there are different ways of describing them. 
The mind can be described from a physical point of view and from the point of view 
of consciousness. This does not show that consciousness exists in its own right, 
independent from the physical brain, but that it can be usefully described using a 
different set of propositions.  For example, one could describe another’s anger in 
terms of neuro-chemical changes or in terms of their speech and behaviour. Neither 
description is more or less accurate than the other, as they are aiming for different 
things.  
As we saw throughout Chapter Two, Freud’s body of theoretical works seem to 
contain multiple and sometimes competing philosophies of mind (Livingstone-Smith 
1999). It could be speculated that Freud, having been frustrated in his scientific 
endeavours designed his topographical and structural models as “theoretical fictions” 
because it was the only way he could move psychoanalysis forward. In his 1915 
paper “The Unconscious” he is explicit about this change in approach, stating “our 
psychical topography has for the present nothing to do with anatomy; it has 
reference not to anatomical localities, but to regions in the mental apparatus” (Freud, 
1915:175). Contemporary empirical psychoanalytic models, it can be argued, should 
be seen as adopting a philosophical framework which allows for the co-existence of 
physical and mental descriptive languages. Despite the fact that they are grounded 
in empirical findings, these are not committed to either reductive ontological or 
explanatory naturalism; both of which given precedence to the physical aspect of 
mental functioning.   
Mark Solms and Oliver Turnball emphasise in “What is Neuropsychoanalysis?”, 
Freud himself would not have adhered to a philosophy of mind that neglected non-
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material aspects of mental functioning as it was his “emphatic view, even as a 
neurologist (Freud, 1891), that the mind was not made up of static modules or boxes 
connected up by arrows. Instead, Freud saw the mind as comprising dynamic, fluid 
processes” (Solms & Turnball 2011: 2).  
In “The Significance of Consilience: Psychoanalysis, Attachment, Neuroscience 
and Evolution” Jim Hopkins (2015) argues that a more sophisticated approach to 
scientific reasoning adopts Bayesian predictive approach, in which scientific 
hypotheses are adopted as a means of explaining why observed phenomena 
behave as they do. As he explains: 
Our hypotheses explain and unify data by integrating them into larger but 
hypothetical causal patterns—those produced (caused) by the causal 
mechanisms or processes that the explanations hypothesize. So such 
hypotheses explain why the data are as they are, in the sense that they enable 
us to see that the data are as we should expect them to be given the causal 
mechanisms and processes by which they are explained. And it is because a 
hypothesis enables us to see the data as expectable in this way that we accept 
that hypothesis as providing a good explanation of the data with which we are 
concerned (Hopkins 2015: 48). 
According to Bayesian methodology, scientific reasoning does not consist in the 
straightforward observation of data but is a process in which we try to unite bits of 
observed ‘data’ together in a way that explains and predicts them (Hopkins 2012, 
2015). The sign of a good scientific hypothesis, on this view, is that it renders the 
observed data expectable. (To take a mundane example, heated water boiling when 
it hits 100 degrees centigrade is an expectable event if the guiding hypothesis is 
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“water boils at 100 degrees” but not under the hypothesis “water boils at 200 
degrees”.) Rather than naively reflecting ‘the way things are’, scientific hypotheses 
primarily function to enable us greater degrees of predictive accuracy (Hopkins 
2012). This basic premise, Hopkins argues, can be used as a guiding mechanism for 
understanding a range of phenomena, from grand scientific theories regarding the 
movement of the planets to our day to day recognition and understanding of one 
another as fellow human beings (Hopkins 2015: 49-50, 62-64). Furthermore, this 
form of Bayesian reasoning mirrors the way that our brains process sensory data 
into a conscious experience of our environments (Friston 2012; Hopkins 2012, 2105; 
Clark 2016, see below), linking the structure of perception with the architecture of the 
scientific method. For the purposes of the current argument, this is worth noting for 
the manner in which it dissolves the hard line between scientific methodology and 
our spontaneous, everyday understanding of the world, drawing out how both are 
essentially interpretive exercises (Hopkins 2015).  
Naturalization and the ‘Disenchanted’ Universe 
Western thought has seen an increased movement towards naturalized models 
throughout the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty first centuries. 
Collin explains this as follows:  
Naturalization is the movement of thought towards naturalism. A movement of 
this kind has been a pervasive characteristic of European thought for two and a 
half millennia, a slow but inexorable drift away from an original dualist mode in 
European philosophy, and indeed of European thought in general, towards an 
ever more stringent naturalistic monism (Collin 2011:1). 
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This phenomenom has also been described as a process of ‘disenchantment’. 
Drawing on a notorious lecture by Max Weber in 1922, Kathleen Lennon offers the 
following account of the ‘disenchanted universe’:  
Max Weber, speaking in 1922 characterised the world which it was the job of the 
scientist to describe as a world in the ‘process of disenchantment’. In such a 
world, ‘there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play … one 
can … in principle master all things by calculation… One need no longer have 
recourse to magical means in order to master [it]… But for Weber it was not only 
magical and mysterious forces which have no place in such a scientific world but 
also meaning and value. ‘If these natural sciences lead to anything in this way, 
they are apt to make the belief that there is such a thing as the ‘meaning’ of the 
universe die out at its very roots’ (Lennon 2010: 375). 
A ‘disenchanted universe’ is one in which empirically grounded scientific practice has 
championed over theological and metaphysical speculation. It is described as 
‘disenchanted’ because the external world is not construed as containing normative 
values (anything that could be described using terms such as ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘moral’ 
or ‘valuable’) as these are categories which do not submit to naturalistic classification 
(McDowell 1996). On this basis, many thinkers have argued that this species of 
disenchanted ‘bald naturalism’ should be rejected as a general worldview, as it does 
not leave space for human life shaped in terms of subjectivity or value (Lennon 2015; 
McDowell 1996).   
Issues surrounding ‘disenchantment’ pose a particular challenge to naturalized 
psychoanalytic models, as such theories must inevitably touch on the subjective 
qualities of meaning and value (Graham 2013). Even if psychoanalytic theories 
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themselves refrain from commenting on what makes a ‘good’ or ‘valuable’ life, the 
fact remains that the target of their explanations (their explanans) are human beings 
who themselves will have shaped their internal world according to personal sets of 
meaning and value. Psychoanalysis, as an approach which straddles theory and 
practice, cannot afford to lose its grip on subjectivity in the search for an empirical 
foundation. Even Freud, who ostensibly aimed to capture subjectivity as 
‘scientifically’ as possible, made it clear that he believed the majority of (what he 
defined as) imaginative activity was unhealthy and to be discouraged, while ‘realistic’ 
thought and, in particular, self-knowledge was to be championed (Freud 1907, 
Tauber 2010).The interpretive nature of the Bayesian Model can ameliorate this 
perceived tension between naturalistic and normative forms of explanation, as it 
offers an empirical account of the mind as a meaning making machine (Hopkins 
2015). As will become evident from the discussion on ‘active’ perception below, it is 
an inevitable aspect of our perceptual machinery that we consistently grant our 
experience an explanatory structure (Clark 2016; McDowell 1996).  
Although a satisfactory defence of disciplines such as ‘neuropsychoanalysis’ is 
far beyond the scope of this thesis, it still seems safe to conclude that linking 
psychoanalysis with empirical disciplines is possible without side-lining its focus on 
subjective, psychological states or losing sight of its interpretive nature. Yet purpose 
of this chapter is not to justify the existence of naturalized psychoanalytic models, 
but to consider the impact that conceptual changes engendered by empirical 
advances have had upon our implicit understanding of mind, psychopathology and 
the role of the imagination. I will turn to this task now.  
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Empirical Advances and the ‘Epistemic Turn’ 
Advances in our understanding of perception, affect and infantile development have 
the potential to influence psychoanalytic theory in a manner that encourages the 
introduction of epistemic concerns. In what follows, I will discuss this in terms of 
three highly important conceptual shifts: the replacement of ‘reason’ with prediction 
and strategy (Clark 2016; Hopkins 2012, 2015), ‘drive’ with affect (Panksepp 2010, 
2012; Solms & Zellner 2012), and ‘unconscious phantasy’ with ‘unconscious 
schema’ or ‘internal working model’ (Bretherton 1992; Rees 2012). My argument will 
centre on one simple but highly important acknowledgement: that our perception of 
external environment does not consist of bare sensory givens but is itself infused 
with thought-like elements (Clark 2016; McDowell 1996; Raftopolous 2009). This 
recognition stems from Kant’s argument that the imagination is necessary in order 
for humans to experience a unified and coherent conscious experience that is 
situated in space and time (Kant 1781/1900/2007, see Chapter Two). Advances in 
our understanding of the mechanisms which underlie perception have shown that 
even sensory experiences such as visual perception are ‘cognitively penetrated’ 
(subject to influence and distortion by higher-order brain mechanisms) (see 
Raftopolous, 2009). This gives perception an ‘active’ rather than a ‘passive’ nature, 
collapsing the space between experiential sensation and conceptual thought which is 
(I have argued) relevant to an interpretation Freud’s juxtaposition between 
imagination and thought (McDowell 1996).  
Drawing on recent work in perceptual neuroscience, especially that which has 
been employed in the neuropsychoanalytic literature (e.g. Solms 2013, Hopkins 
2016), I will adopt the current dominant hypothesis that perceptual consciousness is 
the result of the brain generating a predictive model of its environment. Adopting this 
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view of perception, referred to as the “Bayesian Brain” (Hopkins 2012, 2015) or, 
more generally “Predictive Processing” (Clark 2016), has several knock-on effects 
which rather dramatically alter Freud’s theory of the imagination as a psychological 
process governed by the pleasure principle, stemming from the fact that that mental 
activity is driven from the bottom up by the need to predict (Clark 2016). The only 
change that this shift does not directly influence is the movement from ‘drive’ to 
‘affect’. Nevertheless, it shall become evident below that this shift also engenders a 
heightening of epistemic concerns. After I have considered the three changes in 
some detail, I will conclude by exploring how they impact the subject’s epistemic 
relationship to her environment and offer a preliminary sketch of how this can 
suggest a revised notion of imagination so that it may contain a healthy as well as a 
pathological dimension (McDowell 1996).  
Kant Revisited: ‘Active’ Perception and the Predictive Mind  
The existence of an active combining mechanism was acknowledged in 
neuroscience from the time that Freud was developing the roots of psychoanalysis. 
Most notably, Hermann van Helmholtz and Theodore Meynert, both of whom directly 
influenced Freud’s work, argued that Kant (discussed previously) had hit upon 
fundamental truths about brain operations in his attempt to create a transcendental 
metaphysics (see Makari 2008). This, George Makari has argued, could have been 
derived in turn from Schopenhauer’s interpretation in which he argued that Kant 
“showed everything that makes real perception possible, namely space, time and 
causality, to be brain function. He refrained however, from using this physiological 
expression, to which our present method of consideration necessarily leads” (Makari 
2008: 554; Schopenhauer 1844: 285). This reading of Kant flattens out the 
transcendental aspect of his metaphysics, seeing him less as philosopher in the 
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strict sense and more as a thinker who intuitively pre-empted later scientific findings 
(Allison 2004). It is therefore a prime example of naturalization and its impact on the 
content of theories which undergo this change (see Collin 2011). 
The theoretical claims of neuropsychoanalysis are grounded in a similar model 
of perception to that which Freud would have been exposed to via Helmholtz and 
Meynert, derived ultimately from Kant (Hopkins 2012, 2015). As Jim Hopkins 
explains in his recent paper “Psychoanalysis, Representation and Neuroscience: the 
Freudian Unconscious and the Bayesian Brain”: 
Helmholtz wrote in a tradition founded by Immanuel Kant (1781). His 
neuroscientific work partly embodies Kant’s idea that we can see our basic 
concepts (Laurence and Margolis, 2011)—that is, our basic but everyday ways 
of thinking of space, time, substance, objects, events, and the relation of cause 
and effect—as performing an unconscious synthesis of the “manifold” of sensory 
intuition (…) This philosophical perspective, at once straightforward and 
profound, has been carried forward via Helmholtz, Hinton, Friston, and others, 
into the conception of the Bayesian brain. (Hopkins 2012: 236). 
While the neuroscientific notion of ‘active’ perception was drawn, via Helmholz, from 
Kant’s notion of the productive imagination, I will not be equating ‘active’ perception 
with my proposed construct of the ‘reality oriented’ imagination in this thesis. This is 
because, from a psychoanalytic point of view, ‘active’ perception is not enough in 
itself to capture what it means to be in a state of psychological health. In contrast to 
psychoanalytic constructs such as mentalization’s ‘reflective functioning’ and 
Winnicott’s ‘creativity’, which aim to denote a particular mind-set towards self and 
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others, ‘active’ perception merely describes a basic, universal feature of brain 
functioning which remains intact in most instances of psychopathology23.  
Nevertheless, the recognition that perception contains ‘active’ elements is an 
essential step in sketching a sound picture of ‘reality oriented’ imagining. As we saw 
previously, Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ repositioned the imagination as a 
mediating force between the subject and the environment, replacing the classic 
notion that it is an intrapsychic mediator between perception and thought (or 
‘intellection’) (Modrak 2016). In doing so, he opened up space for imagination to be 
constitutive of knowledge, rather than an obstacle to it and highlighted the fact that 
all mental activity is essentially interpretive. More importantly, the ‘reality oriented’ 
imagination is based upon psychoanalytic models which themselves incorporate 
‘active’ perception. Neuropsychoanalysis, attachment theory and the mentalization 
model are all empirically minded schools of thought which not only implicitly adhere 
to the notion of ‘active’ perception but actively rely on it (Bretherton 1992; Crittenden 
& Landini 2011; Hopkins 2015). For example, attachment theory presents a young 
child’s formation of ‘attachment narratives’: internal schemas which are used to 
interpret and explain caregiver’s behaviour in a manner that renders it predictable 
(Bowlby 1997;Fonagy et. al 2002; Gopnik 2009). The mentalization model 
incorporates the notion of active perception via attachment theory (which it adopts as 
a general developmental framework) and also, arguably, in the interpretative 
                                            
23 Even in extreme cases such as the psychotic delusional states experienced in 
schizophrenia it is likely that what is occurring is that the predictive element in perceptual 
systems has started to work incorrectly e.g. by making predictions based on the wrong sorts 
of sensory clues. It therefore represents a case of ‘active’ perception gone wrong, not one in 
which it is conspicuously absent from the subject’s experience (see Clark 2016: 207- 209).   
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organisation of facial expressions and observable behaviour in terms of the 
underlying mental states they represent (Schuwerk et. al. 2016).   
It will therefore be of prime importance to outline the notion of active perception 
in more depth. My focus will not lie on a satisfactory neuroscientific defence of the 
concept, which has received ample attention elsewhere (e.g. Raftapolous 2009) but 
in drawing out the impact that this has on a psychoanalytic conception of the 
imagination. I hope to show that the conceptualization of perception as ‘active’ and 
‘thought-like’ can be seen to challenge a couple of key assumptions that are integral 
to Freud’s theory of the imagination. Firstly, it demonstrates how imaginative activity 
can be oriented towards the external world in a way that enlightens rather than 
obscures an individual’s relationship to it. Secondly, it challenges Freud’s notion that 
visual thought should be excluded from the ‘system conscious’ as a consequence of 
being a non-linguistic form of representation. Although it could be argued that a 
salient difference can be maintained between linguistic and non-linguistic thought 
(for instance, we saw briefly earlier that mental imagery may not be a suitable 
vehicle for forming thoughts about thoughts (Bermudez 2003)), the concept of ‘active 
perception’ can be seen to challenge some of the qualities that Freud projects onto 
the image; perhaps most notably its concrete, non-symbolic nature. One result of 
‘active’ perception is that images do not migrate into the mind as isolated fragments 
or ‘things’ (which can, at best, be strung together associatively) but that visual 
scenes are structured according to concepts which can be manipulated according to 
logical ‘thought–like’ rules (Clark 2016; McDowell 1996). To borrow a phrase from 
earlier in this work, it could be argued that active perception creates an arena in 
which mental images can ‘behave like language’ (see Chapter One).  
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The Face-House Experiment 
Within neuropsychoanalysis in particular, the “face-house experiment” is often used 
to provide a clear example of how the brain creates a conscious perceptual 
experience from a predictive hypothesis (Hopkins 2012). In this experiment, a picture 
of a house is projected onto a participant’s right eye and a picture of a face is 
projected onto their left eye, with the result that they have the phenomenological 
impression of a face gradually turning into a house, and then gradually back into a 
face again. This occurs because the brain ‘knows’, from experience, that there is no 
such thing as a “face-house”, so it uses the visual data available in the right eye to 
conclude that it is looking at a face and suppresses the contradictory data coming in 
from the left eye. This succeeds momentarily, but there is so much contradictory 
data (it makes up half of the visual field)24 that the brain is forced to change its 
hypothesis, and concludes that it is seeing a house. The cycle repeats, creating the 
undulating image for the participant. In more technical terms, undulating image 
embodies a tension between the brain’s ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ mechanisms. 
‘Top down’ mechanisms act to inhibit any incoming sensory data which contradicts 
the brain’s dominant hypothesis, whereas ‘bottom-up’ mechanisms flag up errors in 
‘top-down’ hypothesis (they draw attention to anomalies) with the hope of updating 
these predictions so that they more accurately represent the entire range of incoming 
data (Hopkins 2012:11, 2016:4). The undulating image occurs as a result of 
perceptual system attempting to manoeuvre the contradictory incoming data as well 
as it can in an attempt to reduce the chance that it will be ‘surprised’ by the 
environment (see ‘Prediction as Regulation’ below). 
                                            
24 This contradictory data, it is important to note, does not exist as a competing 
representation (as it operates at levels prior to representations being formed) but is rather a 
type of error signal (Clark 2016: 46) 
174 
 
The face-house experiment may explain why individuals appear to act with 
unified intentions despite the fact that they experience mental conflict, because it 
demonstrates how conflicting information can be suppressed outside of awareness, 
compelling us to conclude that the mind engages in the repression of its own 
contents (see Hopkins 2012). It also offers a clear example of how conscious states 
are created by predictive hypotheses: when the individual has the experience of 
seeing a face, this is simply a product of the brain’s prediction that she is seeing a 
face. Far from being the passive reception of incoming sense data, conscious 
experience not only contains cognitive elements but is the result of a prior cognitive 
hypothesis (Hopkins 2012; Clark 2016). In this sense, the Bayesian model goes 
above and beyond the Kantian principle that imagination is a schema under which a 
set of empirical data can be unified: it demonstrates how the brain actively generates 
perceptual experiences from an initial cognitive premise. 
Prediction as Regulation 
Although it must be acknowledged that this approach, championed by 
neuroscientists such as Karl Friston (2012), is based on computational models which 
Freud could not possibly have worked with (Hopkins 2016:2), it nevertheless shares 
deep conceptual similarities with Freud’s differentiation of the primary and secondary 
processes as describing the tension between ‘unbound’ and ‘bound’ psychic energy 
respectively (Hopkins 2012: 12). As we have seen, in The ‘Project’ Freud proposes 
that the secondary process has the function of ‘binding’ free flowing primary process 
energy in order to create representational ‘maps’ of the external world which links 
things together in a way that facilitates action by, for example, representing how a 
certain cause (such as a head movement towards the breast) leads to a certain 
effect (being able to feed) (Freud 1895/1950) Such action, for Freud, had the 
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potential to lead to the discharge of endogenous instinctual stimuli by the satiation of 
the drive, which he believed to be the ultimate end goal of the psychic apparatus 
(Freud 1895/1950) see also Chapter One).  
Yet, unlike Freudian theory, the Bayesian account places epistemic uncertainty 
and its amelioration at the centre of psychic experience (Clark 2016). In order to 
generate sound predictive models the brain must not only aim to predict the cause of 
incoming sensory data but simultaneously evaluate how likely it that its prediction will 
be correct. Andy Clark explains this phenomenon (technically known as ‘precision 
weighting’) using the example of driving in the fog versus driving on a clear day: in 
the fog incoming sensory data will be ‘marked’ by the brain as less reliable than 
incoming sensory information on a clear day (Clark 2016 56- 57). This allows the 
driver to navigate a potentially dangerous situation by recognising that incoming 
sensory data needs to be approached differently in this context than it would, for 
example, on a clear day. The fact that perceptual models inherently take into 
account that they do not have direct access to ‘the way things are’ complicates the 
picture of ‘active perception’ put forward by earlier neuroscientists such as 
Helmholtz, as it demonstrates that the brain/mind ‘recognises’ (on a non-conscious, 
sub-personal level) that it is an epistemologically vulnerable position. It creates a 
picture of brain functioning as growing around a core of epistemological uncertainty, 
the reduction of which is one of its most primitive driving mechanisms. This can be 
used to re-frame the conceptualisation of the ‘reality indifferent’ imagination (namely, 
its pathological form) as a force which compensates for a deficit in understanding, 
rather than deficits in instinctual satisfaction. For the time being, it is simply worth 
acknowledging how a neuropsychoanalytic approach based upon the kind of 
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predictive processing model that Clark identifies cannot help but draw 
epistemological issues into our understanding of both health and pathology.  
The naturalized account of Kantian metaphysics instantiated in ‘The Bayesian 
Brain’ therefore transforms Kant’s connection between imagination and knowledge 
from a transcendental philosophy to an account of everyday challenges faced by 
individuals as they come to understand and predict their environments. While Freud 
would have been familiar with the application of Kantian principles to perceptual 
neuroscience through the work of Theodore Meynert and Herman van Helmholtz, his 
own descriptions of the mechanisms perception arguably fall in line with the view that 
perception is the straightforward registration of incoming sense data (Schimek 1975, 
see Chapter Two). The fact that Freud adopted such a view of perception not only 
explains his presentation of the mental image as a concrete ‘thing’ but can also 
account for his portrayal of the relationship between the individual and the external 
world as epistemologically straightforward (barring the inevitable intrusion of 
unconscious processes).  
Reasoning below the Threshold 
There are several points that can be drawn from the face-house experiment that are 
highly relevant to a psychoanalytic conception of mind. The first of these worth 
considering is the manner in which it highlights the brain’s capacity to perform 
comparatively sophisticated cognitive functions prior to conscious experience. The 
neural mechanisms which underlie the generation of conscious representations do 
not line up neatly with Freud’s categorizations of processes into conscious, 
preconscious and unconscious. Like secondary process (conscious or preconscious) 
mechanisms they force representational content into clear, linear cause and effect 
sequences, yet like dynamically unconscious processes, and in direct opposition to 
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Freud’s theory of the secondary process, they are by virtue of their very nature 
inaccessible to conscious awareness (Solms 2013). 
Secondly, this experiment highlights the fact that a perceptual experience of 
seeing a face (rather than a house) is not the brain’s interpretation of a conscious 
perceptual scene but rather the explanation it uses to form a conscious perceptual 
scene, presenting a picture in which we ‘reason’ our way to experience rather than 
reason on the basis of experience. While adopting a ‘predictive processing’ model of 
brain functioning does not preclude human beings engaging in rational deliberation 
about our experiences, it nevertheless highlights that such experiences are 
themselves already the product of an inference. This is highly significant for 
psychoanalytic understanding of pathology and its treatment, as it lays bare a form of 
‘unconscious reasoning’ that cannot be altered by being made conscious25. For 
example, it is likely that attachment narratives (unconscious ‘working models’ used to 
interpret and predict interpersonal scenarios, see below for more detail) are the kind 
of automatic unconscious inference that cannot be directly modified by conscious 
reflective thought: being explicitly aware that one has an insecure attachment style 
will not change the fact (Bowlby 1997; Crittenden & Landini 2011).  
Current research outlines how similar forms of sub-conscious reason may 
contribute to extreme forms of psychopathology such as psychotic delusions (Clark 
                                            
25 As we saw in Chapter One, this is also not sufficient within a traditional Freudian 
paradigm: the act of translating primary process to secondary process structures must be 
accompanied by the release of appropriate affect in order for repression to be lifted. 
However, it remains a necessary aspect of change that the patient has declarative 
knowledge of their (previously) unconscious processes. In contrast, an individual 
reorganizing from an insecure to a secure attachment style does not need to have the 
accompanying declarative  awareness that such a process is taking place (although some 
would argue that it can help). Analogously, those individuals who maintain a good sense of 
self through being effective mentalizers will be unlikely to be able to describe this process as 
such.  difference in these two approaches to self-knowledge could be crudely interpreted 
according to the philosophical difference between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’.  
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2016) and Capgras Syndrome (the persistent delusion that a loved one has been 
replaced by an imposter) (De Sousa 2008). For example, Andy Clark outlines a 
theory of psychotic delusions which draws on similar neural mechanisms to the face 
house experiment described above. In the experimental scenario, the undulating 
image is created by the fact that the unified scene of (for example) the face is 
disrupted by an error signal which alerts the brain to sensory information which does 
not fit the dominant hypothesis. In schizophrenic patients it has been suggested that 
these error signals are both falsely generated and then given an undue level of 
significance with the result that they can ‘force’ drastic changes in top-down 
interpretative theories in order to be accommodated26. For the individual who is at 
the mercy of such faulty ‘precision weighting’, interpretive theories which would strike 
the outside observer as paranoid and delusional such as “people can read my 
thoughts” and “the CIA are following me” become the only way in which information 
that the brain marks as both reliable and unexplained can be reconciled (Clark 2016: 
206). Clark explains how this aetiology makes it difficult for schizophrenic patients to 
dissolve their delusions through a controlled, rational assessment:  
What about the ‘obvious’ higher level explanation, which a friend or doctor might 
even suggest to an affected agent, namely, that the agent herself is cognitively 
compromised? This should indeed constitute an acceptable high-level 
explanation, yet it is one that severely affected subjects find unconvincing. In this 
context, it is worth noting that prediction error signals are not objects of (or 
realizers of) experience…The PP [predictive processing] suggestion is not that 
we experience our own prediction error signals (or their associated precisions) 
                                            
26 I will also discuss this phenomenon in terms of ‘complexity reduction’ in Chapter Five (also see 
Hopkins 2016)  
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as such. Instead, those signals act within us to recruit the apt flows of prediction 
that reveal a world of distal objects and causes (Clark 2016: 207, emphasis 
added). 
A similar form of ‘unconscious inference’ has been drawn on by Robert de Sousa in 
order to explain Cargpas Syndrome, a persistent delusion in which a loved one is 
thought to have been replaced by an imposter. This highly specific form of delusion 
is thought to arise when the recognition of the loved individual becomes uncoupled 
from its usual attendant affective element. Taking this into account, de Sousa argues 
that: 
The Capgras delusion is then no more than a perfectly reasonable inference 
(though of course one that is neither conscious nor explicit): I get a characteristic 
thrill when my father appears; I’m not getting that father-thrill now; therefore the 
person before me is not my father. Yet he looks exactly like my father. Therefore 
he is an impostor, a stranger who looks just like my father… But it is not 
experienced subjectively as an inference, but as intuitive conviction about the 
supposed father (de Sousa 2008 accessed online, emphasis added). 
These examples, while they occupy a rather extreme end of a psychopathological 
spectrum, are essential in setting up a picture of the mind that is shaped, in both 
health and pathology, by the need to render experience explainable and predictable.  
Crossing the Mind-Body Frontier 
Adopting a ‘predictive processing’ model of perception therefore dramatically alters 
many of Freud’s core assumptions about psychological motivation and the 
representations it produces. As will be familiar from Chapter One of this work, the 
most primitive form of representations which populate both infantile psychology and 
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the adult unconscious are taken to be imagistic and driven by an affective logic; they 
are the form of mental expression that lies closest to the drive (although they cannot 
be equated with it) (Freud 1990, 1923). Despite the fact that the drive cannot be 
definitively grasped as either a mental or a physical phenomenon, when the drive 
does break through into the mind it is prompted by its need to discharge, which it will 
attempt to do in the first instance by representing wishes as though they are being 
fulfilled (Freud 1895/1950, 1911). It is therefore the need for pleasure (under its 
particular Freudian definition of discharged tension) which drives mental activity from 
the bottom up. On this view, the mind is not concerned with knowledge until the 
reality process has set in. From a ‘Bayesian’ perspective, however, prediction is the 
driving force that prompts the jump from physical to mental activity. As Clark 
describes: 
The mystery is, and remains, how mere matter manages to give rise to thinking, 
imagining, dreaming and a whole smorgasbord of mentality, emotion and 
intelligent action…But there is an emerging clue…The cue can be summed up in 
a single word: prediction. To deal rapidly and fluently with an uncertain and noisy 
world, brains like ours have become masters of prediction (Clark 2016: xiv). 
On this view epistemic concerns are not a ‘luxury’ of sophisticated secondary 
process functioning but are built into the very foundations of mental functioning. 
Below I will discuss how this has impacted two areas that are central to 
psychoanalytic theorizing: affects and unconscious processing. One theme which will 
emerge, in particular regarding the discussion of affects, is how the ‘predictive 
processing’ model opens up space for the inclusion of epistemic emotions as a 
relevant concern in psychoanalytic theory of mind. 
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The ‘Conscious’ Id: 
Before turning to a discussion on the roles of unconscious schemas and affects in 
empirical accounts, I will first outline a seminal paper from the neuropsychoanalytic 
literature which is highly relevant to both: Mark Solms’ “The Conscious Id”. This 
paper highlights how neuroscientific advances since Freud’s time serve to challenge 
many core psychoanalytic assumptions regarding the structure of conscious 
experience. As the title of Solms’ paper suggests, this transformation involves a 
reversal of Freud’s postulation that the secondary process is inherently conscious 
and the ‘drive’ is inherently unconscious. For our current purposes, it will be a highly 
useful paper in demonstrating how secondary process mechanisms can (and often 
do) operate ‘below the threshold of awareness’ while simultaneously highlighting the 
important role of affect in phenomenal conscious experience. Solms aims to 
demonstrate that it is bodily affectivity rather than secondary process thought which 
forms the core of conscious experience, drawing on the recognition that the brain 
has two distinct means of representing and regulating the body: one which 
experiences the body from the inside out in a visceral manner and one which 
represents the body from the outside in as though it were an external object (Solms 
2013: 6). In many ways, these two forms of bodily representation preserve important 
aspects of Freud’s metapsychological writings on the experience of the body. As he 
writes in the Ego and the Id, for example: 
A person’s own body, and above all its surface, a place from which both internal 
and external projections may spring. It is seen like any other object, but to the 
touch it yields two kinds of sensations, one of which may be equivalent to an 
internal perception (Freud 1923: 26, emphasis in the original). 
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Solms’ bipartite neuroscientific categorization can therefore be seen to line up with 
Freud’s metapsychological formulations: the internal representation of the body, in 
contrast, is ‘objectless’ in a manner comparable to Freud’s theory of the drive; it is a 
form of representation is made up of a series of affective ‘states’ that reflect whether 
the body’s evolutionary needs (such as for food and sex) are being met or denied. 
While these ‘affective states’ draw on the full range basic core affect systems 
identified by Jaak Panksepp (Panksepp 2012, see below) they can generally be 
seen to obey Freud’s Pleasure-Unpleasure Principle as their end goal is to provoke 
approach or withdrawal behaviour in the individual (Solms 201:3).   
Where Solms’ approach drastically challenges Freudian assumptions is in the 
attribution of phenomenal consciousness to the internal bodily feeling but not to the 
external bodily representation. The internal form of bodily representation - the 
‘autonomic body’ - is thought to be generated in the upper brainstem; an area of the 
brain which is inherently conscious. In contrast, external form of bodily 
representation - the ‘sensorimotor’ body (which appears to line up neatly with the 
Freudian ego) - is associated with cortical mechanisms which are inherently 
unconscious (Solms 2013:2). This can corroborates the argument presented above: 
rather than being a characteristic of conscious experience, organising processes are 
a prerequisite for conscious experience; a fact which might significantly impact how 
psychoanalytic theory understands the role of the secondary process (Solms 
2013:10).  
The Importance of Affect 
Solms’ picture of brain functioning does not stop at the relegation of the secondary 
process into a subconscious state but actively promotes the affective basis of 
conscious experience. It does this, in the first instance, by showing how the 
183 
 
sensorimotor ‘secondary process’ is hierarchically dependent on the visceral 
‘autonomic’ ‘primary process’. Although in day to day life there is a two-way 
exchange of information between the systems that support autonomic and 
sensorimotor representations, sensorimotor perception cannot function if the areas 
of the brain which support autonomic representation (the brainstem and attendant 
limbic systems) are not functional. Autonomic representations, on the other hand, 
remain intact in humans and animals that have severe damage to areas of the brain 
that govern sensorimotor perception. As Solms’ summarises: “the internal aspect is a 
prerequisite for the external aspect” (Solms 2013: 6).  
In everyday functioning, autonomic representations use sensorimotor 
representations to get bodily needs met in the external environment, a set-up which 
has an uncanny similarity to Freud’s proposal that the pleasure principle uses the 
reality principle as a means of effectively discharging psychic energy through real 
bodily satisfaction rather than hallucination. What Freud failed to account for, 
however, is that once bodily sequences have been tried and tested they fade out of 
conscious awareness because they no longer require awareness in order to be 
successful (Solms 2013:12). As is also emphasised in the Bayesian model of 
perception, conscious awareness is drawn towards aspects of the environment that 
are novel and unexpected so that they may be tested against the brains working 
predictive hypothesis (Clark 2016; Raftopolous 2009). Thus it is the fate of the 
majority of secondary process sequences to disappear from conscious experience 
once the brain and the body become adept at applying them. Autonomic awareness, 
on the other hand, is persistently conscious: it does not fade away once the 
individual has adjusted to it. This means that id not only functionally underpins the 
ego, it phenomenologically dominates it (Solms 2013:12). 
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From Phantasy to Schemas and Working Models 
Ellen Rees points out in her essay “Unconscious Phantasy and Schema: A 
Comparison of Concepts” (2012), that naturalized psychoanalytic models currently 
suffer from a lack of means of comparison between the psychoanalytic unconscious 
and the cognitive unconscious , which centre on the central nodes of unconscious 
phantasy and unconscious schemas respectively. The notion of unconscious 
phantasy (or primary process functioning) from both a Freudian and a Kleinian 
perspective has already been considered in some depth: it is an act of imagination in 
which the individual’s wishes are experienced as though they are being satisfied 
(Freud 1895/1950, 1911). Unconscious schemas, in contrast, have been described 
as follows:  
A schema operates as a gestalt that can structure perceptions or images. It is 
not a template but a dynamic structure that organizes mental representations at 
an abstract level. Schemata of this kind operate preconceptually and 
unconsciously in different domains of experience, perceptual, sensory, affective, 
motor, and cognitive and so represent the body's experience of somatic 
functioning as well as the body's experience in space, time, gravity, and 
relationship with others (Johnson, 1987 quoted in Rees 2012: 9). 
This definition of a schema draws on the work of psychoanalyst and infant 
researcher Daniel Stern (1985), who argues that, for infants, schemas are built up as 
a way of representing and understanding experiences before higher cognitive 
capacities emerge. Similar principles underlie John Bowlby’s theory of ‘internal 
working models’ within attachment theory, in which children build up naïve theories 
or working models in order to anticipate caregiver response so that they may act 
strategically to remain in as close (emotional) proximity as possible (Bowlby 1997; 
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Fonagy 2001). The following outline of Bowlby’s internal working models by Inge 
Bretherton draws out their strategic dimension: 
Bowlby (1969, 1973) defines internal working models of self and attachment 
figure(s) as dynamic representations with both cognitive and affective 
components. He derived the term from the writings of Craik (l943), a 
psychologist involved in the design of intelligent rocket guidance systems. Craik 
suggested that organisms that carried a small-scale model of reality in their head 
were thereby enabled to choose amongst alternative courses of action, and to 
react to anticipated situations before they arise. Bowlby was attracted to this 
idea of representation as simulation because it was compatible with the 
psychoanalytic concept of representation as an inner world (Bretherton 1992: 2). 
As is well recognised within attachment research, such an approach leads to highly 
different working models across infants and young children who find themselves in 
different interpersonal situations (Crittenden & Landini 2011, Bowlby 1997, Fonagy 
2001). For example, infants whose caregivers only respond to their distress once it 
reaches a certain threshold will find it more beneficial to strongly express their 
feelings than those infants who find themselves in the care of an individual who 
becomes rejecting (or stressed themselves) when faced with outpourings of negative 
affect. In the latter case, dampening down expressions of emotion will likely result in 
the caregiver remaining emotionally available, whereas in the former it will likely to 
lead to (perceived) indifference27. Within internal working models there is therefore a 
greater interplay between the individual and her environment than in phantasy, 
                                            
27 A variety of approaches have been systematized into attachment styles or classifications 
(such as ‘secure’. ‘insecure’ ‘disorganized’) which can be drawn out in artificial research 
scenarios such as the ‘Strange Situation’ (for babies and young children), and the Adult 
Attachment Interview (for adults). These will be outlined and discussed in Chapter Six. 
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whose role is determined by internal, intrapsychic factors (Fonagy 2001). For the 
purposes of the current chapter, both the strategic nature of schemas or working 
models and their intrinsic focus on the external environment are worth noting 
because they demonstrate how even more primitive aspects of mental functioning 
have the aim of learning about the environment in order to anticipate it. While these 
‘lower’ mechanisms may not do this as well as sophisticated conscious processes, 
their driving purpose nevertheless remains the same. This is essential in order to 
understand psychopathology as the mind’s misguided attempt to ‘double down’ on its 
ability to accurately predict and represent the environment and, conversely, the 
healthy mind’s capacity to be open to learning from novelty.  
From Drive to Affect 
The second shift in emphasis that is relevant for an analysis of epistemological 
concerns in psychoanalysis is the movement away from ‘drive’ and towards ‘affect’ 
(Panksepp 2012, Solms & Zellner 2012). Psychoanalytic theory is often accused of 
having no satisfactory theory of affect, a fact which potentially stems from Freud’s 
own failure to properly delineate affect from the drive (Enckell 2007). The explosion 
of empirical research into the nature and function of affects since the 1990s, 
particularly from a neuroscientific perspective, has enabled psychoanalytic theory to 
take affects as the well-spring of psychological motivation (Cozolino 2010). As 
Henrik Enckell argues:  
Changes in our discipline's self-image have probably been especially clear 
during the last two decades. Partly, these changes may be an effect of 
influences from infant observation and the neurosciences. These adjoining fields 
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lean on systems theory, a paradigm that has perhaps influenced psychoanalysis 
to an extent not yet fully realized (Enckell 2007: 64). 
He continues: 
Two things seem to be typical of modern motivational theory. First, most 
psychoanalytic authors today see affects as the most important motivators. They 
may not deny the existence of the drives, but see these as secondary in 
importance (Lichtenberg, 1989; Westen, 1997; Sandler & Sandler, 1998) in 
motivation. Second, many authors-e.g., Lichtenberg (2001) and Kernberg 
(2001)- delineate a specific sequence in motivational evolvement. According to 
these writers, psychological motivation starts with the affect. (Enckell 2007: 66). 
While a full discussion of affect theory is far beyond the scope of this discussion, I 
will consider two ways in which the replacement of drive with affect within the 
psychoanalytic taxonomy encourages the growth of an epistemic dimension in 
psychoanalytic theory. The first concerns regulation: Freud believed that the drive 
was regulated (satisfied) via a process of discharge when the need it represents is 
satiated in real life (perhaps the most clear-cut example being the discharge of 
hunger upon feeding). Affects, on the other hand, are regulated via understanding 
and containment (Fonagy et. al.  2002, Bion 1962/1984), processes which 
emphasise communication, understanding and knowledge over physical pleasure. 
The second concerns linking curiosity and a drive for learning to core psychological 
motivation. Seminal work on core affect systems by Jaak Panksepp produces a 
conceptualization of the mind (via the ‘SEEKING’ system) that is energized by 
curiosity and exploration rather than pleasure per se (Panksepp 2012 95 - 145).  
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Before we can consider both of these epistemic dimensions an important 
clarification is in order. While I am advocating for a change of emphasis from drive to 
affect, this should not be read as an argument that the notion of the drive can be 
cleanly replaced with notion of affect. Affects, especially under some descriptions, 
are not the same things as drives. As Solms and Zellner explain: 
You never experience a drive directly. Frequently in the literature, drives are 
described as something that people feel; for example, it is said that the feeling of 
thirst drives people to drink water. It is as if the feeling is the drive. However, for 
Freud, the feeling of thirst is not itself a drive, which is not something you 
experience; rather, the concept of drive explains why you feel thirst when you 
need water. A feeling such as thirst is conceptualized by Freud as a ‘drive 
derivative’, a mental representation set in motion by the body's need. A drive is 
more fundamental, therefore, than an unconscious wish that already has 
representational content. Indeed, a drive is something prior to all such mental 
things—it is the force that gets the mind going. As such, from the mental point of 
view, drives are inferred entities, unconscious states of ‘mind’ (Solms & Zellner 
2012: 6). 
This also points to a potential confusion of terminology in regards to ‘affects’ 
themselves: the ‘core affect systems’ that Panksepp offers as a contemporary 
alternative for the Freudian drive are not the same as affects in the sense of 
conscious feelings, which (in humans) will always involve elements of higher order 
cognitive processes (Panksepp 2010, 2012). It is therefore important not to conflate 
the notion of ‘core affects’ with the kinds of subjective feeling states which, according 
to the ‘mentalizing’ perspective can be regulated via second order representations. 
For the purposes of examining the higher epistemic component of affects in 
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comparison to drives, this confusion should not be too potent. When drawing on 
Panksepp’s notion of core affect systems, I will argue that the ‘SEEKING’ system 
can give rise to conscious feelings (‘affects’) that have an epistemic dimension such 
as curiosity (Panksepp 2012: 97-98).  
Representation and Affect Regulation 
One of the core claims of attachment theory which sets it aside from instinct theory is 
its claim that the infant seeks proximity with the caregiver as an end in itself and not 
as a means of getting its instinctual needs met (also see Chapter Six for an extended 
discussion on this). As attachment theory has developed, it has adopted a less 
‘naively’ realistic account of the impact of the interpersonal environment on infantile 
behaviour and come to appreciate that it is the individual’s representation of reality 
which is important in the formation of attachment styles. This has been an important 
factor in the “softening of the impasse” (Slade 1999: 797) the unification of 
attachment theory and psychoanalysis and, for our purposes, emphasising the role 
of representation and understanding in affect regulation.  
Following this, the mentalization model account of development is centred on 
the regulation of affective states via their symbolic representation, which is achieved 
first with the help of the caregiver and then (in ‘good enough’ circumstances) 
autonomously by the self (Fonagy et. al. 2002: 192). The capacity for ‘reflective 
functioning’ is established when the caregiver’s sensitive mirroring of an infant’s 
expressed affect is internalized by the infant to form a second order representation. 
In order for a robust mentalizing capacity to emerge, it is imperative that the 
caregiver’s mirroring is experienced by the infant as analogous but not identical to 
their own affective experience. By marking the difference between their own and the 
infant’s emotional state through bodily and facial cues (such as distortion and 
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exaggeration), the mother ‘marks’ that the emotions expressed are not her own but 
belong to the infant (Fonagy et. al. 2002: 192). Over time, the mother’s facial 
expressions and gestures can be internalised as a mental representations used to 
symbolise the infant’s state of mind without being that state of mind (Fonagy et al. 
2002: 192). If the mother’s mirroring is too close to the baby’s subjective state, its 
symbolic quality will be lost: the infant will experience the mother’s affect concretely 
which risks amplifying their emotional state (Fonagy et. al. 2002: 193)28. It is 
important to note here that the caregiver need not explicitly understand the infant’s 
affective state in the sense that she has a declarative awareness of it. In fact, her 
mirroring is more likely to be intuitive expression of implicit mentalizing29. 
Nevertheless, it is a combination of successful understanding and its communication 
that allow the infant to self-regulate. Drives, by their very nature, do not permit 
regulation via this channel. While the focus on affects over drives does not in itself 
necessitate adopting the mentalizing account, it opens the door for an increased 
emphasis on representation.  
                                            
28 It is as if, through her concrete mirroring, the caregiver is confirming the infant’s emotional 
view of the world, rather than implicitly showing him his feelings belong to his mind instead of 
the world. Research seems to bear this hypothesis out. For instance, It has been found that 
mothers who mimic their babies pain following an injection interspersed with different 
emotive cues (such as mocking) managed to soothe their babies more effectively than those 
who simply mirror their baby’s distress.  On the same token, it has been suggested that 
individuals with panic disorders may interpret relatively mild physiological cues as signalling 
catastrophe because their metarepresentation of these signals are not far enough away from 
the original feelings of panic with the result that representing their emotional state leads to a 
cycle of amplification (rather than regulation) resulting in a seemingly unbearable state of 
mind (Fonagy et al 2002: 193- 198).  
29 This form of mentalizing is defined as non-verbal, intuitive and embodied and is thought to 
make up the vast majority of our mentalizing in day to day life (Fonagy & Luyten 2009: 
1358).  
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The ‘SEEKING’ System: ‘Feeling Good’ as an Epistemic Emotion 
Another highly influential supporter of affect rather than ‘drive’ as providing 
motivation for human organisms comes from Jaak Pankepp’s ‘The Archaeology of 
Mind’ (Panksepp 2012). Throughout this work Panksepp reimagines Freud’s model 
of the primary and secondary processes in light of advances in affective 
neuroscience. He links our ultimate sources of motivation to a series of seven basic 
affects that are shared across mammalian species30. Although humans naturally 
experience a much higher degree of nuance and complexity in their emotional worlds 
than other mammals, coming to terms with the underlying core of internal 
experiences could shed light on pathologies of emotional experience, especially 
when these are constitutive of common forms of mental illness such as anxiety and 
depression (Panksepp 2010). Panksepp captures the impact of mammalian affect 
systems on human psychological experience by proposing a three-tiered model of 
the mind which contains primary, secondary and tertiary processes, suggesting that 
basic ‘primary process’ affects can be elaborated on by the ‘secondary processes’ 
which are descriptively unconscious brain mechanisms that allow for memory and 
learning. The content of these ‘secondary process’ mechanisms can, in turn be 
interpreted by ‘tertiary processes’ which allow for the uniquely human form of 
reflective consciousness in which one can reason about one’s experience (Panksepp 
2012:80). Aside from providing robust empirical support for the presence of core 
motivational affect systems in humans (which cannot be satisfactorily covered here) 
Panksepp’s ‘SEEKING’ system is a particular useful construct for the current project.   
                                            
30 These are (in no particular order): seeking, rage, fear, lust, care, panic/grief/separation 
and play (Panksepp 2012:35 – 37).  
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Although Panksepp’s taxonomy of affects cannot be satisfactorily mapped onto 
Freud’s metapscyhological concepts, the ‘SEEKING’ system can be considered a 
rough equivalent of Freud’s pleasure principle: it is the ‘get up and go’ driving force 
that compels the organism to engage with its environment (Freud 1911). Like the 
pleasure principle, ‘SEEKING’ is appetitive and is not concerned in itself with the 
limitations of reality: it spurs action regardless of consequence. Solms and Zellner 
express their agreement with the comparison between ‘SEEKING’ and the pleasure 
principle in the following passage: 
The general pleasure-seeking tendency of the libidinal drive, which has a source 
and an aim but is inherently without an object, seems to correlate remarkably 
well with the ‘objectless’ action tendencies that Panksepp attributes to the 
SEEKING system. This system is an all-purpose system, activated by a variety 
of needs, that energizes forward-moving, foraging, and effortful behaviour aimed 
at any number of goals, rewards, or objects. As a behavioural process, 
therefore, we can think of SEEKING as the instinctual elaboration of the primary 
libidinal drive (Solms & Zellner 2012: 10). 
Unlike the Pleasure Principle, however, the ‘SEEKING’ system is characterised by 
epistemic emotions31 such as curiosity and interest (Morton 2009). As Panksepp 
summarises: “When the SEEKING system is aroused, animals exhibit an intense, 
enthused curiosity about the world” (Panksepp 2012: 97-98). It produces a special 
kind of positive affect in mammals that can be described as “excited, euphoric 
anticipation” (ibid: 95) which differs markedly from the pleasure obtained by 
                                            
31 Epistemic emotions are emotions that generally relate to knowledge e.g. awe, certainty, 
understanding, interest, doubt, confusion, surprise and curiosity (See Amory, J. & Vuilleumier, P. 
2013 :14) 
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satisfying instincts. This accommodates the presence of a motivational force 
concerned with knowledge, learning and exploration and not simply with satiating 
bodily needs.   
Panksepp’s ‘SEEKING’ system will be an important theoretical construct for 
establishing the ‘reality oriented’ imagination, as it can be seen to work harmoniously 
with concepts from other fields (such as attachment theory and the mentalization 
model) to produce a general picture of psychic health that is defined by a form of 
openness to the environment that facilitates a mutually reinforcing cycle of emotional 
learning and psychological growth. While the ‘SEEKING’ system underpins a range 
of different affective experiences (including some that are negative and even highly 
psychopathological (Panksepp 2012: 108)) it links human psychological motivation 
with exploration in a manner that fits the proposed ‘epistemic turn’ in psychoanalytic 
theory. It is important to note that it does not do this through the claim that 
exploration is more important than ‘feeling good’ but rather by arguing that one 
cannot disconnect the two from one another: seeking out novelty is pleasurable. The 
‘SEEKING’ system could can therefore be seen to fit smoothly (on a conceptual 
level) with insights from other fields of research which emphasise that healthy 
individuals are those who are able to both detect and make use of novelty in their 
(social) environments (Crittenden & Landini 2011; Fonagy et. al 2015, 2017a, 
2017b). Within the mentalization framework, this facet of psychological health shows 
up most starkly in relation to epistemic trust: ‘healthy’ individuals are defined by their 
ability to be open to social and cultural learning from the communication of others (a 
trait which can be used to great effect in psychotherapy) while those who are 
‘epistemically vigilant’ can become trapped maladaptive patterns precisely because 
they cannot use other’s communication to revise and update their implicit 
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behavioural and affective strategies (Fonagy et. al. 2017a, 2017b)32. While the fact 
that an individual’s ‘SEEKING’ system is active is not enough to guarantee that they 
are able to ‘learn from experience’ in a psychologically beneficial manner, it can be 
used to account for the fact that psychologised health is characterized (in part) by a 
tendency to seek out novel information and perspectives. Within Freud’s Pleasure-
Reality Principle dichotomy, on the other hand, it is difficult to account for the desire 
for exploration of either aspects of the external world or another’s mind.  
‘Frictionless Spinning in a Void’: Establishing a new Epistemological Relationship 
between Mind and World 
So far, I have discussed the idea that naturalizing psychoanalysis results in an 
increased focus on epistemic dimensions of mental experience including prediction, 
understanding and curiosity (Clark 2016; Fonafy et. al 2002; Panksepp 2012). The 
active, ‘thought-like’ nature of perception has been of great interest to philosophers, 
due in part to its power to upheave traditional conceptions of knowledge (McDowell 
1996). As should now be familiar, the recognition that perception contains cognitive 
elements counters the naïve idea that perceptual experiences consist of the simple 
passive reception of sense data, and make it inevitable that the mind plays an active 
role in shaping experience from ‘the bottom up’. While epistemological concerns in 
the traditional sense (such as delineating what it means to know something) lie 
outside the bounds of both the current project and psychoanalytic thinking as a 
whole, the manner in which an individual’s epistemological access to the world has 
grown increasing more complex is of prime importance for understanding 
developments in psychoanalytic theory since Freud’s time.  
                                            
32 See Chapters Five and Eight for a fuller account of ‘epistemic trust’ including its proposed 
evolutionary roots. 
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The epistemic anxieties set in motion by Kant’s proposal that perception involves 
the active application of concepts to perceptual experience has been beautifully 
captured by analytic philosopher John McDowell in “Mind and World” (1996). 
Discussing the Kantian idea that a form of rational freedom can persist in the face of 
a ‘disenchanted’ natural world, McDowell argues: 
To accept that point is to acknowledge that judging is an active employment of 
capacities that empower us to take charge of our thinking. But that threatens us 
with oscillating between two unpalatable alternatives. The initial threat is that we 
lose a connection between empirical thinking and independent reality, a 
connection that there must be if what is in question is to be recognizable as 
bearing on independent reality at all. The idea of spontaneity is an idea of 
freedom, and that threatens to make what was meant to be empirical thinking 
degenerate, in our picture, into a frictionless spinning a void (McDowell 1996: 
66). 
McDowell paints a philosophically layered picture of the impact of active perception. 
In a manner not unlike Clark, he asks how it is possible - in the context of our current 
intellectual climate where knowledge is no longer considered innate, and the natural 
world no longer ‘enchanted’ - to make sense of a reason connecting with the natural 
world. McDowell draws attention to the fact that if it is true that our perceptual beliefs 
about the external world entirely shaped by our conceptual capacities – crudely, if 
how we think shapes how we see tout court – then we must face the risk that this 
interpretive freedom could go too far. It could leave us in a place where our ‘contact’ 
with a reality outside of interpretation is limited, an epistemological position where we 
cannot truly claim to have knowledge which is grounded in experience. McDowell 
uses the striking image of ‘frictionless spinning in a void’ to convey the unsatisfactory 
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nature of this position, evoking a mind that has an unbounded creative freedom 
which only serves to trap it in a solipsistic bubble33. He continues in “Mind and 
World” to argue that the ideal position, epistemologically speaking, is one in which 
thought is enchanted to the degree that it can genuinely been seen to deliver 
meaning while being bounded by ‘the way things are’ independently of the mind.  
Although McDowell’s philosophical concerns are not, in themselves, concerns 
which are relevant to the psychoanalyst, the picture he paints of the human mind 
creating meaning from a position of epistemological vulnerability carries many 
similarities to many contemporary approaches, linking Bayesian models of 
perception with features of attachment theory and the mentalization model 
(Bretherton 1992; Bowlby 997; Fonagy & Luyten 2009) . The picture that McDowell 
builds up of an epistemically vulnerable subject may be highly applicable to the 
actual situation of infant or young child, especially if the ‘reality’ that the child is 
aiming to make meaningful contact with is the unobservable psychological world of 
                                            
33 Throughout “Mind and World”, McDowell’s highly philosophical worry concerns the 
nature of beliefs and their justification. He is not worried by the possibility that 
exercising conceptual capacities in perception causes people to believe and 
experience notably different worlds from one another in everyday life: countless 
experiences of successful communication, cooperation and agreement demonstrate 
that this is quite clearly not the case. His worries centre, instead, on the nature of 
knowing in this scenario. Following the general tenet that knowledge can be defined 
as a justified true belief, McDowell discusses the possibility that active perception 
may threaten the very idea that we can use sensory experience to build up beliefs 
that are rationally defensible in any (philosophically) meaningful way. These are not 
worries for the psychoanalyst, who has no need to settle the highly abstract issue of 
whether sensory beliefs as a general phenomenon are rationally defensible. Despite 
this, McDowell can be credited for his vivid portrayal of how tenuous epistemic 
contact with an ‘independent reality’ can be: it is an achievement, rather than a given 
and one which must balance the application of interpretative capacities with open 
receptivity to ‘the way things are’. He demonstrates how one cannot assume the 
openness of the subject to reality, even before we reach issues of unconscious 
distortion.  
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her caregiver’s mind: an arena which inherently grants the interpreter a great deal 
less ‘friction’ than the observation of the natural world.  
McDowell’s depiction of a mind which is engaged in ‘frictionless spinning in a 
void’ is, in his own words, “an account, in diagnostic spirit, of some characteristic 
anxieties of modern philosophy – anxieties that centre…on the relation between 
mind and world” (McDowell 1996: xi). It is these anxieties, relating to the contact 
between mind and world, I believe, that have become constitutive of a 
psychoanalytic understanding of health and pathology over time in such a way that 
calls for a radical alternation of the imagination and its psychic function. On this view, 
it is the mind’s epistemologically complex relationship with external reality (which 
includes the unobservable internal worlds of others) that is the driving force behind 
unconscious distortions and, in the extreme, psychopathology. The ideal scenario, 
McDowell argues, is one in which we can accommodate the exercise of conceptual 
capacities within the ‘space of reasons’ while also retaining a place for the external 
environment to impinge on our think in a manner that exerts a form of ‘spin control’ 
(McDowell 1996). According to the view advanced throughout this thesis, ‘reality 
oriented’ imagining is the form that healthy consciousness takes when the individual 
is in ‘good enough’ health to lay these inescapable anxieties to rest, not as a form of 
conscious philosophical pondering, but as a fundamental part of their psychic 
structure. In health, the individual is open to knowing (and, perhaps more 
importantly, learning from) reality because they accommodate a place for an 
independent reality to exert friction on their projections. In what follows, I will turn to 
the importance of trust in maintaining friction with an ‘independent’ reality.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has proposed that the naturalization of psychoanalytic theory incurs an 
‘epistemic turn’; a movement of emphasis towards epistemological motivation in 
psychoanalytic theory. It is within this context, drawing on the empirically oriented 
models sketched above, that my theory of the ‘reality oriented’ imagination should be 
situated. According to this view, an account of mind and psychopathology that places 
a high emphasis on epistemic factors such as curiosity, prediction and learning can 
encourage of a view of psychic health which goes above and beyond the absence of 
psychopathology. It encourages an account of psychic health as a form of 
imaginative engagement with the world in which one seeks out opportunities for 
learning. In the following chapter, I will expand on the theme of emotional and social 
learning, drawing out its role in dreams, psychopathology and psychic health.  
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Chapter Five  
Dreaming, Fantasying and Learning 
I have dedicated the previous two chapters to exploring how psychoanalytic theory 
has changed since Freud’s time, focusing on both paradigmatic shifts within 
traditional psychoanalytic theory itself and the impact of reuniting psychoanalysis 
with an empirical knowledge base. At the heart of both of these analyses has been a 
renewed vision of the relationship between the subject and the external world, in 
which the individual’s connection to an independent reality is understood as an 
achievement rather than a given (Bateman & Fonagy 2010; Fonagy & Luyter 2009). 
The account of imagination that emerges from such an approach is bound up with 
(often unrecognised) epistemological concerns: insights from psychoanalytic theory, 
affective neuroscience and attachment research form a picture of the ‘healthy 
subject’ as embodying an attitude of epistemic openness towards both internal and 
external reality34. This requires individuals to be motivated, at least to some extent, 
by epistemological concerns (such as prediction, explanation and curiosity) which 
challenges Freud’s ‘instinct theory’ which is driven by the need to discharge psychic 
tension. 
Yet the replacement of ‘pleasure seeking’ with ‘knowledge seeking’, if taken too 
far, risks portraying the human subject in a rather two-dimensional light. Although I 
have aimed to show that the epistemological dimensions of psychological functioning 
have gradually gained more ground since the time Freud was working (e.g. Rees 
2012, Panksepp 2012), this should not be read as an argument that humans are not 
motivated to seek pleasure and avoid pain: that much seems obvious, and a good 
                                            
34 Why such a mind-set is most accurately captured as a form of ‘imagination’ rather than 
some other form of mental process is an issue that I will deal with in Chapter Seven.  
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model of mental functioning will be able to account for it. Rather than replace a drive 
for pleasure with a drive for knowledge, the current argument encourages the view 
that pleasure often incorporates epistemic factors in important ways. This is 
evidenced, for instance, by Panksepp’s work on the mammalian SEEKING system 
(which has been deemed a contemporary equivalent of the Freudian ‘drive’) in which 
he argues that there is a particular form of ‘feeling good’ that manifests as a form of 
‘enthused curiosity’. Conversely, the negative emotions associated with 
psychopathology may stem from this ‘enthused curiosity’ being shut down (see 
Panksepp 2010) or from the deployment of rigidly coherent interpretive schemas that 
lock the individual into reinforcing pathological cycles of relating in which little can be 
learnt. Th latter case, which has been conceptualized as failures in epistemic trust 
from a ‘mentalizing’ perspective, it is not the inhibition of learning itself that leads to 
emotional stress, but the manner in which this makes the individual vulnerable to 
interpersonal scenarios which can lead to dysregulated affect (Fonagy et. al 2015, 
2017).  
The aim of this chapter is two-fold. In the first instance I will re-visit the 
epistemological dimensions in health and pathology discussed in the previous 
chapter by focusing on the important role emotional learning in successful affect 
regulation and, by extension, robust psychic health. Through a discussion of dreams, 
psychopathology and ‘reality oriented’ imagining, I hope to demonstrate that the role 
of ‘knowing’ in psychic life is much more nuanced than a simple division between a 
pathological need for certainty versus a heathy tolerance for ambiguity. Rather, the 
capacity to ‘learn from experience’ is instantiated to a high degree in both dreaming 
and ‘reflective functioning’. Conversely, ‘reality indifferent’ (or ‘fictive’) states of mind 
in waking life (such as delusional beliefs and experiences) represent a two-fold 
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epistemological failure: firstly, there is evidence to suggest that they may be the 
result of failures in emotional learning during sleep and, secondly, they bar further 
learning by creating an often highly coherent but ‘closed – off’ explanatory 
hypothesis which has no ‘friction’ with independent states of affairs and therefore 
does not allow for learning or reappraisal (Hopkins 2016; McDowell 1996).  
One benefit of the analysis below is that its focuses on the deep-seated 
connections between dreaming and mental disorder in a manner that allows for 
some classic Freudian constructs to be re-integrated. Firstly, it will open up space for 
the symbolic content of ‘fictive’ experiences to once again provide meaningful insight 
into an individual’s state of mind. Secondly, it will allow for the development of a 
‘reality indifferent’ form of imagining which forms a necessary counterpoint to the 
‘reality oriented’ imagination proposed here. While I have aimed to emphasise 
throughout this thesis that the imagination can be a means of engaging with the 
external world, this does not entail that ‘reality indifferent’ forms of imagining do not 
continue to operate in psychic life and leave their mark on the experiencing subject. 
A theory which can account for these within the same general paradigm as the 
‘reality oriented’ imagination – specifically, one that can explain such experiences in 
a manner which is both consistent with empirical advances and takes 
epistemological factors into account – will be the most useful for our current 
purposes.  
A similar thematic connection between dreams, ‘reality oriented’ imagining and 
‘fictive’ experiences to the one explored here was arguably expressed by Winnicott 
in the one paper he wrote explicitly about the imagination “Dreaming, Fantasying and 
Living”. As he writes: 
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With unexpected clarity, dreaming and living have been seen to be of the same 
order, daydreaming being of another order. Dreams fit into object-relating in the 
real world, and living fits into the dream-world in ways which are quite familiar, 
especially to psychoanalysts. By contrast, however, fantasying remains an 
isolated phenomena, absorbing energy but not contributing-in either to dreaming 
or to living (Winnicott 1971/2005:36). 
Winnicott captures the difference between dreams, fantasy and ‘reality oriented’ 
processes in the language of psychic energy, evoking Freud’s economic perspective 
on mental functioning (Freud 1895/1950). In what follows, I will aim to show that 
Winnicott’s general point regarding the fundamental difference between fantasy and 
dreaming can be applied to recent advances in psychoanalytic theory in a manner 
which translates them from the language of instinct theory into contemporary view of 
the mind that is concerned with regulation through psychological and social 
knowledge. I will demonstrate how both dreaming and ‘reality oriented’ imagining 
both allow one to learn from emotional experience in a manner which is 
psychologically adaptive and outline an account of how psychotherapy may re-
instantiate this ability in individuals for whom it has become compromised (Fonagy 
et. al. 2017a, 2017; Hopkins 2016). 
Recent neuropsychoanalytic research by Jim Hopkins (2016) on the Bayesian 
‘complexity’ model of dreaming and mental disorder may be able to provide such a 
means of re-introducing Freudian insights in a way that is continuous with the 
developments discussed so far. Drawing on Hopkins’ work, I will combine insights on 
fictive experiences from the ‘complexity’ model with the core notion of the 
mentalization model that affect regulation can be achieved through the imaginative 
interpretation of self and others (Fonagy and Luyten 2009: 1357), suggesting a 
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framework in which ‘reality indifferent’ and ‘reality oriented’ forms of imagining exist 
in dynamic tension with one another. The first is the pathological creation of fictive 
experiences which function in a manner comparable to Kleinian phantasy or the 
Freudian primary process: they aim to deny a piece of internal or external reality by 
creating an alternative explanation that renders the experience bearable but at the 
expense of compromising the individual’s relationship capacity to be open to the 
world (Segal 1964/1988:5). The second is imaginative mentalizing, included here 
under the banner of the ‘reality oriented’ imagination, which has the strikingly 
different aim of creating a psychological arena that incorporates the internal 
psychological world of self and other (Fonagy et al 2002: 203- 253). 
Neuropsychoanalysis and Mentalizing: Towards a Unification  
As this approach calls for a combined perspective, it will be necessary to set the 
scene by considering the potential for a link between the neuropsychoanalytic 
account of ‘reality indifferent’ imagining and a mentalizing account of ‘reality oriented’ 
imagining (Fonagy & Luyten 2009; Hopkins 2016). In what follows, I will aim to 
demonstrate that despite stemming from different theoretical models, insights from 
both of these perspectives can be combined in order to create a multifaceted view of 
the imagination which accounts for its role in both healthy and pathological purposes. 
Uniting these two perspectives is arguably possible as both use attachment theory 
as a developmental basis (a fact which shall be the focus of the following chapter) 
and conceive of the imagination as a means of achieving affect regulation35. 
                                            
35 It should be noted upfront that the similarities I will draw attention to are conceptual rather than 
empirical, although they do presume some degree of general empirical compatibility (that, put 
simply, both models hold broadly similar beliefs about brain functioning). While there are notable 
differences in approach these need not derail the current argument. For example, while both models 
place affect regulation at their core there is a divergence in opinion regarding the role 
variational free energy, which is not explicitly included within the mentalization model’s 
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It also notable that ‘fictive’ experiences and poor mentalizing skills have both 
independently been considered the common factor across various forms of 
psychopathology: Freud supported the former view via his account of the primary 
process and its role in psychopathology, the latter stems from recent work 
undergone by Fonagy and colleagues (Fonagy et. al 2016; Freud 1900, 1915a). A 
natural extension of this recognition therefore, is an enquiry into how (if at all) these 
two factors are linked. Although the mentalization model was initially developed to 
specifically target patients with Borderline Personality Disorder (Bateman & Fonagy 
2007), it has since been applied to a range of psychological disorders and even 
proposed as a general factor underlying all forms of psychopathology (Fonagy et. al. 
2016). For example, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and depression have all been 
linked to deficiencies in various dimensions of mentalizing and social cognition 
(Ciaramidaro et. al. 2014; Regenbogen et. al. 2015; Fonagy & Luyten 2016). While 
space will not permit a satisfactory review of deficits in mentalizing in 
psychopathology, it is worth illustrating this point with a couple of quick examples. 
Focusing on these three disorders will also set the scene for the discussion below in 
which I will demonstrate how they have all been linked to disorders in sleep and 
dreaming (Hopkins 2016). Various studies have shown that patients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia perform significantly worse than controls on measures of explicit and 
implicit mentalizing (e.g. Ciaramidaro et. al. 2014). In an experimental paradigm 
where schizophrenic patients and controls were both asked to respond to two visual 
jokes (one of which could be understood purely though a physical and semantic 
                                            
conception of dysregulation. This grants the ‘complexity’ a far more explicit focus on sensory 
prediction than the ‘mentalization model’ but does not entail any direct contradictions (Friston 
2012; Hopkins 2016).  
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analysis, the other of which involved attributing a mental state to a character in a 
narrative) schizophrenic patients who were actively experiencing symptoms (such as 
paranoid delusions or passivity) found the psychological joke considerably harder to 
understand than the non-psychological joke, whereas controls understood both jokes 
easily (Corcoran 1997). Commonalities have been found between disrupted social 
cognition in schizophrenia and in bipolar disorder, with the latter seemingly entailing 
a similar but more modest deficit (Bora & Pantelis 2016). Depression has also been 
linked to deficits in mentalizing. For example, female inpatients diagnosed with major 
depressive disorder were found to perform significantly worse than healthy controls 
when measured for reflective functioning during the Adult Attachment Interview (see 
Chapter Eight for more on the AAI) (Fischer-Kern et. al. 2013). As we shall see in 
more detail later on (See Chapter Seven), Fonagy and Luyten have argued that 
deficits in mentalizing in depressed patients may be responsible for the diminished 
sense of self and agency that often accompanies the disorder (Fonagy & Luyten 
2016). . 
It is important to clarify that impairments in mentalizing and fictive beliefs and 
experiences are not construed as the causes of psychopathology. The point, rather, 
is that they tend both to be manifest features of psychopathology. In other words, 
evidence suggests that both of these features of experience tend to emerge as the 
dominant epiphenomenal manifestations of failures in internal regulation (which itself 
will have a complex causal history incorporating both genetic and environmental 
factors).It should be understood, therefore, that re-establishing the capacity for 
mentalizing or for veridical experience does not in itself constitute recovery from 
psychopathology, (nor is it impossible to imagine mental health in its absence); one 
cannot, for example, simply ‘teach’ mentalizing as a means of ameliorating 
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psychological distress or cure schizophrenia by convincing the sufferer that her 
beliefs do not align with reality36 (Fonagy et. al 2017b; Graham 2013). The 
recognition that both fictive beliefs and failures in mentalizing have found to be 
common factors in psychopathology, therefore, does not in any way imply that 
psychopathology should be reduced to these features, or can be explained away by 
them. Both may be said, however, to characterise the phenomenology of 
psychopathology in a way which transcends diagnostic categories which makes a 
perspective which can incorporate them into a larger explanatory framework an 
appealing line of research to pursue.  
Perception, Fiction and Imagination: A Clarification of Terms 
Hopkins’ neuropsychoanalytic interpretation of the link between dreaming and 
mental disorder is based on the ‘Bayesian Brain’ model (Friston 2012; Hopkins 2012, 
2015). This model, which we saw in Chapter Three is underscored by the recognition 
that perception is an active force, states conscious perception has evolved in human 
beings (and other animals) as a means of predicting the sources of incoming data. In 
line with Kantian epistemology (Kant 1781/1900/2007, see Chapters Two and Four), 
this approach recognises that although pieces of sensory ‘data’ may be manifestly 
visible, we cannot directly perceive the links, causes or organising principles of such 
data (Hopkins 2012, 2015: see discussion in Chapter Three). Predictive Bayesian 
neuroscience evolves Kant’s basic principles by giving an account of how the brain is 
able to learn from the experience of deploying its own predictive models, thus 
                                            
36 A potential clinical suggestion that stems from the complexity model states that diminished 
reliance on complexity reduction via fictive beliefs can be achieved through allowing the re-
experiencing of intense emotional conflict in an environment that is safe, thus prompting the 
reconsolidation of the emotional memory in a new form that does not trigger complexity reduction 
outside of sleep to the same extent as previously (Hopkins 2016). This would be a fruitful line of 
further research.  
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reducing the need for innate mental structures identified in Kantian philosophy, 
giving it an even more active and generative character (Clark 2016) 
Kant is rightly credited for demonstrating that all perception is inherently 
imaginative, yet I will not be equating Kantian ‘active’ perception with ‘reality 
oriented’ imagining for the purposes of the current argument. In order to ameliorate 
the potential confusion that is often associated with the term ‘imagination’ (See 
Introduction Part One) it is worth offering definitions of the three forms of 
psychological experience discussed in this chapter before continuing. Although all 
depend ultimately on the existence of ‘active’ perception – which functions as the 
basis from which both reality-indifferent and ‘reality oriented’ forms of imagination as 
I am currently conceiving them - I hope to make the case that these three modes of 
experience are psychoanalytically interesting in virtue of their differences rather than 
their similarities. I will define them as follows: 
• Veridical Perception: Perception of the external world according to 
Kantian/Bayesian principles of ‘active’ vision. While this form of perception 
has been described as ‘imaginative’ in some contexts, I will argue that it 
should not count as ‘imaginative’ within a psychoanalytic framework as it fails 
to incorporate the necessary affective dimensions.  
• ‘Reality-indifferent’ Imagination or ‘Fictive’ Experiences: Psychological 
experiences that provide pseudo-explanatory narratives without taking 
external states of affairs into account. Like the Freudian account, this form of 
imagination is defined by indifference to reality. Unlike the Freudian 
conception, it is motivated by the need to form a crude predictive explanation, 
rather than by the pleasure principle.  
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• The ‘Reality oriented’ Imagination: An imaginative mode of experiencing the 
social and emotional world that understands both the self and others as 
psychological beings constituted by unobservable thoughts and feelings. It 
has an affective dimension which crafts a coherent self with a sense of 
agency.  
In what follows, I will unpack how each mode of experience manifests in 
psychopathology and dreaming (their respective roles in infantile development will be 
discussed in the following chapter). At this stage, my emphasis will rest on outlining 
a selected range of the relevant empirical literature and considering some 
connections that can be made between models.  
A ‘Complexity’ Account of Dreaming and Perception 
According to the Bayesian perspective, the fundamental aim of the brain/mind is to 
minimise free energy through formulating conscious experiences which represent the 
causes of incoming sense data (Hopkins 2012: 9). We saw this concept at play in the 
‘face-house’ experiment described the previous chapter, in which an undulating 
image of a face turning into a house (and then back again) is experienced when the 
brain has two competing, equally likely hypotheses about what it is seeing. The 
Bayesian Brain forms predictive hypotheses in order to minimise that it will be 
‘surprised’. ‘Surprise’ in this context is formally conceptualised as ‘variational free 
energy’: a measure of prediction error which plays an analogous role to statistical 
free energy in thermodynamics (Hopkins 2016:3). While space will not permit an in-
depth look at neurophysiology processes underpinning this, the relevant point to be 
drawn from the notion of ‘variational free energy’ is the recognition that the mind is 
constantly attempting to minimise its prediction errors through making accurate 
models of incoming sensory data, while simultaneously making economically 
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efficient predictions that are not overly complex (Hopkins 2016:3). There is an 
inherent tension in this task: as accuracy increases, so does complexity. Bayesian 
predictive models therefore involve a trade-off between accuracy and complexity, 
with good models resting at a sweet-spot between the two (Hopkins 2016:3).  
In “Free Energy and Virtual Reality in Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience” 
Hopkins (2016) argues that the inherent tension between the tasks of increasing 
accuracy and decreasing complexity in the Bayesian account of generative 
consciousness could account for the existence of both dreaming and mental disorder 
in humans (Hopkins 2016:1). In healthy, adult human life, it suggested, the brain 
circumvents the conflict of increasing accuracy and decreasing complexity by 
essentially dividing the tasks between the waking brain and the sleeping brain 
respectively. Thus, while the waking brain has the role of increasing accuracy by 
gaining as much new information as possible during the day, it depends upon the 
sleeping brain to, in essence, streamline the complexity of predictive models 
(Hopkins 2016: 4)  
In dreams, one is cut off from external perceptual stimuli and yet nevertheless 
has a perceptual experience. As sensory perception shuts down during sleep, 
dreams must draw their representational contents from other sources. In line with 
Freudian intuition, the manifest content of dreams is thought to come from internally 
generated affects and memories (Hopkins 2016: 5-7). Memory plays an especially 
significant role in complexity reduction because it is through the reconsolidation of 
memory that affect regulation and emotional learning take place. As part of this 
process, relevant memories are reconsolidated (updated) to include new information 
gleaned during waking hours. Affects, especially of a highly arousing conflicting 
nature, are often the target for complexity reduction through consolidation, so that 
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both recent experiences and longer-term memories which embody highly complex 
affects that are still ‘active’ at the time of sleep can become ‘available’ for complexity 
reduction (Hopkins 2016). Consider, as Hopkins does, Freud’s dream of Irma’s 
injection in which Freud creates the ‘fictive’ conscious experience of Otto’s culpability 
in order to ameliorate his much more complex feelings of personal guilt and 
responsibility over this incident (and other incidents which he associatively relates 
with it). Discussing the various clinical failures that Freud associates with this dream, 
Hopkins argues: 
These memories are clearly concerned with Freud’s feeling of being criticized by 
Otto and his wish to justify himself; and Freud’s discovery in the dream that 
Otto’s thoughtless injection was responsible for Irma’s continued suﬀering 
provides both justiﬁcation and grounds for retaliatory criticism. So we see a 
connection between the manifest content and the emotions of the day that is 
similar to those in the simple examples above. Just as Freud’s experience of 
satisfaction, so Freud’s experience in this more complex dream can be seen as 
ﬁctively satisfying the desire to justify himself and the annoyance with Otto that 
he felt on the evening of the dream. So here, as before, we naturally take the 
dream experience as both caused by, and also as serving to pacify (that is, to 
inhibit) the emotions aroused in REM (Hopkins 2016: 13). 
As Hopkins describes, dreams are both brought on by the emotional disturbances of 
the day and simultaneously serve to mitigate them. This mitigation takes the form of 
emotional learning, so that new information can be used to enhance the ability for 
the brain to focus on predictive ‘accuracy’.  
212 
 
The ‘Complexity’ Theory of Sleep and Mental Disorders: 
Hopkins proposes that the generation of fictive experiences in psychological disorder 
may have a similar structure and function to fictive experiences in dreaming. He 
argues that dreams represent an attempt to obtain regulatory control over conflicting 
affects that cannot be managed by brain’s veridical daytime model. Evidence of this 
can be seen through the analysis of a range of psychological disorders including 
schizophrenia, bipolar, OCD and depression. For instance, Elyn Saks describes how 
her experience of schizophrenia involved the undulation between negative 
symptoms (in her case, severe depression) and positive symptoms (delusional 
beliefs): 
 […]  her increasingly unbearable depression altered only when came to imagine 
herself “receiving commands” from “shapeless powerful beings that controlled me 
with thoughts (not voices) that had been placed in my head.” These commanded, 
e.g., “Walk through the tunnels and repent. Now lie down and don’t move. You are 
evil.” She was also commanded to injure herself, which she did by burning herself 
with cigarette lighters, electric heaters, or boiling water, so that ﬁnally she spent most 
of her time “alone in the music room or in the bathroom, burning my body, or 
moaning and rocking, holding myself as protection from unseen forces that might 
harm me.” These delusions ﬁt the generalizations advanced so far. They served to 
mitigate the conﬂict, or reduce the complexity, of Saks’ self-punishing depression, by 
replacing it with an imaginary relationship with punitive others…This change from the 
internalization to the externalization of punishment constituted Saks’ shift from 
depression to paranoia, and eﬀected a temporary inhibition (reduction of parameters) 
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of her internal self-punishment, and so a reduction in conﬂict (complexity) and FE 
overall ( Hopkins 2016: 9-1037).  
Hopkins later suggests that the positive symptoms of schizophrenia may be 
understood as the attempt to regulate the unbearable negative symptoms (a similar 
format of cycling ‘realistic’ depressive experience and delusional thinking can be 
found in Bipolar disorder). Thus a delusional belief may act as a regulating force in 
the same manner that dreams do in healthy functioning, although such attempts at 
repair unfortunately draw suffers even further away from realistic experiences and 
therefore increase their need for complexity reducing mechanisms in the long run.  
In support of this, numerous studies have demonstrated a connection between 
sleep deprivation and a reduced capacity for emotional learning. Walker and Van der 
Helm (2009) have provided a review of research which connects sleep with the 
capacity to learn from emotional memory, demonstrating that sleep deprivation (and, 
by extension, deprivation of the opportunity to dream) can have an impact on both 
the early stages of information encoding and the later stages of memory 
consolidation (Walker & Van der Helm 2009). It has been well established that 
events which are emotionally arousing are remembered better than those which are 
neutral. Following this, sleep deprivation is not believed to lessen our capacity to 
remember generally but specifically targets the enhancing impact of emotion on 
memory. The finding that Walker and Van der Helm draw from the research in this 
area which is most useful for the current discussion is that negative events are more 
resistant to the impact of sleep deprivation than positive or neutral events, 
                                            
37 It is interesting to note that this account remains faithful to Freud’s assertion that 
positive symptoms in schizophrenia represent the mind’s attempt at repairing the 
individual’s relationship with reality.  
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suggesting that poorly rested individuals will suffer from a bias of attention towards 
negativity:  
These data indicate that sleep loss impairs the ability to commit new 
experiences to memory, and has recently been associated with dysfunction 
throughout the hippocampal complex (Yoo, Hu, Gujar, Jolesz, & Walker, 2007). 
They also suggest that, while the effects of sleep deprivation are directionally 
consistent across emotional subcategories, the most profound impact is on the 
encoding of positive emotional stimuli, and to a lesser degree, emotionally 
neutral stimuli. In contrast, the encoding of negative memory appears to be more 
resistant to the effects of prior sleep loss Walker & Van der Helm 2009, 
accessed online). 
This provides an interesting route for the reintroduction of positive and negative 
affects into the arena of learning and knowledge by demonstrating how failures in 
learning can be directly tied to the forms of negative affects that are common in 
psychopathology and impaired mentalizing (Fonagy et. al. 2017a, 2017b). Indeed, 
Walker and Van der Helm go onto to suggest that the common co-morbidity of sleep 
disorders and psychopathology can be partially explained by appealing to the 
reduced capacity to encode and consolidate positive memories when sleep deprived 
(Walker & Van der Helm 2009). In line with Hopkins’ ‘complexity’ theory, they go on 
to suggest that it may not be sleep loss itself which impacts psychological well-being 
but the fact that this deprives individuals of a chance dream. To link a depressed 
mood with patterns of sleep and dreaming Walker and Van der Helm cite a study in 
which recently divorced women who were found to be more depressed also had the 
worst quality sleep. Interestingly, those depressed individuals who reported 
dreaming more frequently and vividly of their former husbands also had the best 
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remission rates from depression a year on, suggesting that dreaming plays an active 
role in ‘taking the sting’ out of painful emotional memories (Cartwright et. al. 1991 
quoted in Walker & Van der Helm 2009). Furthermore, patients who have been 
diagnosed with severe depression (and therefore are not actively delusional in 
waking life) have been found to have disrupted Slow Wave Sleep: their sleep 
patterns tend to display a ‘jump’ from ‘light sleeping’ straight to REM. As a result of 
this ‘jump’ it is thought that these patients may miss out the stage of sleep in which 
emotional learning is enacted through memory consolidation (the stage in which 
memories are transferred from the hippocampus to the cortex) (Hopkins 2016:11). 
Leaving aside the neurophysiological specifics, this is important to note for the 
current discussion in so far as it suggests that the process of regulating affect during 
sleep has been disrupted for depressed patients38 which may, in turn, impact their 
ability for satisfactory affect regulation in waking life. Insights from the mentalization 
model suggest that such failures in affect regulation may go onto to impair capacity 
for emotional learning in waking life (for example, through psychotherapy) thus 
trapping the individual in a reinforcing cycle that makes them ‘hard to reach’ (Fonagy 
et. al. 2016, 2017a, 2017b). 
PTSD provides another prime example of a link between dreaming and mental 
disorder: the vivid nightmares characteristic of the disorder are thought to be aborted 
                                            
38 It has been suggested, in turn, that this might explain why patients diagnosed with 
depression tend to report that their dreams have a mundane quality to them; the bizarreness 
that often accompanies healthy dreams representing the emotionally charged memories 
which fail to be reactivated for depressed patients (Hopkins 2016) 
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attempts to regulate emotional memories that ultimately are too traumatic for the 
brain to consolidate (Hopkins 2016: 10-11). As Walker and Ven der Helm describe: 
If [the] process of divorcing emotion from memory is not achieved across the first 
night following such an experience, the model would predict that a repeat 
attempt of affective demodulation would occur on the second night, since the 
strength of the emotional “tag” associated with the memory would remain high. If 
this process failed a second time, the same events would continue to repeat 
across ensuing nights. It is just such a cycle of REM-sleep dreaming 
(nightmares) that represents a diagnostic key feature of post-traumatic stress 
disorder (Van der Helm & Walker 2009, accessed online). 
These findings could be taken to support the notion, adopted by many philosophers 
and psychologists over the years, that an individual experiencing psychotic delusions 
is trapped in a similar experience to the healthy individual when she is dreaming 
(Stevens & Price 2016: 229). Yet the particular version of this idea instantiated in the 
complexity model, drawing on classic Freudian insights can allow for a greater depth 
of explanation. The neuropsychoanalytic approach draws connections between the 
psychological mechanisms operating in sleep and those operating in mental illness, 
rather than simply pointing to similarities between the manifest content dreams and 
florid psychosis, suggesting a deeper underlying structure between dreaming and 
psychopathology on the level of function (Hopkins 2016: 10-14). Evidence for this 
can be found by examining the disrupted sleep patterns in individual’s who suffer 
from psychopathological conditions but who are not trapped in the sways of 
psychosis.  
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There are a couple of further points worth drawing attention to before turning to 
a fuller account of emotional learning in waking life and its disruption in 
psychopathology. Firstly, the importance of dreaming for emotional learning from the 
neuropsychoanalytic continues a general theme in the evolution of psychoanalytic 
theory, in which an aspect of mental life which Freud lamented as inevitable is re-
characterised as both positive and necessary for healthy sophisticated functioning. 
While Freud believed that dreams were a healthier way of allowing unconscious 
wishes to emerge than active psychosis, he nevertheless did not portray them as 
constitutive of ‘reality oriented’ processes. Secondly, the ‘complexity’ model may 
offer a greater explanatory force in terms of the content of dreams and symptoms by 
presenting them as meaningfully symbolic representations of an individual’s 
experience (Hopkins 2016: 15). Both Freud’s dream and Elyn Sak’s delusion have 
the potential to illuminate specific information about the thinker. For example, while 
the mentalization model has the potential to account for the profound psychological 
disorganization typical in schizophrenia in terms of a deeply disrupted ‘self-
representation’, it cannot explain why a particular person has a particular delusion at 
a particular time. The ‘complexity’ model can restore these elements of Freudian 
thinking into psychoanalytic theory.  
Hopkins has linked the tendency to resort to ‘fictive’ complexity reducing 
mechanisms in mental disorder to the ‘cumulative trauma’ of misattunements in early 
attachment relationships (Hopkins 2015, 2016:8-9). Fonagy and colleagues have 
located failures in the capacity for ‘reflective functioning’ within the same 
developmental paradigm, once again suggesting lines of cross communication 
between these two models (Fonagy et. al. 2002; Fonagy & Luyten 2009). While 
developmental issues will surface briefly in the discussion that follows, I will reserve 
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the majority of my analysis for the following chapter, which will aim to provide an 
account of ‘reality oriented’ imagining from a developmental perspective.  
Emotional Learning and ‘Epistemic Trust’ 
Although ‘mentalizing’ is a process through which we can come to attribute 
psychological states to both ourselves and others, it is imperative that a ‘mentalizing’ 
stance is characterized by a sense of openness and curiosity39 rather than a state of 
rigid certainty. Openness to learning about the social and psychological world, much 
like ‘mentalizing’, is thought to develop within a securely attached relationship in 
which the baby and young child can cultivate the capacity for ‘epistemic trust’: the 
global belief that what others communicate about social and cultural matters is both 
applicable to the self and generalizable to other contexts (Fonagy et. al 2017a, 
2017b). Epistemic trust can be seen to highlight communication and knowledge 
transmission over relational security per se. It takes “natural pedagogy” (see Csibra 
& Gergely 2009) as its basis, noting that the transmission of cultural and social 
knowledge has put homo sapiens at a distinct evolutionary advantage over other 
species in part because of our willingness to trust authority as a source of 
knowledge. This mirrors a general move away from the Cartesian picture of the 
isolated thinker who rationally deduces everything for herself, towards a view of man 
as a relational being not only along an affective dimension but in terms of 
epistemological matters.  
                                            
39 In Chapter Seven of this work I will link ‘mentalizing’ to Keats’ notion of ‘negative 
capability’.   
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Attachment is thought to open an individual out to learning from others through a 
set of ostensive clues in interaction which serve to reduce an inherited epistemic 
vigilance. As Fonagy et. al. describe:  
This specific form of learning is stimulated by ostensive cues generated by the 
communicator [8, 9]. Such cues trigger a pedagogic stance in the recipient, 
priming them to regard forthcoming communications as significant. Human 
infants display species-specific sensitivity and deference to non-verbal ostensive 
cues, such as eye contact, turn-taking contingent reactivity, being called by their 
name, and the use of a special tone of voice (‘motherese’) by the communicator 
[10, 11]. These ostensive cues have in common the quality that the recipient is 
recognized as a subjective, agentive self. Once epistemic trust is stimulated in 
this way, the channel for the transmission of knowledge is opened. Mimicry may 
be protected by human evolution because it generates epistemic trust, inevitably 
signalling recognition in the child by the imitating adult. A social smile 
(recognition of the self by the other) probably increases the tendency for 
imitation because the smile generates epistemic trust and opens the 
communication channel to receive knowledge (Fonagy et. al 2017, accessed 
online). 
While this form of higher level social and emotional learning is in a sense far 
removed from the fine grained perceptual learning which takes place moment to 
moment in sensory perception, Hopkins has suggested that the two can be linked: 
[…] second-by-second microanalyses of face-to face interactions between 
mothers and infants show that disorganization at 12+ months can be predicted 
from the 4th month by episodes of emotional misrecognition very diﬀerent from 
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abuse. These involve short (2.5s) interactions in play , whose ﬁne details are 
undetectable by unaided sight, and in which, among other things, the mothers 
concerned refuse to recognize or co-ordinate empathically with their infants’ 
expressions of distress. Instead they respond with exaggerated surprise or 
smiling, or again, as distress increases, by facial freezing and/or looking away. 
…This deprives the infants (as their mothers may have been deprived) of 
opportunities for learning in emotional interaction, and so for internalizing in their 
own regulative models the understanding responses of others. Instead they 
apparently learn that their conﬂicts and distress are unsharable, intolerable, and 
not to be recognized or known (Hopkins 2016: 9). 
There is thus reason to believe that fine grained perceptual cues can filter up into 
global attitudes regarding epistemic trust and vigilance.  
Disorganized attachment in infancy caused by the cumulative trauma of 
misrecognition has been linked to psychopathology later in adult life. Notably, 
connections have been drawn between disorganized attachment and Borderline 
Personality Disorder (BPD), which Fonagy et. al have also linked to a shutting down 
of ‘epistemic trust’ (‘epistemic petrification’) so that sufferers of BPD can no longer 
use the communication of trusted others as a means of ameliorating psychological 
distress40 (Fonagy 2001; Fonagy et. al 2017a, 2017b, Fonagy & Luyten 2009). This, 
they note, is likely to be an adaptive move which was originally deployed in 
interpersonal circumstances where others’ communication was either not generally 
transparent and benign, or did not treat the subject as self or agent in her own right41 
                                            
40 This finding can be seen to cohere with the general insight that patient’s with insecure 
attachment style have a more rigid belief system and are less open to revising their beliefs in 
light of new evidence. 
41 A developmental account of the ‘agentive self’ will be provided in the following chapter.  
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(Fonagy et. al. 2017b). Adverse initial circumstances are believed to negatively 
impact how patients with personality disorders are able to ‘make use’ of therapy: the 
fact that they are not able to let go of their epistemic vigilance entails that it is difficult 
for them to internalise the therapist’s communication as applicable and generalizable 
to other contexts, thus making genuine therapeutic change difficult (Fonagy et. al. 
2016). Following this, Fonagy and colleagues have argued that the initial goal of 
therapy in such cases must be to cultivate the patient’s capacity for social learning, 
first from the therapist and then from their own social environments. The patient’s 
emerging capacity for epistemic trust outside the therapeutic hours is thought to be 
the driver of psychic change, as it allows them to adopt a ‘mentalizing’ stance within 
their own social lives in a way that loosens deeply entrenched patterns of 
interpersonal relating (Fonagy et. al. 2016). Therapy, therefore, can have a similar 
impact to successful dreaming, by allowing (what I am calling) a capacity for 
imaginative engagement with reality to take the place of a rigidity; it allows for a 
plastically ‘flexible’ attitude towards one’s experiences which takes them to be 
meaningful without necessarily being universal. The literature on ‘epistemic trust’ 
also proposes a highly different role for ‘knowledge’ in psychotherapy which can be 
seen to cohere with general theme drawn out so far across this thesis. Rather than 
the declarative insight promised in traditional Freudian psychoanalysis, this approach 
places the subject’s epistemological vulnerability at the core of understanding 
disorder (Fonagy et. al. 2017a, 2017b). In the face of an ultimately unknowable 
world, the only means of exerting some ‘friction’ (see McDowell 1996) is to take 
other’s communication as genuinely trustworthy without falling into blind acceptance.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has aimed to show how healthy psychological functioning is defined by 
a healthy partnership between dreaming and ‘reality oriented’ imagining (here 
portrayed through the mentalization model) which works to instantiate psychological 
attitudes in which emotional learning is both possible and implicitly sought out. In 
contrast, ‘reality indifferent’ experiences can be seen to provide a pathological 
response to deep-seated epistemic anxieties which provide coherent explanatory 
frameworks at the expense of veridical accuracy, making them an archetypal 
instance of ‘frictionless spinning in a void’ (McDowell 1996:11). In the final section of 
this work, I will link ‘epistemic trust’ with psychoanalytic writings on ‘negative 
capability’ (see Ou 2009). First, however, it will be necessary to consider in more 
depth how the capacity for emotional learning (thought to arise through a healthy 
partnership of dreaming and reflective functioning) can be linked with infantile 
development. I will turn to this now.  
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Chapter Six 
Towards a Developmental Account of the ‘Reality Oriented’ Imagination 
The previous two chapters have aimed to capture a new role for imaginative 
processes, drawing out the importance of epistemological factors in “dreams, 
fantasying and living” (see Winnicott 1971/2005:36-50). I demonstrated that both 
‘reality oriented’ imagining and dreaming can be granted a key role in emotional 
learning which can be considered a pinnacle of psychic health, whereas ‘fictive’ 
experiences (which, much like Freud’s primary process are indifferent to reality) are 
simultaneously a response to failures in emotional learning and block it through the 
creation of closed-off explanatory systems which offer coherent ‘explanations’ which 
lack any ‘friction’ with a world outside of the mind (see McDowell 1996). My aim has 
been to offer a reformulation of the function of imaginative processes in 
psychoanalytic theory that allows for a heightened emphasis on epistemological and 
interpersonal concerns, presenting an overarching picture in which an individual’s 
psychic relationship to knowledge and uncertainty takes precedence over their 
capacity for object-relating or the toleration of instinctual frustration.  
This chapter will augment the last by exploring ‘reality oriented’ and ‘reality 
indifferent’ imagining from a developmental perspective. In doing so, I will draw once 
more on mentalization literature and the ‘complexity’ model, with the aim of 
reconstructing a schematic developmental narrative which can go some way towards 
accounting for an individual’s tendency to rely on ‘reality oriented’ or ‘reality 
indifferent’ forms of imagination respectively (Fonagy et. al 2002; Hopkins 2015, 
2016). The developmental account presented below will be important in laying the 
groundwork for the final section of this thesis, in which I will aim to formulate and 
characterise ‘reality oriented’ imagining.  
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Defining the ‘Mentalizing Imagination’ 
A high level of emphasis has been placed in this thesis on the fact that mentalizing is 
a form of imaginative activity, yet the precise form of imagination employed in 
successful mentalizing remains unclear. Drawing out the precise nature of 
imaginative mentalizing is a daunting conceptual task, compounded by the fact the 
both mentalizing and imagining are themselves ‘open’ terms which can refers to a 
range of distinct mental processes. In what follows I will set out a phenomenological 
framework for interpreting the ‘mentalizing imagination’ with the aim of highlighting 
how mentalization can be seen to fit into the concept of ‘reality oriented’ imagining 
drawn out in this thesis. 
It is recognised within the philosophical literature that the capacity to ‘mind read’ 
draws on a form of imagination, with the human capacity for empathy, moral 
reasoning and the ability to infer unobservable states all being linked by various 
authors to the human capacity for imagination (see Kind 2016).  Broadly speaking, 
two theoretical camps have emerged to explain how human beings are able to 
imaginatively access the psychological states of others, which have been termed 
‘theory of mind’ and ‘simulation theory’ (Heal 2003; Gallagher & Zahavi 2008). 
‘Theory of mind’ (also known as ‘theory theory’) is the notion that we make sense of 
other’s behaviour by interpreting it as the causal effect of their beliefs, desires and 
intentions. To take a commonplace example: if we perceive another person pick up a 
glass and take a drink we will make sense of this action by inferring that the person 
had an intention to pick up the glass and a belief that making certain bodily 
movements will allow them to do this (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008). This entails that our 
understanding of others is based around a third-person perspective.  As Jane Heal 
describes: 
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The approach is resolutely third-personal. The Cartesian introspectionist error –
the idea that from some confrontation with psychological items in our own case 
we learn their nature – is repudiated. We are said to view other people just as 
we view stars, clouds or geological formations. People are just complex objects 
in our environments whose behaviour we wish to anticipate but whose causal 
innards we do not perceive. We therefore proceed by observing the intricacies of 
their external behaviour and formulating some hypotheses and how the innards 
are structured (Heal 2003: 11).  
There is a lack of consensus among ‘Theory of Mind’ supporters as to whether the 
ability to causally map psychological states onto behaviour is learned and explicit 
(much like the learning of scientific theories), or whether there is an innate ‘theory of 
mind’ mechanism or module in the brain which generates this perspective 
automatically. Despite this, all theoretical models which fall under the ‘theory of mind’ 
banner can be differentiated from the second broad approach to social cognition 
which known as ‘simulation theory’. ‘Simulation theory’ proposes that we are able to 
understand others behaviour and infer their mental states using a form of first-person 
imaginative exercise. To return to the rather mundane example above, a simulation 
theorist would argue that we understand another person’s behaviour when we see 
them reach for a glass because we imaginatively simulate what we would be 
thinking, feeling or believing if we were to perform this action and then attribute these 
qualities to the observed individual. In this respect, our ability to understand others 
draws on the same mechanism we use when thinking about future possibilities in our 
own lives (Heal 2011:13). Much like supporters of the ‘theory of mind’ approach, 
simulation theorists disagree on the extent to which the simulation process is 
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learned, conscious and explicit, with some arguing that it is a sub-personal, 
automatic process that does not give rise a conscious experience of simulation.  
How does the ‘mentalization’ model fit into this theoretical landscape? Fonagy 
and colleagues do not discuss the merits of a ‘simulation theory’ versus a ‘theory of 
mind’ approach extensively in the mentalization literature. Where they do, it is often 
implied that the two approaches co-exist as distinct routes towards understanding 
others.  For instance, in discussing the positive effect of peer-group interactions on 
sound mentalizing in young children, they state: 
Both simulation and theory-theory explanations of the development of 
mindreading offer good explanations of the facilitative effect of more intense 
peer-group interaction (Ruffman et al. 1998). Peer-group interaction should 
increase the opportunities that children have for simulation, imagining what they 
would see, think, feel and so on if they were in another person’s situation. 
Equally, interaction with peers or older siblings could be seen from a theory-
theory perspective as a rich source of ideas of how the mind works (Fonagy et. 
al 2003: 50) 
The possibility that individuals can draw on both simulative replication and third-
person analysis in understanding others has been linked to the multi-dimensional 
nature of mentalizing (Davidsen & Fosgerau). Where a ‘theory of mind’ approach can 
be seen as compatible with explicit and cognitive dimensions of mentalizing, it 
arguably could not be adopted as an overarching conceptual framework because it 
fails to capture ‘implicit’ mentalizing.  This is important to note as psychopathology 
does not always involve the wholesale shutting down one’s capacity to mentalize but 
can also consist of one dimension of mentalizing becoming out of balance with the 
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others. For example, some Borderline Patients are proficient ‘hypermentalizers’. 
These patients are keen and accurate readers of other’s states of mind, an ability 
that was often cultivated in an abusive or neglectful environment where the ability to 
predict caregiver’s mood and behaviour could was protective. However, unlike 
‘healthy’ or ‘balanced’ mentalizing, these patient’s attention is so fixated on the 
‘other’ dimension of mentalizing that they remain out of touch with their own 
subjective states, and therefore fail to use mentalization to regulate affect and 
maintain a experiential grasp on an ‘agentive self’ (Fonagy et. al 2003).  
  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to satisfactorily draw up a conceptual 
framework for the ‘mentalizaton’ model, not least because it is a rapidly growing 
body of empirical knowledge which may not (currently) permit this level of 
thematization (Davidsen & Fosgerau 2015). However, in order to make the case that 
the ‘mentalizing’ imagination is a form of ‘reality oriented’ imagination (as it has been 
defined throughout this thesis) it will be useful to draw out similarities between a 
phenomenological theories of mindreading and the implicit or affective dimensions of 
mentalizing.  The approach that I will focus rejects both ‘theory of mind’ and 
‘simulation theory’ in favour of offering an account of how it is possible for individuals 
to direct perceive emotions in others (Lennon 2011). The ‘direct perception’ account, 
I will suggest, has the benefit of unifying my theory of the ‘reality oriented’ 
imagination with the ‘mentalization’ literature using the same phenomenological 
framework that is applicable to ‘predictive processing’ models.  The focus on 
affective and implicit dimensions of ‘mentalizing’ is justified in light of the fact that 
research increasingly suggests that implicit mindreading forms of bulk of our 
‘mentalizing’ abilities, with explicit ‘theory of mind’ interpretations representing only 
the ‘tip of the iceberg’ (Davidsen & Fosgerau 2015) 
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The ‘direct perception’ approach to mindreading has been discussed by 
phenomenologists such as Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty, who characterise 
interpersonal perception as non-inferential and epistemologically immediate. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, for example, we do not recognise as angry face by 
piecing together the isolated features of the angry expression and inferring that they 
signal anger: we simply read anger within a gesture. As he quotes: 
Faced with an angry or threatening gesture, I have no need, in order to 
understand it, to recall the feelings which I myself experienced when I used 
those gestures on my own account…I do not see anger or a threatening attitude 
as a psychic fact hidden behind the gesture, I read anger in it (Merleau-Ponty 
1968 quoted in Lennon 2011: 284) 
A staunch rejection of the notion that there facts “hidden behind” appearances is a 
core feature of the phenomenological approach in general (Gallagher & Zahavi 
2008). As we shall see in greater depth in Chapter Seven of this work, 
phenomenologists are committed to taking the world as lived and experienced as the 
only meaningful starting point of philosophical enquiry. Imaginative perception, on 
this account, is the means through which reality is opened out to the experiencing 
individual (Lennon 2011, 2015). The phenomenological approach to ‘mindreading’ 
extends this principle to social cognition: rather than imagination being used to 
attribute unobservable mental states to others (as in ‘theory of mind’) or generating 
an internal experience (as in ‘simulation theory’), it is the means through which 
affective meaning is embedded within our perceptual experience of others. In 
“Imagination and the Expression of Emotion” Kathleen Lennon grants the ‘direct 
perception’ approach a Kantian heritage, specifying Kant’s concept of the ‘productive 
imagination’ as the psychological force which grants an affective form to our 
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perception of facial and bodily expression. It is through the ‘productive imagination’, 
she argues, that we are able to understand behaviour and emotional expression as 
carrying an affective content which is structured by reasons (Lennon 2011). ‘Direct 
perception’ can therefore, much like ‘predictive processing’ be seen as a direct 
descendent from Kantian metaphysics, allowing it to be form of imagining which is 
distinctly ‘reality oriented’.  
 Furthermore, the ‘direct perception’ approach can also be usefully integrated 
into the ‘mentalization’ model’s developmental narrative .Unlike both ‘theory of mind’ 
and ‘simulation theory’, the ‘direct perception’ approach grants an important role for 
bodily and facial expressions. This emphasis on physicality can be helpfully 
integrated into the developmental perspective on ‘mentalizing’, in which an infant 
comes to coherently experience and learn about its own affective states through the 
reactive facial expressions of their caregivers (This process will be outlined in some 
depth in this chapter).  
Secondly, this approach can be situated within a Kantian framework whereby 
understanding the behaviour of other in terms of intentional action is a form of 
‘experiencing as’ which we encouraged to adopt during our upbringing, in a process 
which has been described by John McDowell as being initiated into the ‘space of 
reasons’. As Lennon describes: 
[…] detecting emotions via emotional expressions is something we learn, are 
initiated into within culture. What we are being given with such training is a 
certain kind of perceptual sensitivity to patterns manifest the bodies of others 
over time. On the direct perception account, then, the detection of expressive 
gestures is the recognition of certain contours or patterns displayed in bodily 
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behaviour, open to view, With this account of what constitutes the perception of 
expressive content, comes an account of what it is for bodily gestures to have 
such a content: for it is simply for them to manifest such patterns, recognizable 
by observers, teachable to newcomers and projectable to new cases (Lennon 
2011:286) 
It can be argued that a comparable perspective is introduced directly by Fonagy and 
colleagues.  Continuing their discussion on the role of peer-interaction in developing 
the capacity to mentalization, Fonagy et al. provide an account of social cognition 
which is rooted in a similar form of developmental enculturation: 
Another view is that enculturation is itself the source of the child’s mental-state 
concepts (Astington 1983). Bruner (1983) proposed that parent’s tendency to 
treat the infant’s spontaneous gestures as if they were intentional 
communications leads to infants seeing themselves as having intentions and 
starting to communicate intentionally… Through participation in activities in their 
culture they come to share their culture’s way of regarding other’s and their own 
actions. If children’s entry into the folk psychology is viewed as a process of 
“apprenticeship” In which senior peers and caregivers are seen as encouraging 
the child’s adoption of mentalizing concepts (Astington 1996 ; Lewis et. al 1996), 
then secure attachment may be considered as a kind of catalyst to this learning 
process (Fonagy et. al. 2003: 50-51).   
Adopting a ‘mentalizing’ perspective on social cognition appears, on the one hand, to 
support the notion that understanding others – whether through functional analysis 
(‘theory of mind’) or experiential replication (‘simulation theory’) – is a learned and 
explicit process; as it is only through good-enough interactions with caregivers and 
232 
 
peers that infants and young children are able to develop skills in social cognition. 
On the other hand, the fact that the mentalization model framed as a psychoanalytic 
developmental narrative allows for a more nuanced perspective. As I shall explore in 
more depth in the forthcoming chapters, the capacity to ‘mentalize’ is arguably 
different in kind to the form of theoretical learning involved, for example, in grasping 
scientific theories. Rather than being simply a form of conceptual knowledge, the 
capacity for imaginative mentalizing can be seen as a constitutive part of developing 
the capacity to have certain forms of affective experiences. As a result, the 
breakdown of the ‘mentalizing’ imagination in mental illness entails more than just a 
failure of conceptual intelligence; it fractures affective coherence of the subject’s 
sense of being-in-the-world on a much deeper level. It is arguably only the ‘direct 
perception’ view which can adequately capture the breakdown of ‘mentalizing’ in 
psychopathology by having the theoretical resources to capture it in terms of a 
rupture the relationship between the subject and the world on a deep-seated level.  
In summary, ‘mentalizing’ –especially across its implicit and affective 
dimensions – can be seen as a species of ‘reality oriented’ imagining, defined from a 
phenomenological vantage point as a form of perceptual sensitivity and engagement 
with external reality. Although the ‘direct perception’ approach could seem to eschew 
the role of imaginative elaboration in our understanding of others, this is only when 
imagination is understood as the generation of internal experiences. Much like the 
‘reality oriented’ imagination generally, ‘mentalizing’ can be seen the manner in 
which interpersonal perception is made possible for the experiencing subject; it is a 
form of imaginative augmentation of perceptual givens that allows for a deeper 
connection with reality.   
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Mentalization and Agency:  
This chapter will also establish an important conceptual connection between self and 
agency in the mentalization model (‘the agentive self’ (Fonagy et. al. 2002: 203 - 
251) which I will argue plays a vital role in establishing the epistemological 
dimension of ‘reality oriented’ imagining. It is worth pre-empting my argument briefly: 
‘reality oriented’ imagining can be characterised by an epistemic attitude of ‘negative 
capability’, a phrase coined by English poet John Keats to evoke a mind-set of 
comfortable yet explorative not-knowing (Ou 2009). What differentiates 
straightforward lack of knowledge from ‘negative capability’ in a psychoanalytic 
sphere, I will argue, is the felt presence of an ‘agentive self’ which can transform 
uncertainty into possibility for exploration, learning and action (Fonagy et. al. 2002; 
Ou 2009, Panksepp 2012). This chapter will therefore be dedicated to setting out the 
empirical literature on infantile development which can be used as a foundation for 
this claim.  
It will also be necessary to delineate the ‘reality oriented’ imagination from the 
Freudian ‘secondary process’ reality principle (Freud 1911, 1915a). One of the most 
striking differences is that the ‘reality-oriented’s’ imagination often has a pointed 
social and cultural focus which the ‘reality principle’ does not. Accounts of the 
development of mentalizing, which I have presented as a prime example of ‘reality 
oriented’ imagining, can demonstrate how the capacity for reflective functioning 
grows out of mechanisms that are specifically geared towards processing social 
information and, importantly, show how these mechanisms differ from those which 
allow us to process information regarding inanimate objects (Fonagy et. al. 2002: 
222-223) The sui generis nature of social understanding, alongside the unique 
developmental circumstances in which it is encouraged to flourish, can arguably go 
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some way towards explaining features of its phenomenology. Firstly, the imperfect 
and unpredictable nature of social phenomena (in contrast to physical objects) can 
help to explain why they require a greater tolerance for ambiguity and openness to 
‘learning from experience’. Secondly, the ‘agentive’ dimension of the ‘reality oriented’ 
imagination can be attributed to the fact that it the capacity for an ‘agentive self’ 
develops within interpersonal conditions which sustain an infant’s illusion of control 
(Fonagy et. al. 2002 176-181; Winnioct 1971/2005: 151).  
The developmental perspectives outlined below stem from the 
neuropsychoanalytic ‘complexity’ model and the mentalization model, both of which 
use attachment theory as a general developmental base (Bowlby 1997, Crittenden & 
Landini 2011). A unification between psychoanalysis and attachment theory faces 
potential difficulties as a result of their somewhat contentious history (see Fonagy 
2001 for a substantial review). Due to its biological heritage, attachment theory has 
been criticised by psychoanalysts for reducing the complexity of the infant’s 
subjective experience to a set of empirically measurable behavioural criteria and 
overemphasising the external environment at the expense of internal phantasy. It 
has also been accused of proposing an overly linear account of development in 
which only attachment relationships have the power to disrupt psychological balance 
rather than a multiplicity of drives or developmental pathways (Fonagy 2001:8). 
These criticisms have arguably become less pertinent over time, as the evolution of 
attachment theory has been characterised by a move towards the acknowledgment 
of the subjectivity of representational states. For instance, the notion of ‘felt security’, 
developed in the 1970s by Sroufe and Waters, allowed for the expansion of Bowlby’s 
initial focus on physical proximity to include psychological proximity and availability 
(Fonagy 2001: 19-20). Fonagy has argued that the development of ‘felt security’ has 
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allowed attachment theory to be characterised as a mechanism of affect regulation, 
which in turn expanded its applicability to internal experience: “Thus, internal cues 
such as mood, illness or even fantasy could be seen as relevant to the child’s 
response to separation, as well as external events and the social environmental 
context” (Fonagy 2001: 20) Moreover, it could be argued that there exists a greater 
variance of approaches and viewpoints within psychoanalytic theory than between 
attachment theory and psychoanalysis as a whole (see Greenberg & Mitchell 1983; 
Rayner 1991). The inherent flexibility within the psychoanalytic approach (which will 
be evidenced by the argument to follow) also entails that certain psychoanalytic 
theories will be more amenable to an integration with the principles of attachment 
theory than others.  
Prediction and Epistemic Opacity in Attachment 
Considering development from an attachment perspective demonstrates why using 
the imagination to both explore and structure one’s environment is necessary during 
infancy and childhood (Bowlby 1997, 1989/2005; Bretherton 1992; Crittenden & 
Landini 2011) and can establish a sense of the infant as epistemically vulnerable in a 
manner which explains the emergence of both interpersonal ‘reality oriented’ 
imagining and its pathological counterpart. 
Attachment theory, broadly stated, focuses on the ways in which individuals form 
cognitive and affective strategies for maintaining psychological proximity to 
caregivers (Bowlby 1997, 1979/2005; Crittenden & Landini 2011). It not only places 
the external object at the centre of psychic life but, through its emphasis on 
unconscious forms of processing social information, creates an internal world which 
is primarily strategic rather than compensatory (Bretherton 1992; Rees 2012). As 
discussed in Chapter Four, attachment theory is based upon the infant and child’s 
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development of often rough-and-ready ‘working models’ whose prime purpose is to 
understand and predict caregiver’s behaviour (Bowlby 1979/2005: 140; Rees 2012). 
Perhaps the most famous empirical test of attachment theory is Mary Ainsworth’s 
‘Strange Situation’ experiment (Ainsworth & Bell 1970; Crittenden & Landini 2011: 
730), in which an infant’s behaviour is observed during several short (3 minute) 
separations and reunions with their caregiver (Ainsworth & Bell 1970:53). Observing 
hundreds of infants in this scenario allowed Ainsworth to develop “attachment style 
classifications” of secure, insecure (anxious/avoidant) and insecure 
(anxious/resistant)42 (Ainsworth & Bell 1970; Fonagy et. al. 2002:38).  
Secure Attachment: Secure infants explore the experiment room freely while 
their caregiver is present, become visibly anxious in the presence of the stranger 
and avoid contact with her, are distressed when their caregiver leaves and seek 
contact with the caregiver immediately on their return. These infants are 
reassured enough by contact with the caregiver to swiftly resume their 
exploration of their surroundings (the instinct of the secure infant to explore can 
be seen to corroborate the view, presented here, that psychic health is defined 
in part by the presence of curiosity).  
Insecure (Anxious/Avoidant): Infants classed as insecure (anxious/avoidant) 
do not appear to be made as anxious by the separation (although physiological 
data collected suggests they are in a very high state of emotional arousal, higher 
in fact than their secure counterparts who freely express their distress) and do 
not overtly prefer the mother to the stranger on her return. 
                                            
42 The later classification of ‘disorganized attachment’ will be discussed in due course.  
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Insecure (Anxious/Resistant): Insecure (anxious/resistant) infants are limited 
in their play and exploration in the presence of the caregiver, become highly 
distressed at separation and do not seem reassured by the caregiver’s return, 
continuing to express a variety of unsettled behaviours for some time afterwards.  
It is hypothesised that secure infants are able to retain a higher degree of 
affective and psychological organisation than their insecure counterparts because 
their caregivers, while present, are emotionally available in a manner which helps the 
infant to regulate their emotions in a more effective way (Bowlby 1979/2005, 1997; 
Crittenden & Landini 2011). This successful regulation within the infant-mother dyad 
can then be internalized as a capacity for self-regulation in times of separation and 
emotional turmoil, allowing the child to remain (more or less) psychologically 
organised in situations that are felt to be threatening (Fonagy et. al 2002:38).  
For the purposes of the current argument it is important to acknowledge what 
procedures like the ‘Strange Situation’ can highlight about epistemic opacity of the 
world from the child’s point of view. The behaviour of other people, including 
caregivers on whom the infant’s survival depends, is not inherently regular and 
predictable (like, for instance, the movement of inanimate objects) (See Fonagy et. 
al. 2002: 212). In order to form interpretive working models of the relevant incoming 
data, the infant and young child must therefore create a narrative which explains the 
caregiver’s behaviour in a manner which makes it somewhat understandable and 
predictable (Hopkins 2015, 2016, also see relevant discussion in Chapter Four). This 
grants the environment the potential to have a significant impact on psychological 
growth: the predictability of a caregiver’s responses to the infant will be shaped by 
her own unique personality and personal history, which in turn will require different 
behavioural (and later psychological) responses on behalf of the infant or young 
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child. It will be helpful here to re-call the example I gave earlier on (See Chapter 
Four): an infant who is paired with a caregiver who becomes implicitly rejecting in the 
face of distress will find it adaptive to minimise their expressions of negative affect, 
whereas this will prove counterproductive for the infant whose caregiver only 
responds to expressions of distress once they reach a certain volume. As this 
example demonstrates, insecure attachment styles are therefore not intrinsically 
maladaptive but rather a strategic use of the information available to the baby or 
child within the context of their particular attachment relationship (Bowlby 1979/2005: 
87 – 93; Crittenden & Landini 2011)43.  
Attachment Security and ‘Reality Oriented’ Imagining  
There is, however, a difference in kind between insecure and secure attachment 
styles that is highly relevant to the capacity for ‘reality oriented’ imagining, which 
stems from the different manner in which secure and insecure individuals attend to 
and process social information (Crittenden & Landini 2011; Gopnik 2009). As babies 
grow into children (and then adults), overt attachment behaviour (such as clinging or 
avoidance) transforms into internal dispositions to represent (or symbolise) 
interpersonal interactions. Crittenden and Landini have argued that individuals 
process information in a manner that, following the evolutionary mandate, maximise 
the potential for sexual success and minimise exposure to danger44 (Bowlby 
1979/2005:143- 149; Crittenden & Landini 2011:9-10). For the purposes of the 
current discussion, the protection against danger plays an especially important role 
                                            
43 This has led some attachment researchers (see Crittenden & Landini 2011)  to eschew the 
terms “secure” and “insecure” in terms of the morally neutral categories “A”, “B” and “C”, 
terms which they argue better preserve the fact that all attachment strategies are normally 
effective within the interpersonal context that they are first cultivated and deployed 
(Crittenden & Landini 2011:492) 
44 Crittenden and Landini’s theory will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 7, where I will 
discuss the relationship between ‘reality oriented’ imagining and language.  
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in highlighting how the conditions within which thoughts are formed shapes their 
content (ibid). Notably, it has been argued that representations are constructed more 
rapidly in situations where there is a perceived threat in order to meet the danger as 
quickly as possible. Secure individuals, who do not perceive close interpersonal 
interactions as threatening, tend to integrate information in a measured way using 
various formats of representation from a range of memory systems, resulting in a 
greater degree of psychological integration. Integration is a “slow cortical process” 
(Crittenden & Landini 2011: 12) which is considered a luxury when threat is looming: 
insecure individuals unconsciously make the judgment that there is not enough time 
to integrate a range of different forms of information and therefore tend to fall back 
on the most commonly used representational schemas (ibid). Despite the fact that 
most grown adults tend to adopt a range of processes, insecure individuals tend to 
be more consistent and less varied in their use of strategies than secure individuals 
as a direct result of having a lower threshold for feeling ‘under threat’. The speed at 
which symbolic representations are formed by insecure individuals can also prevent 
a satisfactory comparison of the current’s situation’s similarity to events in the 
individual’s past. In favouring self-protection over openness to learning from 
experience, a judgment of similarity is likely to be assumed without the individual 
pausing to assess whether manifest similarities may only be superficial (Crittenden & 
Landini 2011: 11-12). As a result, the approach of insecure individuals not only 
includes less representational variance within a schema or strategy, it also increases 
the likelihood that the same schema will be applied across a range of situations, 
even though for some these it will inevitably prove maladaptive. As Crittenden and 
Landini state: “as threat increases, so does uniformity of strategy” (Crittenden & 
Landini 2011: 12).  
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Secure strategies are therefore more adaptive across a range of scenarios 
than insecure strategies, despite both being realistic responses to a set of concrete 
developmental circumstances (Crittenden & Landini 2011: 19-20). The expectation of 
insecure individuals that others will not be trustworthy therefore often fails to be 
genuinely protective, and can lead to even higher levels of interpersonal 
vulnerability. It is important to emphasise here that secure individuals are not defined 
by the reverse expectation that others are trustworthy, but by their greater capacity 
to attend to the fine grained social detail that will allow them to assess social 
situations accurately (Crittenden & Landini 2011: 19- 20; Fonagy et. al 2016, 2017a, 
2017b). This has the important consequence, I propose, that secure individuals are 
able to imaginatively engage with their environment in a manner that makes them 
open to learning.  
Disorganized Attachment: a Failure in Predictive Strategies  
Secure attachment therefore provides a sound base for healthy psychological 
functioning, with secure individuals boasting a greater degree of adaptive flexibility 
than insecure individuals. It can be seen as an important development basis from 
which the capacity for ‘reality oriented’ imagining emerges. The greatest vulnerability 
to psychopathology, however, is thought to stem not from insecurity but from 
‘unclassifed’ or ‘disorganized’ attachment (Fonagy 2001; Lyons-Ruth & Jacobvitz 
2008). Disorganized attachment has been linked to numerous relational difficulties in 
middle childhood and adulthood, with ‘disorganized’ individuals being considered 
more vulnerable than those who are simply ‘insecure’. For example, in one sample of 
low income maltreated infants 82% were classed as ‘disorganized’ (Fonagy 2001: 
42), demonstrating a clear link between adverse early circumstances and the ability 
to develop a predictive internal working model of one’s immediate social and 
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emotional environment. Unlike insecure attachment, disorganized attachment is 
perhaps most accurately construed as the failure to form a consistent attachment 
narrative, often leading to bizarre and contradictory behaviour on the part of the child 
in the ‘Strange Situation’ (Ainsworth & Bell 1970). As described by Lyons-Ruth and 
Jacobvitz: 
One unclassifiable infant, for example, cried loudly while attempting to gain her 
mother's lap, then suddenly fell silent and stopped moving for several seconds. 
Others were observed: rocking on hands and knees following an abortive 
approach; moving away from the parent to the wall when apparently frightened 
by the stranger; screaming by the door upon separation from the parent and 
then moving silently away upon reunion; raising hand to mouth in an 
apprehensive gesture immediately upon seeing the parent; and, while in an 
apparently good mood, swiping at the parent's face with a trancelike expression 
(Lyons-Ruth and Jacobvitz 2008:676). 
It has been suggested that disorganized attachment is a result of the caregiver being 
perceived as simultaneously a source of comfort and danger, disrupting normal 
approach and avoid behaviour (Hopkins 2016). It has been linked to caregivers who 
are either frightening or frightened, leading Mary Main to describe it as “fear without 
a solution” (Shemmings & Shemmings 2011: 34). This is especially important for the 
current project, as it highlights once again the predominance of predictability over 
pleasure in regulating psychological experiences.  
In situating these three attachment styles (secure, insecure and disorganized) 
within the focus on the subject’s capacity form an epistemologically healthy 
relationship with reality, it will be helpful to return to John McDowell’s epistemological 
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dilemma in “Mind and World” (1996). McDowell presents the ideal epistemological 
subject as a free and rational thinker who nevertheless is open to what is being 
‘given’ from an environment that is genuinely independent from the subject’s mind or 
perspective. Taken as a metaphor, McDowell’s account can help illuminate how 
secure attachment enables an epistemologically sound relationship with the world 
from a psychoanalytic perspective: secure individuals can be seen to embody an 
analogous position to McDowell’s ideal epistemological subject. Unlike disorganized 
individuals, secure individuals are able to interpret the social world within a coherent 
and meaningful narrative. At the same time, their sensitivity towards novelty in 
interpersonal scenarios grants secure individuals more ‘friction’ with contingent 
situations than their insecure counterparts, who we have seen let past situations 
dominate the interpretation of current ones in a manner that diminishes their ability to 
learn new social and emotional information and can lead to overly rigid patterns of 
interpretation and relating.  
Mentalizing and Theory of Mind 
Mentalization, as we have seen, is essentially the process of regulating affect 
through the representation and understanding of psychological states belonging to 
self and other (Bateman & Fonagy 2007, 2010; Fonagy et. al. 2002; Fonagy & 
Luyten 2007, 2009) .In mature adults, the capacity to mentalize emerges across 
various dimensions: it may be automatic or controlled, based on internal or external 
features of self and other, primarily cognitive or affective, representing a range of 
ways in which people can engage in mature, empathetic social cognition (Fonagy & 
Luyten 2009). Its multifaceted nature has led some authors to conclude that: 
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This theoretical framework, which we will refer to as the theory of mentalization, 
is probably not yet to be seen as a full-ﬂedged theory. Rather it is as a 
framework which is still developing, and consists of a number of conceptual 
innovations, distinctions, hypotheses, and suggestions. Therefore, the theory of 
mentalization, at the present stage, should not be expected to be complete and 
free from inconsistencies (Liljenfors & Lundh 2015:37). 
Keeping this in mind, the mentalization model can is consistent in its portrayal of the 
imagination as a state of mind in which the individual is open to emotional learning 
and seeks out psychological knowledge about self and other (Fonagy et. al. 2002, 
2017a, 2017b). In this sense, epitomizes ‘reality oriented’ imagining. In order to fully 
grasp how the capacity for ‘mentalizing’ imagination develops it will be helpful to 
draw out the deep links that it has with both attachment theory and more generic 
‘theory of mind’ research (Dennett 1991; Gopnik 2009). 
It will now be necessary to consider interpersonal understanding from another 
relevant perspective. In healthy adult life, the behaviour of others is rendered 
explainable by the automatic deployment of a ‘theory of mind’. Like attachment 
theory, ‘theory of mind’ has strong links with a ‘mentalizing’ account of development. 
Perhaps more importantly, considering ‘theory of mind’ in development can offer 
empirical support for the argument presented in Chapter Three, by demonstrating 
that the infant as inherently geared towards the external interpersonal world from 
early in life (Fonagy et.al. 2002, Gopnik 2009). ‘False belief’ experiments with young 
children arguably provide evidence to suggest that the immature mind is 
characterised by an excessive focus on external events at the expense of internal 
psychological processes, challenging the Freudian account of psychological 
immaturity as the excessive influence of internal processes. This important 
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recognition, I will argue, can be used to emphasise the importance of the self in 
‘reality oriented’ imagining, allowing the Freudian reality principle to be reframed in 
Winnicottian terms (Winnicott 1971/2005:71 -86).  
‘Mindreading’ is a skill that most people employ automatically and unreflectively 
in their everyday lives (Baron-Cohen 1995). A rather mundane example of an 
automatic application of ‘theory of mind’ run as follows: if I were to see a person pick 
up a glass and drink, I would implicitly make sense of his behaviour by assuming that 
he desired to have a drink and believed that picking up the glass would allow him to 
do this (Costal & Leudar 2009; Hopkins 2012, 2015). When behaviour is interpreted 
solely in terms of physical behaviour without the accompanying imaginative 
interpretation, this is taken to signal psychopathology (Baron-Cohen 1995; Schuwerk 
et. al. 2016). Simon Baron-Cohen, in his analysis of the prevalence of this in Autism 
Spectrum Disorders has termed the failure to interpret interpersonal data in terms of 
theory of mind as ‘mindblindness’ (Baron Cohen et al. 1995)45. Conversely, one can 
attempt to understand other people ‘intentionally’, as psychological beings whose 
actions reveal underlying states of mind, and whose mental states can be construed 
as reasons for their actions, rather than simply causes of their actions (Dennett 
1991, Gardner 1993, Hopkins 2015). 
At 9 months infants are said to undergo a “social revolution” in which their 
interest in the (potentially) perfect contingencies of their own bodily movements is 
replaced by a heightened responsiveness to the high but not perfect level of 
                                            
45 The difference between a ‘mindblind’ and a ‘mindreading’ stance has been famously 
described by the philosopher Daniel Dennett (Dennett 1981). Dennett’s analysis of the 
different modes of interpretation highlight that it is possible, on the one hand, to look at 
people as physical beings with a focus purely on their external characteristics and behaviour, 
leading to a mechanistic view of their actions as products of physical cause and effect. 
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contingencies that characterise successful social interactions (as people are 
considerably more complex and difficult to predict than physical objects, perfect 
contingent responses do not exist in the social realm) (Fonagy et al 2004:222). 
Although they are socially attuned from the beginning of life (see Fonagy et. al. 2002: 
155), infants gain a new insight into goal-related actions towards the end of the first 
year of life (Fonagy et al 2004:222). At this stage, they begin to understand 
behaviour in terms of intentions and rational action, demonstrating the capacity to 
represent other’s behaviour as goal-directed and will express particular curiosity 
towards individuals who take an irrational path of action towards a goal, 
demonstrating a sensitivity for behaviour which does not simply cause an event but 
which justifies it (Fonagy et. al. 2002:223). This, at the age of two years, grows into a 
rudimentary ability to adopt the ‘intentional stance’ (Dennett 1991) in which other’s 
behaviour is rendered predictable through the postulation of unobservable mental 
states (beliefs, desires and intentions) (See Chapter Six).  
It is possible to tie the infant’s representation of rational action to the Bayesian 
neuroscience which underpins the ‘complexity’ model of dreaming and mental 
disorder (Hopkins 2016). As explained, the Bayesian Brain model postulates that the 
brain is an inference machine which interprets the world in a way that it can unify as 
much data as possible into an encompassing hypothesis or model (Clark 2016; 
2012; Hopkins 2015). It does this by following a method similar to the Bayesian 
approach to statistics, which states that a hypothesis is sound if the given data are 
more predictable given the hypothesis than without it (Friston 2012). One can argue 
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that our common-sense understanding of one another follows a similar structure (see 
Hopkins 2012, 2013 and Chapter Three)46.  
Despite this, numerous studies have shown that children up until the age of four 
do not possess a mature, full-fledged ‘theory of mind’ (Goldman 2012, Gopnik 2009). 
The most commonly cited example of a psychological study that demonstrates this is 
known as a ‘false belief experiment’, which typically would run as follows: A three-
year old, shown a Smarties tube, is asked what they think it will contain. Invariably, 
the child will answer that they think it contains Smarties. The experimenter opens up 
the Smarties tube to reveal it contains pencils, and then asks the child what they 
thought was in the tube before they saw the pencils. Children under 4 are very likely 
to respond that they thought the Smarties tube contained pencils even before it was 
opened up. Similarly, when asked to guess what the next child will think is in the tube 
(before it is opened up), they will answer that the child will think the tube contains 
pencils (Goldman 2012: 405). In both cases, the child fails to grasp the notion of a 
false belief: they can attribute a false belief neither to their past self nor to another 
child and can only represent states of mind that are congruent with observable ‘facts’ 
(Gopnik 2009). Fonagy and colleagues point out that this presents a rather different 
picture of the respective roles of psychic and external reality in the child’s experience 
than that proposed by Freud. Rather than framing the world in terms of their own 
mind, children as old as 4 are inclined instead to fit their mind to the external 
environment, swapping out internal experience in favour of external facts (or what 
they take to be external facts) if there appears to be a conflict between mind and 
                                            
46 This follows a line of thought introduced in philosophy of mind by Donald Davidson who 
argued that, in rational action, an agent’s reasons for acting serve as the cause of their 
action. This view was presented against the Wittgensteinian position that reasons and 
causes are distinct modes of explanation (for an extended account of how this principle may 
be relevant to psychoanalytic theory see Cavell 1992). 
247 
 
world that they cannot cognitively manoeuvre. Contrary to common psychoanalytic 
assumption, such experiments may suggest that young children are more likely to 
‘mis-perceive’ their internal world by experiencing it as more similar to the external 
environment than it actually is, rather than perceiving the external world in a way that 
has been skewed by internally generated phantasies (Fonagy et al 2002: 58 – 61). 
The young child, as a result, “is more like a weather vane than a psychotic person” 
(Fonagy et. al. 2002: 61). This may serve to highlight the fact that the internal world 
must be cultivated in development and cannot be taken for granted, an account of 
which can be drawn from the mentalization literature.  
One of the major ways in mentalization differs from classic ‘theory of mind’ is in 
its proposal that the capacity to mentalize is a developmental achievement, rather 
than a biological given (Fonagy et. al. 2002: 16. 53). The capacity for reflective 
functioning, it has been argued, flourishes in attachment relationships with 
sensitively attuned care-givers who mirror infant’s states of mind back to them 
(Fonagy et. al. 2002: 192) In this sense, it follows psychoanalytic insights of thinkers 
such as Winnicott (1971/2005) and Bion (1962/1984) (both discussed previously) 
who attribute similar functions of mirroring and containment to the maternal 
environment.  
Two Developmental Pathways 
The ‘complexity’ and mentalization models both use attachment theory as the 
developmental model upon which they base their theories of psychopathology 
(Hopkins 2016:8, Fonagy & Luyten 2009: 1356). The infant’s need to securely attach 
to a caregiver is given a prominent role in both accounts, seemingly signifying a 
move away from instinct theory and towards the recognition that the external 
interpersonal environment is important in the development of a healthy mind (see 
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Greenberg & Mitchell 1983). It can be argued that this movement has been partly 
achieved in both models by the substitution of the Freudian drive with ‘affects’, which 
described as being one of the prime driving forces of infantile mental life in both 
models (Enckell 2007; Panksepp 2012; Solms & Zellner 2012). An increased focus 
on the role of affect over the past few decades, especially from a biological 
perspective, could signal a move back to classic instinct theory which had otherwise 
been largely abandoned in psychoanalytic theory and practice (see Chapter Four) 
(Panksepp 2012; Solms & Zellner 2012). There are intuitive similarities between 
affects and instincts: both are strong motivating forces in human life, both are 
depicted as a-rational and, perhaps most importantly, neither are considered to have 
an inherently representational structure (Solms 2013).  
There are, however, salient differences between instincts as Freud (and one 
could say Klein) conceived of them and the ‘affects’ of modern neuroscience in terms 
of both their function and their content. These differences largely fall in line which the 
shifts in psychoanalytic theory described in Chapter Three: affects have closer links 
with interpersonal relationships and often need to be regulated in the context of a 
relationship rather than simply through another person as an object (Bowlby 
1979/2005; Fonagy et. al 2002). Affects are also bound up to a greater extent with 
‘epistemic’ concerns than instincts; they are regulated in part through being 
understood by a caregiver and, later in development, being understood by the self 
(Fonagy et al 2004: 153). This entails that the mother’s understanding of the infant’s 
emotional state is not simply a pre-requisite to providing the right form of physical 
satiation (such as taking crying to indicate hunger) but appears to provide a soothing 
effect in and of itself (Fonagy et. al. 2002: 191-192).   
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In what follows, I will sketch two alternative developmental trajectories in which 
infants come to depend on different forms of imagining in order to regulate affect. 
These will show how fictive and interpersonal imaginative forms of experience could 
exist in tension with one another. In the first, failures in maternal containment can be 
linked to the adoption of ‘complexity’ reducing psychological activity in waking life 
which, as we have seen, may underlie various forms of psychopathology (Hopkins 
2016:8-9). In the second ‘good-enough’ scenario, I will show how effective mirroring 
may lead not only to a reduced need for fictive explanations but to the active creation 
of a new depth of psychological experience, which has strong ties to the 
phenomenological experience of self and agency (Fonagy et. al. 2002: 248) The 
approach below should be taken as highly schematic for the purposes of theoretical 
elucidation: there is no implication that any individual’s real life developmental history 
is quite this simple.  
Complexity and Disorganization 
Following the trend mentioned above, Hopkins argues that affects provide the 
motivational fuel for infants from the beginning of life. While affects do not replace 
bodily needs, which obviously remain imperative, they are presented as playing a 
significant role in a manner which embodies many of the assumptions of object 
relations theory over traditional drive theory. As he describes:  
Basic expectations connected with biological imperatives like homeostasis are 
woven into the functioning of the brainstem. Comprehensive motor responses to 
the FE produced by these are required for all aspects of thriving and 
development. From birth such responses are generated by motoric “prototype 
emotions systems” delineated in Panksepp (1998), which also perform the 
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motivational work that Freud assigned to the drives (see Damasio and Carvalho, 
2013). Watt and Panksepp (2009, p. 98) describe these as “sitting over 
homeostasis proper (hunger, thirst, temperature regulation, pain, etc.)” (Hopkins, 
2016: 3). 
Affects, it is recognised, must be regulated through interaction, with the failure to do 
so carrying the risk of disorganised attachment (see above). From the Bayesian 
point of view, disorganisation is understood as fuelled by conflicting emotions which 
create incoherent trajectories for action which subsequently fail to be regulated by 
internal representational schemas, as such schemas were not forthcoming from the 
caregiver (Hopkins 2016:9) . The ‘cumulative trauma’ of infinite instances of 
misattunement and misrecognition “deprives the infants (as their mothers may have 
been deprived) of opportunities for learning in emotional interaction, and so for 
internalizing in their own regulative models the understanding responses of others. 
Instead they apparently learn that their conﬂicts and distress are unsharable, 
intolerable, and not to be recognized or known” (Hopkins 2016: 9).  
It is therefore possible to demonstrate how attachment theory and ‘theory of 
mind’ can act as a developmental foundation for the ‘complexity model’ (see Chapter 
Five), showing how the overreliance on ‘reality indifferent’ imaginative processes 
(‘fictive beliefs’) may have their origin in failed attachment relationships, much like 
deficiencies in mentalizing. Yet, following Winnicott, this thesis aims to present an 
account of conscious functioning which is defined by more than the absence of 
psychopathology (Winnicott 1971/2005: 88- 114, 128-139): this is precisely the role 
of the ‘reality oriented’ imagination. In what follows, I will establish a basis for ‘reality 
oriented’ imagining using developmental perspectives from the mentalization model 
by demonstrating not only that it can be differentiated from straightforward veridical 
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perception (Fonagy et. al. 2002: 222- 223), but how it is inherently linked with a 
growing sense of self and agency (Fonagy et, al 2002:248). The following chapter 
will then take up the task of unpacking these themes on a phenomenological and 
conceptual level.  
The ‘Self’ from a Mentalizing Perspective 
It will be useful to begin by giving a brief overview of development of the self from a 
mentalizing perspective. The mentalization model provides an original take on 
several features of everyday human experience by demonstrating how they are 
developmental achievements rather than simple givens. We have already seen how 
this applies to the human ability for ‘mind reading’ (the intentional stance (Dennett 
1991)); a psychological ‘skill’ that develops as a result of adequate interactions with 
early caregivers which are characterised by marked mirroring (Fonagy et. al 2002; 
Fonagy & Luyten 2009). The capacity for mentalizing has also been linked with a 
robust and stable experience of the self (Fonagy & Luyten 2016). While a level of 
bodily ‘selfhood’, may be taken for granted, this can subsequently be elaborated on 
to provide richer and more varied experiential states which can reach the status of a 
sound imaginative relationship with the world. Each of these levels entails a different 
implicit understanding of the self as an agent. There are a total of five forms that an 
understanding of self and agency can take: physical, social, teleological, intentional 
and representational. In ‘good enough’ circumstances, these five stages represent a 
developmental timeline of an infant’s growing understanding of an ‘agentive’ self. 
The final ‘representational’ stage is the most relevant to the current discussion, as it 
is the form that can best be linked with mature mentalizing and the ‘reality oriented’ 
imagination (Fonagy et. al 2002: 203 – 251). Both of the first two stages, the physical 
and social representations of self, are thought to be operative from very early on in 
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life (Fonagy et. al 2002:207-209). The former, as might be expected, understands 
the self as a physical agent who can enact physical change in her proximate 
environment. A primitive form of social understanding also operates early in life as 
infants are able to grasp that they create behavioural effects in other humans. This 
grows into a teleological understanding at around 9 months of age, when infants 
become able to differentiate actions and outcomes (Fonagy et. al. 2002:222). Later 
on, this becomes an ability to take an ‘intentional stance’ in which human action is 
interpreted in terms of beliefs, desires and intentions. As we have seen, this 
continues to mature throughout early childhood, with the ability to represent false 
beliefs surfacing at between three to four years of age (Fonagy et. al. 2002:242 – 
245). At this stage, the individual is taken to have a ‘representational self’. 
Underpinning this developmental trajectory is a deeper capacity to experience 
oneself as an agent, a dimension of experience which is thought to be set up (if not 
fully actualized) in early attachment relationships (Fonagy, Luyten & Allison 
2015:588).  
Contingency and Agency 
As important feature of the successful regulation of affect, therefore, is an 
experiential sense of agency which can then be used as a foundation for an 
experiential sense of self. This sense of self will, in the course of a successful 
development, transform from a bodily self, to a self as rational agent and, finally, to 
self as a psychological being. The depth of experience that the child fosters in 
regards to their own self will determine the extent to which they can attribute 
psychological experiences to others in a meaningful way (Fonagy et. al 2002:197).  
Earlier in this chapter, I explained how the brain’s predictive experience of the 
body’s movement is an essential part of physiological regulation that underpins 
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conscious waking experience (Clark 2016, Hopkins 2016). A similar form of bio-
feedback is adopted in the mentalization literature in order to explain how infants 
self-regulate by learning about the limits of their bodily efficacy and control, which will 
ideally come to form the basis of psychological agency and emotion regulation as the 
child matures. The details of this are worth understanding in order to appreciate how 
a sense of representational agency differs from a sense of bodily agency (see 
Fonagy et. al. 2002: 203-251). The differences between these will form an empirical 
cradle for my assertion that an experiential sense of self as an agent is necessary for 
‘reality oriented’ imaginative engagement. The source of the ‘agentive self’ is thought 
to be entwined by a baby’s experience of contingency in early caregiving 
relationships (Fonagy et. al. 2002). In order to understand this connection, it will be 
necessary to outline how infants use contingency to assess agency in general and 
then apply this more specifically to close interpersonal relating.  
It has been argued that infants learn about their degree of control over the 
environment through attempts to detect contingencies (Gergely 2004: 470; Gergely 
& Watson 1999). Consider, for example, a baby trying to ascertain how much control 
she has over a mobile that she is kicking: in the event that the mobile moves if and 
only if the baby kicks, she will naturally and accurately feel a strong sense of control 
in relation to it (Fonagy et. al. 2002: 162-163). Checking for degrees of control is 
performed by two distinct ‘calculations’: one which works forward in time to check for 
sufficiency (if I do this, what will happen?) and another which works backwards in 
time to check for necessity (what caused what I am experiencing?) (Gergely 2004: 
473; Fonagy et. al 2002: 163-165). These two values can line up, such as in the 
example above, but often do not. If, for example, the mobile moves every time the 
baby kicks it but also sometime moves when she doesn’t kick it (because, for 
254 
 
instance, it is moved by the researcher) the baby will feel a diminished sense of 
control over the object, as kicking is sufficient but not necessary for the object to 
move. The experience of discrepancies between the indexes of sufficiency and 
necessity in turn prompts behavioural changes. If the mobile only moves when it is 
kicked by the baby’s right leg and not the left, her experience of 50% control will lead 
her to experiment by reducing the number of activities she is performing in order to 
work out the scope of her agency. This, if successful, will lead her to obtain total 
control over the object by kicking her right leg only (Fonagy et. al. 2002:164).  
A similar pattern of behaviour modulation occurs in relation affect regulation with 
the caregiver. This, it has been argued, may be achieved through the infant’s 
experience of parental emotive expressions that occur contingently which their own 
affective expressions (Gergely 2004; Gergely & Watson 1999; Fonagy et. al. 2002: 
168). In accordance with the contingency-detection mechanisms described above, 
infants will attempt to ‘make sense’ of parental affective expression in part by 
scanning for internal cues which might explain what caused the parental expression 
to come about. This will also work the other way: the baby will monitor the effect of 
certain sets of internal cues on the parents in order to map an increasingly 
differentiated and complex set of subjective states onto observable effects (in this 
case, the expressions and behaviour of others) in the external world (Gergely 2004; 
Gergely & Watson 1999).   
Adopting this stance heightens the importance of the genuine interpersonal 
conditions in development, as in order for such a process to work well, parents must 
be at least somewhat sensitive to affective displays in their infants. If an infant’s cries 
produce wildly different responses from the parents each time, it will be difficult for 
the baby to lump together the relevant internal cues signalling the presence of felt 
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distress (Fonagy et. al. 2002: 170). As such, behavioural consistency on the part of 
the caregiver allows the infant to set up a temporal contingency between their feeling 
and parental expression which will allow a rudimentary representative link to be 
formed between the two (Fonagy & Luyten 2009: 1359). This alone, however, cannot 
account for infant coming to recognise the expressed affect as their own rather than 
the parents. This must be achieved through the parents ‘marking’ their mirrored 
expressions (Fonagy et. al. 2002: 188 – 189; Fonagy & Luyten 1359). Following the 
infant’s preference for imperfect social contingencies after nine months, the parent 
will help communicate that their expression represents the infant’s feelings (rather 
than their own) through expressions of affect which are marked, exaggerated and 
interrupted with ‘breaks’ or ‘time outs’ (Fonagy et. al 2002: 172). In ‘good enough’ 
scenarios, two systems of representing affects will be set up whose difference will be 
emphasised by both the different outcomes they produce (marked versus realistic 
expressions) and by their different relationship to the activity of the infant (the 
parent’s own affective state will not be temporally contingent with the infant’s 
feelings). This represents the first way in which a sense of self is conceptually tied to 
a sense of agency: it is only through believing that they are the cause of external 
events (in this case, the parent’s affective displays) that infant’s begin to build up a 
representation of a self in order to make sense of the effects they are observing 
(Fonagy et. al. 2002: 170). It is important to recognise here that a sense of agency at 
this stage in life is not only necessary for a good sense of self but for a notion of self 
at all. The baby who experiences a low level of agency in regards to his caregivers 
will not internalize a sense of the self –as-ineffective but, more drastically, will fail to 
represent a self at all; he does not see any evidence for one reflected in the 
behaviour of those around him.  
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There is another important manner in which a sense of agency is constitutive of 
a sense of self mediated via the infant’s ability to self-regulate. Firstly, feelings of 
control have been linked to a general increase in positive affect, so the sense of 
controlling the interpersonal environment that arises from successful mirroring 
exchanges may itself serve to mediate the infant’s distress in itself (Gergely 
2004:470). Additionally, the imperfectness of the parents affect mirroring in has the 
potential to induce self-regulating behaviour on the part of the infant. As the level of 
control the infant’s has (or rather experiences himself to have) over the caregiver will 
only be partial at the best of times, this creates a discrepancy between sufficiency 
and necessity indexes of contingency detection. Such a discrepancy will prompt the 
infant to reduce the parameters of his behaviour (in this case his affects and their 
expression) in order to ascertain his true level of mastery over the object, in an 
analogous manner to experimentally kicking the mobile with only one leg at a time in 
order to see the extent to which it is under his bodily control (Gergely 2004: 472; 
Fonagy et. al 2002: 172). If the baby feels reassured he can control the caregiver in 
times of need, he will feel safe to reduce both his experience and communication of 
negative affect (where strength of feeling could be correlated with how extreme the 
infant takes their situation to be and strength of expression linked to the urgency for 
it to be communicated). Thus a baby who feels fear but believes he has a good 
control over his caregivers will trust that he can effectively bring about his own 
comfort via the mother, leading to a diminished experience of distress (Fonagy et. al. 
2002: 174). A baby whose sense of agency and mastery has been undermined may, 
on the other hand, feel such experiences to be genuinely life threatening. This 
perspective on health and psychopathology has a deep resonance with Winnicott’s 
idea that in order for a healthy adaption to reality to occur the baby must begin with 
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an illusion of omnipotence which is only gradually taken away from him (Winnicott 
1971/2005: 15). The empirical findings presented above demonstrate how the 
mother’s regulation can become internalized as self-regulation: the baby’s 
experience of causing the marked affective expressions of the mother, which in turn 
soothes their negative feelings, creates the representation of a causal chain which 
both begins and ends with the self47.  
It is interesting to note that the development of a sense of self and agency can 
be seen as entailing a series of necessary illusions which require the input of both 
the infant and the mother in order to be sustainable (See Winnicott 1971/2005:2-34). 
The mother, through providing sensitive and contingent responses, grants the infant 
the illusion that she is under his control, allowing him to develop a sense of agency 
through his perceived efficacy in his environment. This, interestingly, requires the 
input of yet another illusion on the part of the mother, who needs to act as though the 
baby is experiencing thoughts and feelings that, as yet, he is not. Paradoxically, it is 
only by treating the infant as if he were a subjective being that he is able to become 
one. I will return to these issues in the following chapter, where I will argue that we 
can use the Winnicottian notions of creativity and transitional phenomena to offer an 
alternative description of development which captures the experience of the ‘reality 
oriented’ imagination from the infant’s perspective (See Winnicott 1971/2005: 1- 34, 
71-86).  
                                            
47 As discussed in the previous chapter, this reverses the Freudian developmental trajectory 
in which the aim is to move from self to object by construing development as reduced 
dependency on the object and increased dependency on the self.  
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Conclusion 
Now that the theoretical basis for the development of a ‘reality oriented’ form of 
imaginative engagement, it will be possible to turn to a deeper discussion of the 
conceptual issues at play. In the following chapter, I will aim to flesh out the 
character of the ‘reality oriented’ imagination by considering the conceptual links 
between affect, self and agency in a manner that, I hope, can usefully connect the 
empirical models described here with non-empirical models in philosophy and 
psychoanalytic theory. Part of this discussion will be a re-assessment of the 
relationship between language and image in light of numerous advances since 
Freud’s time.  
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Chapter Seven 
Re-Conceptualising the Imagination: Phenomenology, Negative Capability and 
the ‘Agentive Self’ 
So far in this thesis I have aimed to give an account of how the dominant notion of 
the imagination in psychoanalytic theory of mind has shifted from an account of 
fantastical daydreaming towards a means of meaningful engagement with the 
external world (Freud 1907, Winnicott 1971/2005: 87). This changing role of the 
imagination, I have aimed to show, is inextricable from the evolving understanding of 
the epistemological relationship between the subject and her environment, from one 
in which the world is presented as straightforwardly ‘given’ to the individual (albeit 
highly vulnerable to disruptions by unconscious processes) to one in which the 
inherent unknowability of ‘reality’ results in a picture of mental functioning that is 
driven by the need to predict and explain from the ‘bottom up’ (Clark 2016; Hopkins 
2016; Schimek 1975). In the previous section, I discussed this change from the 
perspective of empirical advances, suggesting that attempts to link psychoanalysis 
with empirical disciplines (such as perceptual and affective neuroscience) engender 
an ‘epistemic turn’ in psychoanalytic theory that rivals the ‘relational turn’ in 
psychoanalytic theory and practice (see Fotopoulo et. al. 2012; Greenberg & Mitchell 
1983). The resulting picture is one in which both health and pathology can be 
understood as containing constitutive epistemological elements, while 
simultaneously re-incorporating core dimensions of Freudian thinking such as the 
reliance on ‘fictive’ experiences in dreams and psychopathology (Hopkins 2016).  
These final two chapters will aim apply to explore how the ‘reality oriented’ 
imagination might be captured on an experiential level. Building upon the arguments 
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in the previous section - in which I drew out the importance of epistemological 
concerns in development, health and psychopathology - this section will focus upon 
the important role played by trust in being open to ‘learning from experience’ 
(Fonagy et. al. 2015, 2017a, 2017b). In establishing the role of trust, I will draw on 
the concept of ‘negative capability’ (see Ou 2009), arguing that ‘good enough’ 
developmental circumstances foster an attitude of faith in the individual which allows 
them to take experience to be meaningful despite the fact that many aspects of it are 
epistemologically opaque. Such an approach, I hope to argue, carries with it the 
implicit awareness that no clean line can be drawn between imaginative and 
perceptual experiences (Merleau-Ponty 1968), or between that which has been 
internally generated and that which has been ‘given’ from the external world 
(McDowell 1996; Winnicott 1971/2005:1- 34). I will suggest that one way to approach 
this is to draw on the concept of ‘negative capability’ (see below, see Ou 2009).  
In capturing ‘reality oriented’ imagining as an epistemic attitude, I will preserve a 
central role for the ‘agentive self’ (Fonagy et. al 2016,2017a, 2017b). I will argue that 
a robust sense of self and agency is what stabilises not knowing into ‘negative 
capability’; an active state of mind in which lack of knowledge is transformed into the 
drive for exploration. Chapter Eight will expand on this insight by returning to 
‘epistemic trust’ as the mode through which an individual forms a relationship with 
language as a whole.  
The aim of this chapter is to provide a re-conceptualisation of the imagination 
based upon the theoretical and empirical advances that have been discussed thus 
far. In doing so, I will draw on insights from phenomenological philosophy (e,g, 
Merleau-Ponty 1968, Sartre 1940, 1943) as well as aiming to re-incorporate classic 
psychoanalytic insights from Winnicottian theory (Winnicott 1971/2005). Adopting 
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phenomenology as a general framework will allow for a much needed degree of 
stability and consistency when discussing and analysing the role of ‘reality oriented’ 
imagining. As we saw in the introduction to this work, one of the most insidious 
problems with researching the imagination is the lack of any stable definition of the 
term, entailing that where no further qualification is added it risks being rendered 
meaningless (Stevenson 2003). Although there is far from a consensus on the role of 
the imagination and its relation to perception across phenomenological works, it can 
nevertheless operate as a form of ‘background’ philosophy for the concept of ‘reality 
oriented’ imagining; elucidating which important issues are at play, even if it cannot 
offer definitive resolution. More specifically, I will suggest some introductory links that 
can be made between the ‘reality oriented’ imagination and phenomenological 
literature, aiming to show that, in spite of some very broad differences in approach, 
phenomenological accounts present the imagining subject as engaged in attempts to 
come to know and explore reality (Lennon 2015; Morley 2003). Where veridical 
perception is supplemented by imaginative elements, or even wholesale replaced by 
them (see Sartre 1940, 1943) this is nevertheless with the aim of elucidating features 
of reality that cannot be given directly in perception, exploring possibilities for future 
action or engaging with cultural and creative works (Lennon 2015; Merleau-Ponty 
1968). It is not, as per the Freudian account, a form of denying or modifying external 
reality in line with internal needs but rather a means by which the reality can be 
opened out to the individual in a meaningful way (Lennon 2015). These works may 
therefore offer a good general framework for a conceptualization of the imaginative 
that avoids many of the pitfalls that are engendered in a more traditional 
understanding of the term, in which it is primarily linked with imagistic 
representations and acts of fantasy (Descartes 1641/1924; Freud 1907): a reading 
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which I have argued does not make best use of the empirical and conceptual 
insights at hand (Clark 2016; Hopkins 2016; Winnicott 1971/2005).  
A related concept that will also form an important part of this chapter is ‘negative 
capability’ (Bion 1984; Hopkins 1984; Ou 2009). ‘Negative capability’ (a concept that 
is drawn on liberally in psychoanalytic scholarship yet rarely explicitly thematised) is 
a phrase coined by poet John Keats to describe a state of mind in which “a man is 
capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching 
after fact and reason” (Keats 1899 quoted in Hopkins 1984: 85). Throughout this 
chapter, I will aim to show how ‘negative capability’ can be used in concert with 
insights from a phenomenological approach to the imagination to capture the 
epistemological dimension of ‘reality oriented’ imagining. In doing so, I will propose 
that being in state of ‘negative capability’ is not sufficient for ‘reality oriented’ 
imagining. As we saw at some length in the previous chapter, the mentalization 
literature states that successful reflective functioning (which for the purposes of the 
current argument I am classing as a prime example of ‘reality oriented’ imagining) 
goes beyond a capacity to learn from experiences and also requires a the enduring 
experience of an ‘agentive self’ (Fonagy 2002 et. al. 205 -251). In order to draw 
aspects of self, agency and negative capability together, I will conclude this chapter 
with the suggestion that it is the phenomenological experience of an agentive self 
which stabilises simple uncertainty into true ‘negative capability’. On this view, it is 
the implicit recognition of the self as efficacious that can transform ‘not knowing’ into 
active curiosity; a drive for seeking out new experiences and perspectives that is a 
necessary pre-requisite for performing sophisticated psychological tasks such as 
reflective functioning.  
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Perception and Imagination Revisited 
It will be useful to begin by returning to the respective roles of imagination and 
perception Freudian psychoanalysis so that it can be clearly contrasted with the 
alternative view presented here. The reading of the Freudian imagination which I 
presented in the first section of this work was centred on the relationship between 
imagination and perception. Freud, I argued, maintained a strict conceptual 
difference between the two, linking them with his pleasure and reality principles 
respectively (Freud 1895/1950, 1911, 1923). Imagination, as a pleasure driven 
process, usually arises in the form of fantastical daydreams which direct the 
individual’s attention away from the external world towards internally generated 
fantastical scenes (Freud 1907). These, much like night dreams, are the disguised 
derivatives of unconscious phantasies, though benefitting from a much greater 
degree of censorship and structure (Freud 1901, 1907). Less often, Freud presents 
the imagination as an outward facing process which co-opts perception in its own 
interest, the most notable example of which is Freud’s theory of transference in 
which the analyst (or another close figure in the patient’s life) is experienced 
unconsciously as though they were an important figure from the past (Freud 1912). 
Although one could take Freud’s theory of transference as evidence that he believed 
perception is inherently imaginative, I argued that this position does not appreciate 
the subtleties of Freudian metapsychology or take into account the scientific 
principles which informed his outlook (Schimek 1975).  I argued that Freud 
considered perception, generally speaking, as consisting of the straightforward 
registration of sensory data which is then vulnerable to taken over from the outside 
by dynamically unconscious thought (Schimek 1975). In other words, while Freud 
may have maintained that subjective ‘distortions’ are an inevitable part of human 
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experience taken as a whole (accounting for the influence of the unconscious), he 
did not see them as necessary aspect of perception itself (as is the case in ‘active 
perception’ and ‘predictive processing’, see Chapters Four and Five).  
Freud’s position, while it may give rise to a similar manifest experience as 
‘active’ perception (see Clark 2016, Hopkins 2016, Raftopolous 2009), nevertheless 
differs from it in two important ways. Firstly, it maintains a notional difference 
between perception and phantasy that can be seen to inform the aims of clinical 
psychoanalysis, which purports to replace the unrealistic (‘reality indifferent’) primary 
process with the realistic secondary process. It allows for the possibility – if only as 
an ‘ideal fiction’ (Freud 1937:235) – that unmediated access to the external world is 
possible if one could only surmount one’s internal phantasies and conflicts. 
Secondly, the fact that perception is portrayed as being distorted by unconscious 
processes rather than containing inherent distortions encourages the view, or so I 
have argued, that imaginative elements in perception serve to distance the perceiver 
from ‘reality’ (Freud 1907). In accounts such as the Bayesian Brain, distortions do 
not disrupt naïve access to the world but are rather the means through which the 
perception of a coherent scene becomes possible (making the term ‘distortion’ 
arguably inaccurate in this case. I will return to this line of thought below) (Clark 
2016). Freud’s conceptualization of perception as ‘naïve’ can therefore be directly 
linked to his portrayal of the imagination as a process which insulates the individual 
from external reality. It is in part because the imagination is not needed for 
knowledge or exploration of the world that it is construed as actively functioning 
against it. Conversely, accounts of perception and imagination from a 
phenomenological perspective can serve as a useful framework for the ‘reality 
oriented’ imagination (Lennon 2015; Merleau-Ponty 1968). 
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Psychoanalysis and Phenomenology 
Phenomenology and psychoanalysis have experienced a contentious history, 
perhaps most famously through Sartre’s refutation of Freudian theory in “Being and 
Nothingness” (Sartre 1940/2004, also see Gardner 1993). In placing a strict 
emphasis on manifest experience, phenomenology seems naturally at odds with 
psychoanalytic approaches, as the latter make it their aim to look for what is behind 
or underneath experience. In light of this, there is an important clarification in 
terminology which will be necessary to address before potential unifications between 
phenomenology and psychoanalytic theory can be considered. As Gallagher and 
Zahavi (2008) discuss, there are two ways in which the term ‘phenomenology’ is 
commonly employed: in a general sense to describe the subjective feel (the ‘qualia’) 
of experience, and in a technical sense which refers to the intellectual movement 
within philosophy which is thought to originate with the works of Edmund Husserl 
(Gallagher & Zahavi: 28). This distinction is important in understanding 
phenomenological works, which do not seek to describe experience from a first-
person perspective but, following a Kantian legacy, attempt to establish the 
necessary conditions of experience. Gallagher and Zahavi argue that this puts 
phenomenology at odds with a kind of subjectivity that interests the psychotherapist:  
Phenomenology has as its goal, not a description of idiosyncratic experience – 
‘here and now, this is what I just experience’ – rather, it attempts to capture the 
invariant structures of experience. In this sense, it is more like science than 
psychotherapy. Psychotherapy is focused on the subject as a particular person 
and may appeal to introspection in its concern about the way and why of the 
person’s experience of the world, here and now. By contrast, phenomenology is 
not interested in in understanding the world according to Gallagher, or the world 
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according to Zahavi, or the world according to you; it’s interested in 
understanding how it is possible for anyone to experience a world. In this sense, 
phenomenology is not interested in qualia in the sense of purely individual data 
that are incorrigible, ineffable and incomparable. Phenomenology is interested in 
the very possibility and structure of phenomenality; it seeks to explore essential 
structures that are intersubjectively accessible, and its analyses are open for 
corrections and control by any (phenomenologically attuned) subject (Gallagher 
& Zahavi 2008: 28).  
Gallagher and Zahavi root their juxtaposition of phenomenology and psychotherapy 
in the recognition that one deals with what is individual about experience 
(psychotherapy) where the other looks at what is universal about it 
(phenomenology). Yet in focusing on a stripped-down account of ‘introspection’ - a 
highly general feature of the clinical situation and one that is common across all 
psychotherapeutic schools of thought - an important feature of a psychoanalytic 
approach to understanding mind and psychopathology is missed. While the authors 
are right that it would be inappropriate to conceive of a psychotherapy patient as a 
budding phenomenologist, it can be argued that psychoanalytic theory, especially 
from a developmental perspective, does concern itself with establishing the 
conditions under which certain forms of conscious experience can arise. Within the 
mentalization model, for instance, we saw in the previous chapter how a robust 
underlying sense of agency is established within the context of a secure relationship 
in which the caregiver is contingently responsive to the infant’s expressions of affect 
(Fonagy et. al. 2002, 2016, 2017a, 2017b). For Winnicott, the holding environment 
determines the extent to which the subject can experience herself as an embodied 
self, capable of spontaneity and creative living (Winnicott 1971/2005). In Bion, a 
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similar theme can be seen to manifest in his discussions of the intersubjective 
conditions that enable the subject to think (Bion 1962/1984). In these examples, the 
emphasis does not lie on uncovering the unconscious causes of conscious 
experience but on the conditions – normally external and interpersonal (see Chapter 
Three)- that make it possible for the subject to have access to certain dimensions of 
conscious experience in the first place. In this sense, psychoanalysis both resonates 
with phenomenology and stands diametrically opposed to it: where both disciplines 
are invested in understanding why human conscious experience has certain 
structural features, psychoanalysis radically disrupts the phenomenologist’s tasks by 
demonstrating how features of experience that are ostensibly essential can in fact be 
attributed to an identifiable set of empirical developmental conditions. This comes 
through with particular vigour in the mentalization model which makes it a central aim 
to elucidate the fact that psychological capacities often taken for granted (notably, a 
sense of self as an agent and the capacity to interpret self and others in terms of 
underlying mental states) are in fact developmental achievements (Fonagy et. al. 
2002). After sketching some theories on imaginative experience from a 
phenomenological point of view, I will outline some ways in which these can break 
down in psychopathology arguing that phenomenology grasps a form of experience 
that is conceptually close to ‘reality oriented’ imagining but without the recognition 
that access to such forms of experience is a developmental achievement.  
Phenomenological Views of Perception 
Phenomenological accounts place high level of importance of the role of perception 
in our access to the external world. This can be seen to form a natural part of their 
‘philosophical project’ to bring rationality ‘”down to earth” (Morris 2014) and begin 
with the world as it is experienced, rather than as it is conceptualized in rational or 
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scientific discourse (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008; Lennon 2015). Despite the emphasis 
in phenomenology on the world as given, it contrasts markedly with the empirical 
accounts of perception that were dominant during Freud’s time (see Makari 1994, 
2008; Reeves 1969). Rather than breaking perception down into units of sensation 
that can be associatively strung together, the phenomenological approach 
emphasises that perception is experienced holistically; a gestalt which is presented 
as loaded with meaning (Morley 2003:94-96). According to the phenomenological 
perspective we are “pragmatic perceivers” (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008: 109) who 
experience the world as a salient whole that is primed for action and socialization 
(Lennon 2015; Steeves 2004).  
In order to understand the manner in which phenomenological analyses 
generally portray the imagination as ‘reality oriented’ it will be useful to set some 
context by considering how phenomenology frames the epistemological relationship 
between mind and world. In focusing on manifest experiences phenomenology can 
be seen to set up an epistemically straightforward relationship between the subject 
and her environment in a manner resonant of ‘naïve’ perception (See Chapter Two) 
(Lennon 2015; Morris 2014; Steeves 2004). Read in this manner, phenomenological 
accounts are set radically against the empirical models of perception that I have 
appealed to so far: ‘predictive processing’ models like the ‘Bayesian Brain’ which 
argue that perceptual consciousness is a generated by the brain’s attempt to predict 
the causes of incoming sensory data (Clark 2012; Friston 2012; Hopkins 2012, 
2016). Accounts which present perception as an ‘active’, generative force are often 
taken to implicitly endorse a worldview in which perceptual representations create a 
form of metaphorical curtain between the perceiver and the external world, blocking 
the possibility of direct access to ‘things in themselves’ (Clark 2016; Gallagher & 
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Zahavi 2008). Gallagher and Zahavi, arguing that “some version of this view 
(mediated through the work of Hermann von Helmholtz) is still endorsed by 
numerous neuroscientists” (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008: 103), claim that this sets 
contemporary empirical approaches at odds with phenomenology, which actively 
rejects the notion that the world can only be accessed via our representation of it. 
They continue, outlining the ‘faulty’ philosophy which they consider to be operating in 
background of neuroscientific accounts of perception:  
As long as this kind of view is meant to suggest that we actually perceive 
internal pictures, it is open to phenomenological criticism; not only is it not in 
accordance with phenomenological evidence, but the view also entails a highly 
problematic use of the notions of both ‘perception’ and ‘picture’. Rather than 
saying that the perceiving brain constructs an internal representation of the 
perceived world, it would be far less controversial simply to claim that our brain 
enables us to see a visual scene (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008: 104).  
Far from opposing this view, the ‘predictive processing’ model can be seen to 
support it. For example, Andy Clark argues that characterising the brain’s generative 
representations as somehow blocking one’s access to reality (and therefore fulfilling 
a function not unlike the Freudian imagination) appeals to the wrong overarching 
metaphor. As he writes:  
Despite all this, I think we should resist the claim that what we perceive is best 
understood as a kind of hypothesis, model, fantasy or virtual reality. The 
temptation to think so, it seems to me, rests on two mistakes. The first mistake is 
to conceive of inference-based routes to adaptive response as introducing a kind 
of representational veil between agent and world. Instead, it is only through the 
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structured probabilistic know-how distilled from prediction driven learning that 
enables us to see through the veil of surface statistics to the world of distal 
interacting causes itself (Clark 2016: 170). 
In other words, we can just as equally see ‘active’ perception as the only means 
through which a world, in any meaningful sense of the term for human beings, can 
be revealed and opened out to us; this is precisely the starting point that 
phenomenologists adopt. Where phenomenological accounts can go above and 
beyond the empirical theory is in their descriptions of how the world is laid out to the 
individual as affectively laden with meaning (Lennon 2015). In doing so, they can 
offer a ‘partial re-enchantment’ (McDowell 1996 quoted in Lennon 2015:11) of a 
naturalized world (Collin 2011).  
Phenomenology and ‘Reality Oriented’ Imagining: Insights from Sartre and Merleau 
Ponty 
Perhaps the most important ways in which phenomenological accounts of the 
imagination are an appropriate underlying philosophy for the ‘reality oriented’ 
imagination is through their rejection of the representational view of the imagination 
as images within the head and towards a view of imagining as a mode of 
consciousness (Sartre 1940/2004, 1943/2009; Steeves 2004: 33-50). While they 
reserve important roles for ‘visuality’ and affect through asserting the primary role of 
perception and the importance of grounded bodily experience, this approach 
nevertheless transforms the imagination from an internal phenomena into one which 
acts as a bridge between the subject and the world (Lennon 2015:1). In addition, 
there is a strong trend within phenomenology in which the imagination is portrayed 
as the mode through which agency and freedom are manifest (Lennon 2015; 32; 
Reeves 2004: 94-98; Sartre 1943/2009). Combined, these factors lead to a suitable 
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theoretical arena in which to consider the account of the ‘reality oriented’ 
imagination.  
In Imagination and the Imaginary Kathleen Lennon (2015) argues that both 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty appeal to a metaphor of pregnancy in their descriptions of 
experience, in which the world is presented as ‘overflowing’ the concrete givens of 
perception (Lennon 2015: 32-49). Where Sartre and Merleau-Ponty differ markedly 
is in their understanding of the relationship between imagination and perception 
(Lennon 2015:48). For Sartre, the strict division between imagination and perception 
is precisely what allows for ‘re-enchantment’: it gives human consciousness a sui 
generis nature (this is consciousness for-itself rather than consciousness in-itself) 
which makes space for the possibility of freedom in a determined universe (Sartre 
1943/2009). From this perspective, freedom is the act of looking beyond the material 
givens of a situation in order to experience what is absent: a freedom constituted is 
in the distinctly human capacity for negation (Sartre 1943). In an often quoted 
example, he argues that to imagine Pierre in the café is to both negate the veridical 
scene in front of one’s eyes (which does not contain Pierre) and then, in a second 
evocation of the negative, to present Pierre as absent (Lennon 2015: 34; Sartre 
1940/2004,1943/2009). Imagination for Sartre is therefore an active, self-conscious 
force which cannot be confused with veridical perception: in an act of imagination 
one decides to replace passive perceiving consciousness with active imagining 
consciousness (Lennon 2015: 38-39; McGinn 2004).  
While the difference between ‘reality oriented’ imagining and veridical perception 
has been emphasised in this thesis, the distinctions do not follow the lines drawn by 
Sartre. This is, in part, because on Sartre’s own grounds - namely, the 
phenomenological – I follow Lennon in resisting a sharp distinction between the two 
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(Lennon.2015). For example, mentalizing accounts of development do not give rise 
to a scenario in which the capacity for reflective functioning is either wholly present 
or wholly absent. In fact, this approach arguably makes a unique contribution to 
accounts of psychopathology by arguing that on the level of manifest experience the 
capacity for mentalizing in accordance with an agentive self varies across both 
individuals and situations (Fonagy et. al 2017a, 2017b). On a similar token, Winnicott 
gives no particular reason to suppose that the ‘creative’ mind-set should either be 
wholly present or wholly absent (Winnciott 1971/2005). In this regard, the 
relationship between veridical perception and ‘reality oriented’ imagination is better 
understood in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s (1968) account of the continuum between 
imagining and perceiving. As we shall see shortly, the account that Merleau-Ponty 
gives of perceptual experience not only has a more natural resonance with empirical 
accounts of ‘active perception’ but also draws in highly relevant epistemic concerns 
through his notion of ‘perceptual faith’ (Merleau-Ponty 1968:1; Morley 2003).  
Merleau-Ponty did not force a radical distinction between imagining and 
perceiving, arguing instead that the imaginary is embedded within the real; that the 
real has an ‘imaginary texture’ (Lennon 2010, 2015). The phenomenology that this 
evokes is arguably closer to capturing the ‘reality oriented’ imagination than Sartre’s 
account of ‘imagining consciousness’ as it portrays the imagination as something 
that can augment and enrich perceptual experience, not as something that replaces 
it (Merleau-Ponty 1968; Steeves 2004). At times, his account of the imagination as 
something which opens the world out to the individual is resonant of Winnicott’s 
definition of creativity as essentially the ‘colouring of the whole attitude’ (Winnicott 
1971/2005:87).  
274 
 
Merleau-Ponty is especially useful for our current purposes as he gives an 
account of psychopathology which involves a breakdown in the imagination and our 
epistemological relationship with the world (Merleau-Ponty 1968; Morley 2003). 
Merleau-Ponty read Freud extensively. Much like Sartre, his commitment to a 
phenomenological perspective led him to reject Freud’s notion of the unconscious 
and propose an alternate model of neurosis (Reeves 2004:89-120). In particular, he 
discusses a case of a young girl who becomes anorexic after being banned from 
seeing her lover. Rejecting the traditional Freudian interpretation that the anorexia 
was the symptomatic result of her repressed sexuality which could be cured through 
insight and catharsis, he presents a view in which neurosis embodies an intolerance 
of ambiguity which results in a failure of the bodily imagination to serve up alternate 
possibilities for action (Merleau-Ponty 1968; Steeves 2004). The anorexia, which in 
this case is portrayed as a kind of hysterical symptom, is a form of collapsing of the 
patient’s future possibilities for action by creating a form of bodily arrest. As such, 
Merleau-Ponty argues: 
[…] existence is not a set of facts (like ‘psychic facts’) capable of being reduced 
to others or which they can reduce themselves, but the ambiguous setting of 
their intercommunication, the point at their boundaries run into each other, or 
again their woven fabric ( Merleau-Ponty 1968:96). 
Merleau-Ponty believed that Freud’s primary process was the most strikingly original 
and useful aspect of his psychoanalysis in so far as it manifests as inherently 
ambiguous and overdetermined imagistic representations which are carriers for 
meaning (Steeves 2004:90). It is the capacity to tolerate such ambiguity, he argued, 
that makes the difference between and health and pathology (Morley 2003). In taking 
this stance, Merleau-Ponty may be guilty of mis-reading Freud’s theory of the 
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primary process: as we saw earlier in this work, the images produced by 
unconscious process in, for example, dreams may appear ambiguous in the service 
of censorship, but trains of unconscious thoughts are rigidly deterministic, being 
caused by linear associations of isolated ideas (Freud 1900, 1915a). Where 
Merleau-Ponty portrays the imagistic symbol almost like a piece of creative work 
which permits freedom of expression and interpretation, Freud saw the unconscious 
as embodying the fundamental principle of psychic determinism (Freud 1915a). 
It is perhaps no wonder, then, that Merleau-Ponty arrives at a strikingly different 
picture of psychopathology to Freud: their fundamentally different interpretations of 
the primary process can be seen to embody the change in conceptualizing the 
imagination that I have aimed to chart throughout the course of this thesis. 
Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on living within ambiguity gives his 
approach a distinct epistemological slant. While Freud, as we have seen at some 
length, was concerned with self-knowledge as a form of insight, Merleau-Ponty views 
the psychological relationship one forms to the act of knowing itself is important in a 
manner which can be seen to complement and enhance the empirical advances 
sketched thus far (e.g. Fonagy et. al. 2017a, 2017b). 
Perceptual Faith: The Role of Trust in Learning  
Perhaps even more important for the current argument than Merleau-Ponty’s astute 
portrayal of the “imaginary perception of the real” (Lennon 2015:3) is his notion of 
‘perceptual faith’ (at times ‘ontological faith’) which can be used to elucidate the 
epistemological dimension of the imagination from a phenomenological perspective 
(Merleau-Ponty 1968). ‘Perceptual faith’ is a theoretical construct grounded in the 
view that imagination and perception exist along a continuum; it aims to captures an 
attitude of pre-reflective trust we have in our perceptual experiences, whether they 
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are in fact imaginary (as in dreams) or veridical (Merleau-Ponty 1968, Morley 2003). 
According to Merleau-Ponty, the dream is disturbing to the newly awakened 
individual not because of its bizarre content, but because of the immediacy with 
which it was believed at the time of dreaming. In this important respect, perception 
and imagination are indistinguishable from one another: both are built about a pre-
reflective attitude of faith in what one is experiencing. The capacity to sustain 
‘perceptual faith’ is itself grounded in a tolerance of ambiguity in which one implicitly 
recognises that the ‘imaginary’ and ‘real’ exist along a continuum (Morley 2003: 93).   
James Morley has proposed the Merleau-Ponty’s account of ‘perceptual faith’ 
can be used as a conceptual prism through which it is possible to view the common 
substratum across various forms of psychopathology. In particular, Morley draws 
attention to the manner in which psychopathology can be seen to involve a 
breakdown in the pre-reflexive ‘perceptual faith’ which, in health, underpins all 
experience:  
Psychopathology is an instance where this faith in the reality of the perceptual 
world becomes precarious…. What is catastrophic for victims of hallucinations is 
their incapacity to feel confidence in both the perceptual and the imaginary. 
Such episodes, characterized by R.D.Laing (1962) as ontological insecurity, 
invoke a suspicion of the reality of any self or world – real or imaginary. The fact 
that pathological subjects cannot fully believe their experiences is precisely why 
they are so painfully unliveable (Morley 2003:99). 
He continues, in a manner resonant of Hopkin’s ‘complexity’ account of ‘fictive’ 
experiences: 
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Moreover it is the agitated anxious uncertainty that leads to the pathological 
project of absolute certainty. For example, a paranoid delusional system is 
preferable to the ambiguity of not having absolute possession of the other 
person’s thoughts. The delusion of persecution, like all delusions, eliminates the 
ambiguity at the heart of intersubjectivity and makes life more liveable for the 
paranoid (Morley 2003: 99). 
Merleau-Ponty therefore not only elucidates how psychopathology can involve 
deficiency of the imagination that bars the subject from accessing alternative courses 
of action, but demonstrates through ‘perceptual faith’ that this also entails the subject 
adopts a particular epistemic attitude towards imagination itself (Morley 2003; 
Steeves 2004). On a thematic level, this allows for some pertinent parallels to be 
drawn between Morley’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty and the psychoanalytic 
theories of psychopathology that stem from the ‘mentalization’ standpoint. For 
example, the fact that ‘perceptual faith’ is deployed in a state of pre-reflective 
automaticity allows comparisons to be drawn with the notion ‘epistemic trust’: both 
can be seen as primarily concerned with the affective attitude that an individual 
adopts towards incoming information (Fonagy et. al. 2016, 2017a, 2017b). In aiming 
to capture ‘perceptual faith’ Merleau-Ponty turns to Augustine’s example of trying to 
describe time: the passage of time is an experience that all of us are intimately 
equated with, yet most struggle to describe it explicitly (Merleau-Ponty 1968:3). 
Similarly, in psychic health one does not consciously decide that other’s 
communication can be a source of emotional learning but simply experiences it as 
such. As a result, the breakdown in ‘epistemic trust’ that occurs in severe forms of 
psychopathology such as Borderline Personality Disorder may be incredibly difficult 
(if not impossible) for observers (including clinicians) to access on an experiential 
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level (see Fonagy et. al. 2017a, 2017b), as it involves the collapse of a constitutive 
dimension of consciousness. Just as one cannot cleanly separate out veridical 
experience from illusion, one can never know in a definitive way that others internal 
worlds are accessible via their linguistic utterances (see following chapter for further 
discussion of this). Where individual’s from ‘good enough’ circumstances have a 
developmental advantage in such areas, it can be argued, it is in the implicit belief 
that nothing catastrophic will come of mistaking truth for imagination or vice versa 
(Crittenden & Landini; Morley 2003; Winnicott 1958) For such individuals, 
predictability can be risked in favour of learning (Hopkins 2016), as failures in 
prediction never put the individual’s survival in jeopardy (where ‘survival’ can entail 
psychical survival, or survival in phantasy rather than strict bodily survival) (see 
Crittenden & Landini 2011). In contrast, extreme forms of pathology, as Morley 
describes, entail a breakdown in this global trust that allows for healthy experience 
which can move flexibly within the imaginary-real continuum (Merleau-Ponty 1968; 
Morley 2003).  
Trust and the Experience of the Self 
The importance an attitude of ‘pre-reflective’ faith – whether conceptualized through 
the philosophical or the psychoanalytic literature - can also be seen as fundamental 
to a robust and enduring sense of ‘self’ (see Chapter Six). As we saw in the previous 
chapter, the experience of an ‘agentive self’ is a requirement for adopting a 
‘mentalizing’ stance: without it, the individual may be focused on the thoughts and 
feelings of others but at the expense of regulating their own affective states, leading 
to a ‘hypermentalizing’ stance which has little benefit in terms of psychological 
regulation (Bateman & Fonagy 2007, 2010; Fonagy & Luyten 2009). Along similar 
lines, it can be argued that a ‘self’ is important to consider in light of the current 
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discussion as it provides an important internal counterpart to the externally focused 
aspects of ‘reality oriented’ imagining sketched above. More specifically, the 
enduring sense of an ‘agentive self’ that is considered fundamental to health from a 
‘mentalizing’ perspective may require a similar “tolerance for ambiguity” between the 
imaginary and the real as that which is called on in ‘perceptual faith’ (Fonagy et. al. 
2002; Merleau-Ponty 1968).  
It can be argued that the experience of something like ‘perceptual faith’ in relation to 
one’s own affectively grounded sense of self is especially pertinent in light of 
conceptual and empirical advances which have eschewed the ‘self’ as an ontological 
or metaphysical category in favour of theories which frame it as an illusion generated 
by neural processes (Fonagy & Luyten 2016; Gallagher & Zahavi 2008). For 
instance, in “the Self in Depression” Peter Fonagy and Patrick Luyten (2016) draw 
attention to this aspect of experience by noting its conspicuous breakdown in 
depressive disorders.  
Depression may be associated with a range of subjective experiences that seriously 
threaten the coherence of the self: feelings of sadness, guilt, shame, helplessness, 
hopelessness, and despair disrupt the continuity of the self and are felt as extremely 
painful and inescapable, to the point that the depressed individual may have the 
feeling that he/she can no longer bear the psychological pain associated with these 
subjective states (Fonagy & Luyten 2016). 
Yet to speak of depression as a disorder which targets the self implies that the self is 
a genuine, identifiable object of experiences, a position which has become 
increasingly difficult to defend from both philosophical and neuroscientific 
perspectives in recent years, with many thinkers in both camps adopting the position 
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that ‘self’ is simply an illusion generated by the brain. The ‘reification’ of the self as 
an object is a risk within the context of both our common sense pre-reflective 
understandings of one another and in theoretical psychoanalysis. As Fonagy and 
Luyten argue:  
These metaphorical descriptions of the phenomenology of depressive 
experience have led to the reification of these self-experiences, as if we truly 
“have” a false or fragile self, or that we “have” an ideal and an actual self. These 
reifications are understandable: there has been a long tradition of reification and 
the use of metaphorical language concerning the self in psychology, in line with 
the use of the concept of self in folk psychology (e.g., “I find myself unattractive”, 
“I see myself as someone who has high standards for himself”). Similarly, 
notions such as cognitive-affective schemas of self, self-representations and 
internal working models of the self – within cognitive schema theory, 
psychoanalytic object relations and attachment theory, respectively – have 
become increasingly reified (Fonagy & Luyten 2016). 
In order to avoid these ontological pitfalls, Fonagy and Luyten have suggested 
defining the self as the individual’s capacity to generate stable self representations, 
where mentalizing (‘reflective functioning’) is seen as the process which creates the 
illusion of a coherent self. This description can be considered, in some respects, 
compatible with writings on the self from a phenomenological perspective. As 
Gallagher and Zahavi argue, the phenomenological perspective is interested 
precisely in the self as experienced (no matter how it is produced) rather than the 
self as an ontological or conceptual construct (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008: 224- 225). 
Comparing phenomenological views of the self with the contemporary neuroscientific 
work by Damasio (1999) – who argues that all conscious experience is accompanied 
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by a “constant, but quiet and subtle, presence of self in my conscious life” (Gallagher 
& Zahavi 2008: 225)- Gallagher and Zahavi remark that “from a purely descriptive 
point of view, however, there is nothing new in the analyses offered by Damasio. We 
are dealing with a reformulation of ideas already found in classical phenomenology. 
To put it differently, the most explicit defence and analysis of what might be called 
the experiential dimension of selfhood is precisely to be found in classical 
phenomenology” (ibid 225). In line with the discussion above, this can be seen as a 
prime instance of empirical approaches and phenomenology forming a useful 
partnership, with neuroscience outlining the neurological basis for the emergent 
experience which is then captured on a phenomenological level.  
Yet the perspective offered by Fonagy and Luyten (2016) once again challenges 
the phenomenological and neuroscientific account of an experiential self in a highly 
important respect. Much like the capacity for reflective functioning, they argue, a 
stable sense of self varies across individuals and contexts in a manner that can be 
directly linked with an individual’s developmental history (Fonagy & Luyten 2016). As 
a result, a developmental situation in which a mentalizing stance is not strongly set 
up (see Chapter Six) may leave individuals vulnerable to depression by diminishing 
the extent to which they can produce stable self representations through reflective 
functioning (Fonagy & Luyten 2009, 2016). This approach coheres with the notion 
that in BPD an individual’s sense of self becomes seriously compromised alongside 
failures in ‘mentalizing’: the two are interdependent to the extent that compromise of 
one leads to the compromise of the other (Bateman & Fonagy 2007, 2010). Not only 
does the experience of a sense of self also stem from a pre-reflective attitude of trust 
but, I will now argue, also contributes to epistemological dimension of ‘reality 
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oriented’ imagining by offering a stabilising force which can be seen to transform 
epistemic uncertainty into ‘negative capability’.  
In order to draw this out, it will be useful to turn once more to Winnicott’s writings on 
the development of an affectively grounded self (Winnicott 1958, 1971/2005). His 
account of early infantile experience can be seen to highlight two aspects of the ‘true 
self’ which are highly relevant to the argument at hand: the need for the infant to 
begin with a sense of trust in the environment in order for a ‘true self’ to develop, and 
the (later) need to tolerate the paradoxical nature of transitional phenomena in which 
the object can be experienced as simultaneously both found and created. (Winnicott 
1971/2005). For Winnicott the ‘true self’ arises when the baby feels sufficient safety 
and trust in the presence of the caregiver that it can simply feel and express bodily 
experiences as they arise, thus grounding a sense of self in directly felt experience 
rather than thought or deduction. As Winnicott describes in “The Capacity to be 
Alone”: 
When alone in the sense that I am using the term, and only when alone, the 
infant is able to do the equivalent of what in an adult would be called relaxing. 
The infant is able to become unintegrated, to flounder, to be in a state in which 
there is no orientation, to be able to exist for a time without being either a reactor 
to an external impingement or an active person with a direction of interest or 
movement. The stage is set for an id experience. In the course of time there 
arrives a sensation or an impulse. In this setting, the sensation or impulse will 
feel real and be truly a personal experience…. It is only under these conditions 
that the infant can have an experience that feels real (Winnicott 1958: 418). 
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‘Feeling real’ is the product of an environment in which the baby feels safe enough to 
risk disintegration, because he trusts that such experiences will be reflected back by 
the caregiver in a manner that transforms bare physical sensations into a coherent 
sense of self which can be thought about (Winnicott 1958). Much like the 
developmental accounts provided from attachment theory and the ‘mentalization’ 
model, this account highlights the importance of external circumstances in 
developing a capacity for ‘reality oriented’ imagining: it is only if circumstances are 
trustworthy that the capacity for pre-reflective trust genuinely is adaptive rather than 
dangerous (Bowlby 1997; Crittenden & Landini 2011; Winnicott 1971/2005). 
Schematically, such an account could be taken as a developmental perspective on 
‘perceptual faith’: the infant who can develop a sense of herself as real will be able to 
use this as a stabilising force when facing an epistemically opaque environment 
(Merleau-Ponty 1968; McDowell 1996).  
Negative Capability: An Epistemic Interpretation of ‘Creative Play’ 
Negative capability, while not synonymous with ‘reality oriented’ imagining, aptly 
characterises its epistemic element. It can also be seen as a common feature of 
psychological health across various psychoanalytic approaches. For instance, 
negative capability was explicitly draw on by Bion in “Attention and Interpretation” 
(1984) to characterise the ideal state of mind in a clinical situation in which the 
analyst approaches the patient “unencumbered by memory, desire or understanding” 
(Green 1973:119). Of more direct relevance to this project are the salient links that 
can be made between negative capability, Winnicott’s notion of ‘play’ (1971/2005: 
51) and the act of successful mentalizing (especially across its implicit and affective 
dimensions (see Fonagy & Luyten 2009; Davidsen & Fosgerau 2015). Being in a 
state of negative capability, I will argue, is what allows one both to ‘play’ and to 
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mentalize effectively. Unlike Freud’s secondary process, negative capability arguably 
has an affective dimension – an ‘experiential underside’- which, following Amy Kind’s 
argument (2001), can be seen to entail that it suitably characterised as a species of 
imagination rather than a type of pure conceptual ‘thinking’.  
Negative capability is a phrase coined by Romantic poet John Keats in a letter to 
his brother in which he wrote:  
At once it struck me, what quality went to form a Man of Achievement, especially 
in literature, and which Shakespeare possessed so enormously- I mean 
Negative Capability, that is when man is capable of being in uncertainties. 
Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason (Keats 
1899 quoted in Hopkins 1984:90). 
The concept of ‘negative capability’ has been enthusiastically taken up in 
psychoanalytic scholarship, particularly following Wilfred Bion’s adoption of the 
concept in describing the ideal analytic attitude towards the patient (Bion 1984). In 
the Edinburgh International Encyclopaedia of Psychoanalysis Bion’s position is 
described in a manner which emphasises its contribution to thought and learning:  
Consequently, Bion argued that the analytic attitude should be one that eschews 
memory, desire and understanding in favour of the development of negative 
capability, reverie, or patience, until a selected fact is intuited, which may in turn 
act as an organising nexus for further conceptualisation. 
It is negative capability in which the individual is genuinely open to ‘learning from 
experience’; a psychic capacity which, for Bion, is the central aim of psychoanalytic 
practice. Green draws this aspect out of Bion’s writings, stating: 
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Basically, the analytic function is to lessen the persecution of thought by itself 
and on to itself by reaching a state unencumbered by memory, desire and 
understanding. This is reminiscent of the practices of oriental wisdom which are 
so popular nowadays. In the turmoil that our present world witnesses, it is 
certainly a tempting solution (Green 1973: 119). 
The reversal from Freudian thought here is drastic: rather than being in possession 
of declarative, secondary process knowledge about the contents of one’s 
unconscious conflicts, the healthy individual is in an outward facing stance of 
comfortable not-knowing: a position in which the mind is genuinely open as a result 
of being unencumbered by “thought by itself and onto itself” (ibid).  
In reading Bion, Green focuses on the importance of individual (whether they be 
analyst, patient or, as in his case, the reader of a text) not bringing preconceived 
ideas to bear on new experiences in a manner which precludes learning (Green 
1973). Yet a particularly important aspect of negative capability for psychoanalysis is 
to tolerate the fact that one cannot easily discern what is internally generated from 
what is given in experience, a common theme between philosophical (McDowell 
1996) and psychoanalytic (Winnicott 1971/2005) works. Since Klein developed the 
theoretical construct of ‘projective identification’, it can be argued that a post-
Freudian view of pathology has focused on the manner in which individual’s implicitly 
arranges the lump sum of their experiences into inside/outside and self/other 
dimensions (e.g. Sodre 2015: 41-55). Within the mentalization model ‘reflective 
functioning’ is heralded as a sophisticated process because it allows the subject to 
remain implicitly aware that she is attributing a thought or feeling to another, rather 
than simply experiencing her projection as a given fact (Britton 1998, Fonagy & 
Luyten 2009). As the ‘reality’ which psychoanalysis is invested in has become 
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increasingly interpersonal over time (see Greenberg & Mitchell 1983 and Chapter 
Three), ‘realistic’ thinking has increasingly moved into the realm of Winnicott’s 
‘transitional phenomena’ (Winnicott 1971/2005: 1- 35): the fact that one cannot 
directly access the minds of others entails that one must always be willing to tolerate 
the paradox of the object which is simultaneously found and created (Winnicott 
1971/2005). 
The relevance of ‘negative capability’ to the peaceful co-existence of internal 
and external reality has been drawn out by Brooke Hopkins (1984) in proposed links 
between negative capability and Winnicott’s creative play. As we have seen already, 
Winnicott’s notions of creativity and play are bound up with his understanding of 
experience as occupying a transitional space between internal and external reality. 
To live creatively within the realm of experience – to play – is to be successfully 
engaged in “the perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer reality separate yet 
interrelated” (Winnicott 1971/2005:3). Inner reality contributes in a healthy way to 
experience through a sense of self which is grounded in bodily feeling. Hopkins 
draws on Winnicott’s account of the development of the creative bodily self in her 
discussion of negative capability by linking it to the inherent bisexuality of individuals 
of both genders (Winnicott 1971/2005:107-109). This innate mix of the capacity for 
masculine activity and femininity being (existing without needing to take deliberate 
action) is what allows for the flexibility of play in which inner and outer reality can 
exist within the same experiential space without the tension of contradiction (Hopkins 
1984). This ability is what Keats was referring to in his discussions on imagination 
and negative capability: “it was precisely the nature of that “interweave,” the 
geography of that “intermediate area” that Keats set out to define and explore during 
this period. The result is a brilliant, if necessarily unsystematic, account of creativity, 
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of the conditions under which creative vision is possible (Hopkins 1984: 90). Keats’ 
focus on the ‘negative’ in negative capability emphasises the importance of an 
inactive female element in epistemological arenas. Winnicott’s writings therefore 
suggest a developmental perspective on an individuals’ capacity for negative 
capability: the passive, female element that is related to being with and not doing to 
(or being done to) is grounded in the infant’s ability to produce spontaneous creative 
gestures.  
This developmental perspective is important in accounting for the internal, 
subjective side of the “intermediate area” that Hopkins has linked with negative 
capability. Put more simply, it demonstrates how the internal world can offer a 
positive (rather than simply inevitable) contribution to experience and how this might 
contribute to a psychologically healthy epistemic attitude. It also offers a 
psychoanalytically oriented account of how negative capability might manifest in very 
early experiences of being: the infant, in directly experiencing himself in his own 
bodily feeling and the gaze of the caregiver, does not need to “irritably” reach for 
coherence of experience through the development of a precocious intellect.  
The themes expressed here follow several that we have seen across the course 
of this thesis. In many ways the healthy Winnicottian infant represents the ideal 
epistemological subject, managing to have ‘friction’ with objective reality without 
adhering unrealistically to coherent interpretive schemes or collapsing into 
senselessness (McDowell 1996, see Chapter Four). Furthermore, Winnicott’s notion 
of the affective self as contributing positively to experience corroborates the claims of 
the mentalization model that successfully reflective functioning springs from the 
‘agentive self’ (Fonagy et. al 2017a). 
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Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter I have aimed to flesh out my account of the ‘reality oriented’ 
imagination on an experiential level, adopting a phenomenological framework in 
order to draw out how this form of imagining can be understood as a means of facing 
the environment in a manner which is grounded in both affect and the potential for 
future action and also contains an epistemic dimension which can be captured 
through constructs such as ‘negative capability’ and ‘perceptual faith’. I will now turn 
to a discussion of the ‘reality oriented’ imagination as it specifically relates to 
language and communication.  
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Chapter Eight 
Truth, Trust and Interpretation: Re-assessing the Relationship between Language and 
Imagination in Psychoanalytic Theory 
The ‘reality oriented’ imagination as I have described it so far is both cognitively 
sophisticated and distinctly interpersonal; it represents the ability to envisage and 
hold in mind a range of possibilities about states of affairs that are not directly 
observable. This, arguably, lends it a high level of similarity with language. Symbolic 
language shares in common with the imagination the capacity to make the invisible 
visible and the absent present: it is potentially the most common way in which we 
transform internal mental states in external behaviour and come to know the minds 
of others. 
Throughout this chapter, I hope to argue that the ‘reality oriented’ imagination is 
not synonymous with language but, rather, is a precondition for language to perform 
a range of psychological functions which underpin psychological health. Language 
may be co-opted in the service of sound ‘imaginative’ functioning – it could, indeed, 
be the best available representational vehicle for ‘reality oriented’ acts of imagination 
in mature adult life – yet the two cannot be reduced to one another. In order for 
certain benefits of language to flourish, language itself must be experienced in a 
certain way: as the kind of thing which can meaningfully apply to the self and to 
others; working with the ‘healthy illusion’ that what people communicate about their 
intentions tends to be roughly truthful (Cavell 1993, Fonagy et. al 2016, 2017a, 
2017b). This in turn requires a substantial change in the psychological character and 
function of language proposed by Freud (See Chapters One and Two) by replacing 
the structuring force of language with its role as a vehicle of communication. Perhaps 
even more importantly, this view I am presenting also shifts the emphasis from the 
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particular to the global: where Freud was concerned with linking specific acts of 
unconscious activity with language as a means of lifting repression, the notion of 
epistemic trust (and its re-instantiation through therapy) is concerned with an 
individual’s psychological relationship to language and communication as a general 
phenomenon.  
In what follows, I will lay out the claim that there is a dimension of the ‘reality 
oriented’ imagination which applies directly to language and can ‘set the tone’ for 
how an individual will relate to spoken communication across their lifespan 
(Crittenden & Landini 2001; Fonagy et. al. 2016, 2017a. 2017b). It, too, has a set of 
developmental preconditions, which match those of a developing sense of self and 
agency: namely, being treated as an agent in an affective bond characterised by 
marked, contingent responsiveness (Fonagy et. al. 2002, see Chapter Six). This 
capacity for relating imaginatively towards language has been theoretically 
formulated through the notion of ‘epistemic trust’, an attitude of global faith in the fact 
that that what other people say regarding social and cultural phenomena is the kind 
of thing that can be generalizable to the self (Fonagy et al. 2016, 2017a, 2017b). 
Being in a state of ‘epistemic trust’ places one psychologically within a linguistic 
community which involves people with similar psychological experiences.  
The core of the argument outlined below can be captured in a clinical snapshot 
presented b Ana-Maria Rizzuto in her work “Freud and the Spoken Word” (2015) in 
which she describes what can be best described as a breakdown in the patient’s 
relationship with language and speech itself:  
Meanwhile, my patients were conveying to me some of their feelings about 
words. A young anorexic woman almost chanted a mantra in response to my 
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words, saying “Those are only words. They do not mean anything to me.” 
Similarly a woman in her forties with a twenty year history of binging and 
vomiting explained repeatedly with patient impatience, “This is like a play. You 
say your part and I say mine. But we don’t mean anything”. These patients 
taught me much about their conditions and showed me that a significant part of 
their pathology stemmed from emotional deprivation in their early relationships 
and in particular from disaffected patterns of communication in the family. 
(Rizzuto 2015: 4)  
Freud’s Theory of Language Revisited 
In Freudian psychoanalysis, language and reality oriented thinking share an intrinsic 
link. As we saw at some length in Chapter One of this work, Freud’s notion of 
conscious, ‘reality oriented’ thought (‘the secondary process’) is predicated on 
connections between ‘things’ and the words used to describe them; only when an 
unconscious ‘thing presentation’ is connected with its corresponding ‘word 
presentation’ can repression be lifted (Freud 1915a, 1923). The basic division of 
mental life into linguistic and non-linguistic ‘realms’ arguably began in Freud’s pre-
psychoanalytic work ‘On Aphasia’ (1891), where he first suggested that the internal 
structure of a linguistic representation is vulnerable to internal deconstruction (Freud 
& Stengel 1891). It then remained a key theme throughout his work: John Forrester, 
for example, has convincingly argued that Freud’s theory on the nature and causes 
of aphasia can be conceptually mapped onto his later work on hysteria (Forrester 
1980). While aphasia is a neurological condition which impacts the individual’s ability 
to use or understand language in general, hysteria is a psychologically motivated 
(and temporary) affliction that targets the representational structure of a particular 
idea that is causing an unsustainable amount of psychological conflict. In hysteria, 
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the idea which has been targeted for repression, as will be familiar, is broken down 
into components; its linguistic elements divorced from the other aspects which are 
then psychosomatically channelled (‘converted’) into a symptom (Breuer & Freud 
1895). One can only know that the internal coherence of the repressed idea has 
been re-established when it can once again be expressed through speech (Breuer & 
Freud 1895). As Freud’s psychoanalytic approach developed, he continued to use 
this general structure as a means of understanding both repression and the act of 
becoming conscious of an idea, which involves the disconnection and reconnection 
of word and thing presentations respectively (Freud 1915a, 1923).  
Forrester’s interpretation of hysteria in terms of Freud’s theory of aphasia could 
be criticised for failing to take into account the fact that during this phase Freud was 
still working within the confines of the pre-psychoanalytic ‘cathartic method’ (See 
Sandler 2007 and Chapter One) and would therefore have favoured speech as a 
means of discharging psychic energy, rather than structuring an individual thought 
processes in a more ‘realistic’ manner (see Rizzuoto 2015 for a full discussion of this 
argument against Forrester).However, irrespective of whether Forrester can be 
accused of misjudging Freud’s theory of language at the time of writing “Studies in 
Hysteria”, his observation holds for Freud’s later metapyschological works, in which 
rational-conceptual aspects of language adopt a prime position (Freud 1915a, 1923). 
We can see this general principle at play in Freud’s theory visual thinking: when 
asserting that mental imagery is a ‘lower’ form of thought, Freud does not focus on 
the fact that one cannot communicate via an image, but on the fact that images 
alone cannot represent the realistic causal and temporal links between ideas (Freud 
1923:21) see Chapters One and Two).  
294 
 
There are two features of Freud’s theory of language that Forrester’s analysis 
draws to light that are useful for the discussion at hand. The first, as we have seen, 
is the fact that Freud was interested in language as a mechanism of organising 
thoughts internally, rather than a means of accessing an external, social world (a 
characterisation which falls in line with the Freud’s position as an instinct theorist 
(Freud 1905b, 1924a, also discussed in Chapter Three of this work). Secondly, 
Forrester’s analysis arguably demonstrates that Freud’s psychoanalytic (as opposed 
to neurological) interest in language coincided with his shift away from analysing 
language as a global phenomenon and a corresponding movement towards the 
relation of language to particular ideas, belief, fantasies and memories. Between ‘On 
Aphasia’ and ‘Studies on Hysteria’ Freud could therefore be seen to ‘psychologise’ 
disturbances in the connection between thought and language by construing them as 
issues of specific psychic contents rather than general psychic function: while Freud 
certainly was of the opinion that linguistic ‘quirks’ exist in ‘normal’ non-aphasic 
individuals (see The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901) for a vibrant range of 
examples) these centre on the content of particular utterances, word-plays and 
parapraxes, and not the individual’s attitude towards language and communication in 
general.  
Freud’s focus on discrete instances of linguistic disruption may betray the fact 
that he took an individual’s psychological relationship towards language in general 
for granted in much the same way that he helped himself to the idea of 
straightforward epistemic access to the external world in perception (Schimeck 
1975). While the unconscious may have a distorting influence on both perception 
(e.g. transference (Freud 1912)) and language (e.g. parapraxes (Freud 1901)), 
Freud did not consider the inherent ambiguity in either process to be a source of 
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psychological disturbance. So far I have considered this idea at some length in terms 
of perception: theoretical and empirical advances from fields such as attachment 
theory and Bayesian neuroscience have demonstrated the mind/brain’s need to 
reliably predict events is central to healthy mental functioning, with 
psychopathological processes often representing a drastic need to hold onto 
predictability even at the expense of openness to ‘learning from experience’. (Clark 
2016; Hopkins 2016). While Freud demonstrates a clear awareness that unmediated 
perception is metaphysically impossible through his numerous references to Kantian 
philosophy (e.g. Freud 1915a: 171), he did not believe that this posed a practical, 
quotidian problem for the individual. A similar general principle can be seen to 
underlie Freud’s implicit philosophy of language. While unconscious processes may 
become manifest through speech and language, linguistic ability itself is thought to 
develop a in a relatively uniform and straightforward fashion across individuals 
(Freud 1895; Freud 1911). As a result, it does not really make sense within a 
Freudian paradigm to speak of an individual adopting a psychological attitude 
towards language. This, once again, provides an interesting point of contrast to 
contemporary approaches. As we shall see below, recent thinking from attachment 
and mentalizing perspectives often take an individual’s style of speech (such as its 
prosody) as indicative of distortions in thought and representation that provide a 
window into attachment styles and attendant vulnerabilities to psychopathology 
(Crittenden & Landini 2011). To take one example of many, Crittenden and Landini’s 
work on the AAI (Adult Attachment Interview) suggests that participants who give 
jumbled and overly detailed answers to questions about their childhood attachment 
figures tend to have a preoccupied attachment style (Crittenden & Landini: 15). 
Secondly, the notion of ‘epistemic trust’ which has been developed as part of the 
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mentalization approach argues that the capacity for sound mentalizing depends on 
the ability to experience language as a psychologically meaningful phenomenon 
(Fonagy et al. 2015, 2016, 2017a, 2017b). Individuals who cannot form a ‘trusting’ 
attitude towards the communication of others (taking linguistic utterances as a more 
or less reliable sign of unobservable thought processes) are considered to be in a 
state of ‘epistemic petrification’ which may underpin forms of psychopathology such 
as personality disorders (Fonagy. et. al 2015) .  
There is a clear parallel between the changing nature of perception in 
psychoanalytic theory and the changing nature of language. In both cases, 
contemporary views place an emphasis on the state of epistemological uncertainty 
that the individual finds themselves in; a position which is most pronounced when 
considered from a developmental perspective. As we saw in the discussion of 
Bayesian perception in Chapter Four, one of the more remarkable features of the 
perceptual system is its capacity to learn from its own predictive models, assessing 
the reliability of data with very little ‘innate’ knowledge to guide it (Clark 2016: 17). A 
similar principle can be seen to apply to the development of language, in which the 
child must build up a representational world ‘from scratch’ without the aid of any prior 
knowledge. In both cases, the mind begins with (close to) nothing, and must develop 
a system for ‘bootstrapping’ knowledge in a reliable way so that it can build and 
evaluate knowledge as it goes. The epistemological stakes are arguably higher in 
the sphere of language than in the sphere of perception: information can only be 
transmitted (communicated) to an individual indirectly through language whereas the 
transmission in perception is more direct. This is especially pertinent in the case of 
developing language to describe internal, psychological states (Fonagy et. al. 2015). 
As the inner mental states that psychological language aims to capture are 
297 
 
themselves unobservable, their successful communication relies on a much greater 
degree of trust than language used to describe the inanimate, natural world that is 
directly observable to both the speaker and the listener. This, I will argue, leads to an 
interesting set of social preconditions for linguistic communication to occur 
successfully, which have been recognised by philosophical and psychoanalytic 
communities (Davidson1967/1984; Cavell 1993, 2006). For instance, Donald 
Davidson’s philosophy of language and interpretation (which has been helpfully 
applied to psychoanalytic theory by Marcia Cavell) in which he argues that in order 
for communication between individual’s to even get off the ground we must start with 
the base assumption that what people believe and say is generally true and at least 
minimally rational (Davidson 1967/1984; Ludwig ed. 2006).I will suggest that some 
convincing links can be drawn between Davidson’s insights and the notion of 
epistemic trust, which support the general idea that the use of and understanding of 
language can only grow in ‘good enough’ interpersonal conditions in which people’s 
linguistic utterances do reliably match up with their internal mental states (Crittenden 
& Landini 2011). These ideas, taken together, challenge the Freudian notion that 
language takes on a psychopathological character when it becomes subject to the 
irrational structuring mechanisms of the ‘primary process’ and suggest, instead, that 
it suffers from a lack of integration with the ‘reality oriented’ imagination. Such an 
integration can allow linguistic behaviour, much like ‘reality oriented’ imagining itself, 
to become a prime arena for the kind of emotional learning that is thought to 
underpin successful affect regulation (Fonagy et. al. 2016; Hopkins 2016).   
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Speech and Attachment: The Dynamic Maturational Model  
Before returning to language and epistemic trust, it will be important to outline in 
more detail how language has been treated in the mentalization and attachment 
literature. Through doing this, I hope to strengthen my claim that linguistic 
representation itself is not sufficient for psychological health, it must occur in a 
certain way; namely, through the prism of the ‘reality oriented’ imagination. Although 
explicit dimensions of mentalizing can be seen to benefit from linguistic competence 
(although they are not necessarily caused by it), implicit and affective dimensions of 
mentalizing – those which I argued in the previous chapter are most intricately bound 
with a sense of self and agency – maintain an independence from language (Belsky 
& Shai 2011; Davidsen & Fosgerau 2015).  
It will be particularly useful to consider how individual’s come to form a 
relationship to language within an attachment context. In particular, the work on the 
Dynamic Maturational Model by Patrician Crittenden and Andrea Landini can 
demonstrate the importance of an attachment context, most notably the role played 
by feelings of trust and safety, on an individual’s affective relationship to linguistic 
representations and communication. Firstly, in line with the argument presented here 
it provides a variety of evidence in favour of the claim that an individual often forms a 
psychological ‘relationship’ to language and communication as general phenomena, 
rather than to an isolated mental event (e.g. a belief, a fantasy). Secondly, it can 
allow us to emphasise once more the difference between veridical experience and 
imaginative engagement by stressing the difference in kind between secure and 
insecure speakers. Secure speakers, as we shall see, do not provide a ‘positive 
counterpoint’ to insecure speakers but represent an alternative means of functioning 
that is based on openness to learning from experience (Crittenden & Landini 2011).  
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Before we look at the speech dispositions of various attachment styles, it is 
worth giving some theoretical background. Attachment theory, as I have outlined 
previously, began as a measure for ascertaining observable behaviour caused by 
the level of security that an infant feels around her attachment figure(s) (Bowlby 
1979/2005, 1997; Fonagy 2001). How, then, did this become applicable to linguistic 
behaviour? A potential response points to the fact that is normal for purely 
behavioural expressions to transform into a mixture of behavioural and linguistic 
expressions as the infant matures into a child. In this case, however, the continuity 
between the behavioural and linguistic expression lies in the content of the message 
expressed. The Dynamic Maturational Model, in contrast, analyses speech in terms 
of its style, looking at how speakers construct and convey meaning as a means of 
indirectly assessing their level of felt security. For example, the difference between 
preoccupied and dismissing attachments styles is not ascertained by what the 
speakers describe about their own attitudes towards attachment figures or how they 
present their childhood circumstances to the interviewer but, rather, by the degree to 
which speech is organized by affect or cognition respectively (Crittenden & Landini 
2011:15).  
Analysing speech in terms of style, it can be argued, allows for a much more 
nuanced and accurate analysis than could be gleaned from a consideration of 
linguistic content alone: it takes into account the fact that people not only distort 
information, but are usually unaware of the fact that they are doing it. Unlike the 
Strange Situation Scenario in which both caregiver and child are present and 
watched by a third (the researcher) no such ‘objective’ standpoint is possible within 
the Adult Attachment Interview and the interviewer must take into account the fact 
that the interviewee’s portrayal of both their childhood circumstances and their 
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reported affective response to it will contain numerous distortions. Looking at the 
way information is presented will not lead the researcher to a more accurate view of 
what an individual’s childhood circumstances were ‘really’ like, but they may flag up 
an individual’s particular ‘style’ of distorting information. Furthermore, by looking at 
the processes through which representations are formed, the Dynamic Maturational 
Model is able to demonstrate how unconscious schemas and strategies are formed 
at a great level of depth, highlighting how distorting factors can come into play prior 
to thought, in the preconditions that make mental activity possible.  
According to Crittenden and Landini, distortions in information arise in the 
form of dispositional representations: patterns of processing information that are 
strategic in so far as they dispose the individual to behave in a way that is 
(seemingly) adaptive to the situation at hand. Strategies for processing information 
can be seen to lead back to three evolutionary goals: to prevent danger to the self, to 
prevent danger towards one’s offspring and to exploit instances of sexual 
opportunity. For the purposes of the current discussion, the protection against 
danger plays an especially important role in highlighting how the conditions within 
which thoughts are formed shapes their content. Notably, representations are 
constructed more rapidly in situations where there is a perceived threat in order to 
meet the danger as quickly as possible. As we shall see shortly, secure or ‘balanced’ 
speakers are so called because they tend to integrate information using various 
formats of representation from a range of memory systems. Integration, as we saw 
previously (see Chapter Six), is a comparatively lengthy process which requires the 
individual to be a state where they do not feel under threat to reach a judgement 
quickly, allowing them to be in a state comparable to Keats ‘negative capability’ 
(Crittenden & Landini 2011; Hopkins 1984). Despite the fact that most grown adults 
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tend to adopt a range of dispositional representations (preferred processes), 
insecure individuals tend to be more consistent and less varied in their use of 
strategies than secure individuals as a result of feeling ‘under threat’ more often that 
secure individuals. The speed at which dispositional representations are formed by 
insecure individuals also prevents a satisfactory comparison of the current’s 
situations similarity to events in the individual’s past. In favouring self (or child) 
protection over openness to learning from experience, a judgment of similarity is 
likely to be assumed without the individual assessing whether this may only be skin 
deep. As a result, the approach of insecure individuals not only includes less 
representational variance within a schema or strategy, it also increases the likelihood 
that the same schema will be applied across a range of situations, even though for 
some of these it will inevitably prove maladaptive. As Crittenden and Landini state: 
“as threat increases, so does uniformity of strategy”48. 
Attachment styles, therefore, do not simply refer to an individual’s implicit set of 
beliefs but also to a differing attitude towards such beliefs. Secure individuals are 
more open to the fact that their initial appraisal of a situation may be wrong, allowing 
for a greater degree of flexibility than their insecure counterparts (see the relevant 
discussions in Chapters Three and Four). This flexibility, Crittenden and Landini 
have attempted to show, can be inferred from the way in which balanced adult 
speakers articulate themselves in an integrated fashion. But in order for us to fully 
understand how this attitude is cultivated in development, it is necessary not only to 
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formulate a theory of how people speak but also how they listen and interpret 
information. 
Language and Mentalizing: Epistemic Trust Revisited 
Language can be seen to play a prominent role in mentalizing in both its 
representational and interpersonal aspects. In so far as mentalizing occurs within the 
context of a relationship, it is concerned primarily with interpretation and 
communication, both which it has been claimed rely on the ability to form linguistic 
representations of psychological experiences (Fonagy et. al. 2002; Fonagy et. al. 
2015, 2017a, 2017b). As we have seen (Chapter Five), Fonagy and colleagues have 
proposed the construct of ‘epistemic trust’ to denote the general attitude that 
individuals adopt towards social communication (Fonagy et. al 2015, 2016, 2017a, 
2017b). Epistemic trust may play a key role in human psychological development for 
evolutionary reasons (Csibra & Gergely 2009). The fact that human beings can 
ascribe psychological states to themselves and others is a unique trait not shared by 
other animals, including higher primates; the same is true of symbolic language 
(Fonagy et. al. 2015) The linguistic advantage enjoyed by homo sapiens over other 
primates and Neathderthals allows for the widespread transmission of social and 
cultural knowledge across generations.  
Crudely speaking, there are two key routes to knowledge that we regularly employ: 
deduction and the appeal to authority. From an evolutionary perspective, the latter is 
both more efficient in terms of resources (it takes more time and effort to work out if 
something is true than to simply take it as such) and also inevitable at early points in 
life where we are dependent on others teaching us how the world is (Csibra & 
Gergely 2009; Fonagy et. al 2015). An attitude of epistemic trust within communities 
of homo sapiens is therefore to our distinct evolutionary advantage. As we have 
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already seen to some extent in Chapter Five, abuse, neglect and the ‘cumulative 
trauma’ of misattunement may lead, in extreme cases, to ‘epistemic petrification’: a 
state in which communication is understood in terms of its content but is not 
interpreted as having any emotional relevance to the self (Fonagy et. al 2015): 
In a state of epistemic mistrust, the recipient of social communication may well 
understand what is being expressed to him/her, but he/she cannot encode it as 
relevant, internalize it and appropriately reapply it. The consequence of this is 
that the regular process of modifying one’s stable beliefs about the world in 
response to social communication is closed down or disrupted. This generates 
the quality of rigidity and being ‘hard to reach’ that therapists have often 
described in their work in the field of PD (Fonagy et al., 2015). Change cannot 
be made because although the patient can hear and understand the social 
communication transmitted to them from the therapist, this new information 
cannot be accepted as relevant to them and generalizable to other social 
contexts. The persistent distress and social dysfunction associated with PDs is 
the result of the destruction of epistemic trust in social knowledge of most kinds 
(Fonagy et. al 2017, accessed online). 
Such a deferential attitude towards culturally transmitted knowledge, however, 
cannot be unbounded: we would not be successful species if we never critically 
evaluated the information imparted to us. Attachment theory shows us the extent to 
which we rely on our immediate caregivers to introduce us into the world of affective 
bonding and social interaction. Where factual knowledge may come from a variety of 
sources (such as school, other adults, the media) affective learning tends to be 
restricted to those on whom we emotionally depend. Knowledge of self and other 
gained in early interactions therefore runs a reasonable risk of not being transferable 
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to other social contexts (as what is adaptive in one social situation may not be 
adaptive in others). This is, in part, why successful attachment does not involve the 
automatic presumption that people are trustworthy but rather aims to evaluate 
situations based on their presenting features (Fonagy et, al 2015). In this regard, 
Fonagy and colleague’s work on epistemic trust can work alongside Crittenden and 
Landini’s work on language and attachment to grant a picture of a secure and 
healthy individual who is able to use language and communication as a prime arena 
of social and emotional learning, modifying their beliefs and perspectives in a 
manner that can aid affect regulation and, as a result, sound mental health.  
A Philosophical Context for ‘Epistemic Trust’ 
The view of language that ‘epistemic’ trust engenders has the benefit of being in line 
with contemporary philosophical insights. Over the course of two books The 
Psychoanalytic Mind (1993) and Becoming a Subject (2006) Marcia Cavell has 
drawn out the relevance of the philosopher Donald Davidson’s (2001) work on the 
connection between language, interpretation and mind to psychoanalysis. Cavell’s 
aim, broadly stated, is to work against the insular picture of the mental functioning 
which she argues often found in Freudian psychoanalysis towards a picture in which 
psychological meaning is dependent, in part, upon external interpersonal context. In 
many ways she can be seen as making a conceptual and philosophical case for the 
psychanalytic paradigm shifts that I have described in this work (Cavell 1993). 
Where her account does not hit the mark, I will argue, is in failing to account for the 
role of trust that I have emphasised throughout this work. Briefly considering her 
perspective will therefore allow me to conclude the argument presented here by 
bringing my position into sharper relief.  
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Although it is beyond the scope of this argument to do Davidson’s philosophy 
any justice, it will be useful to briefly introduce his theory of radical interpretation in 
order to ascertain how Cavell applies it to the mentalization model. Most relevant will 
be his notions of Radical Interpretation (Davidson 2001) and the Principle of Charity 
(ibid).  Piers Rawling introduces the notion of ‘radical interpretation’ by presenting the 
following scenario:  
You find yourself stranded on a desert island with one fellow castaway. You 
rapidly discover that you cannot communicate with her; indeed, perhaps it is not 
clear initially that she has a language. You must build up your interpretation of 
her, as an agent, from scratch. How is such radical interpretation possible? 
Insight into the answer to this question is apt to tell us something quite general 
about what it is to speak a language, and to be interpretable as a speaker- about 
what it is, in short, to be a linguistic being (Rawling 2003). 
The epistemological position that Rawling’s imaginary castaway finds herself in can 
be compared to the position of the infant or young child who is becoming initiated 
into a community of speakers (Cavell 1993, 2006; Davidson 2001; McDowell 1996). 
Davidson’s analysis is conceptual; he looks to establish what, in theory, would allow 
for radical interpretation rather than aiming to provide an empirical account of 
language acquisition in the same manner as the accounts discussed above 
(Davidson 2001; Ludwig 2003). Nevertheless, there is an important resonance 
between Davidson’s philosophy and the mentalization model, in particular the 
literature on ‘epistemic trust’ which argues that having a mind is a developmental 
achievement which is established through acts of interpretation (across various 
dimensions) of the minds and self and other. Perhaps most important is Davidson’s 
insight regarding the intrinsic link between belief and truth. Although as mature, 
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linguistically competent adults it is possible to be keenly aware that an individual’s 
beliefs may not accurately reflect states of affairs Davidson shows us that unless we 
apply the ‘Principle of Charity’ to others: unless we assume that they are rational 
agents whose belief system is largely in tune with how things are the in external 
world, the process of interpretation cannot even get off the ground (Davidson 2001).   
Marcia Cavell uses Davidson’s paradigm in her recent work ‘Becoming a 
Subject’ (2006) to show how the infant is taught what words mean by her caregivers 
through the process of triangulation: both parent and baby are looking at the same 
thing in the world, and the baby comes to associate the parent’s utterance with the 
object they are attending to. She then extends this to show how the baby learns to 
mentalize and thus self-regulate, although her argument appears to be based on a 
misunderstanding of the mentalization model. Looking at the nature of her 
misreading is interesting for the current argument because it highlights precisely why 
one must form an imaginative and trusting epistemological relationship with reality to 
be in good psychic health. Specifically, Cavell misses out the two-person 
developmental scenario in which the infant learns it has a self and a mind through 
caregiver’s marked mirroring (Fonagy et. al 2002). In contrast, Cavell places the 
development in the triangular relationship between the infant, caregiver and the 
outside world, implying that infants learn that others have minds through a 
Davidsoanian triangulation process. In short, infants see that the other sees the 
same world, but have a different perspective on it. As she argues:  
I would emphasise that an aspect of this triangulating process that Fonagy and 
Target perhaps take for granted: the ‘object’ in question is a real person with 
whom the child is in communication, about a real external world, with material 
objects in it. So modified, their view is this: the child needs the repeated 
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experience over time of seeing that her own mental attitudes towards something 
present to both her and an adult are recognized by the adult, and of seeing that 
the attitudes towards this same thing are different from the child’s. This same 
thing must be something clearly observable and common to the spatio-temporal 
world that they share” (Cavell 2006: 874) 
Later, she continues: 
The perception of something that is the same, outside both persons’ minds, is 
necessary for the perception that they are perceiving it or thinking of it 
differently; and those dual perceptions are necessary for the further idea that 
one of these perceptions may capture something about the object that the other 
perceptions do not (Cavell 2006:895) 
This analysis captures, to a certain extent, the role that the adult or older child may 
play in helping the young child integrate real and pretend modes of functioning in 
make-believe play (Fonagy et. al. 2002: 253- 291). Yet is does not grasp the process 
in which a sense of self and agency is formed through mirroring earlier in 
development (Fonagy et. al 2002: 145 – 203). What sets mirroring apart (indeed, 
what makes the term ‘mirroring’ so apt) is that it is trying to teach the infant about the 
unobservable internal world of the self within the context of a dyad in which no ‘third’ 
position is yet possible (see Britton 1998). It is an important part of this process that 
the entity that is the target for symbolization is not something outside the baby and 
the caregiver but is the mental states of the baby and the caregiver themselves. It is 
precisely the fact that there is no third, external referent which can be ‘objectively’ 
observed that places the subject in an epistemically vulnerable position where 
concepts such as ‘epistemic trust’ have a chance to take hold.  
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Conclusion 
Throughout this final chapter, I have applied my notion of ‘reality oriented’ imagining 
to issues regarding language and communication, arguing that contemporary 
approaches encourage a view in which individuals vary in the affective and 
psychological relationship they adopt towards language and communication. My 
view significantly challenges Freud’s presentation of language on two counts. Firstly, 
it rejects the intrapsychic structuring role of language in favour of one in which 
language, much like the ‘reality oriented’ imagination generally, is a means through 
which the individual has epistemic and affective access to the world. Secondly, it 
shifts the emphasis from the contents of particular linguistic utterances (such as 
parapraxes) towards the psychological function of language as a whole.  
The view of language presented above strengthens my account that sound psychic 
health requires the ability to form a sound epistemic relationship towards incoming 
information that is mediate through an individual’s capacity to trust.  
  
309 
 
 
310 
 
Conclusion 
Throughout this thesis I have aimed to demonstrate how an ‘epistemic turn’ in 
psychoanalytic theory leads to a renewed picture of the relationship between the 
subject and the external world, in which a sound epistemological relationship with 
reality can be seen as the basis for psychic health. I have proposed that the 
imagination, when construed as a ‘reality oriented’ force, can mediate this ideal 
epistemological relationship by combining a stance of ‘negative capability’ with a 
sense of self an active agent. When in a state of ‘reality oriented’ imagining, one is 
open to emotional and social learning in a manner that grants psychic health the 
active character that Winnicott calls for in “The Location of Cultural Experience” 
(Freud 1975/2005: 133).  
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